PSQ

Political Science Quarterly

PRE

SEP 26 1985
LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
14th & H STREETS
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68508

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Fall 1985

Sidney Verba
Gary R. Orren — The Meaning of Equality in America

William D. Anderson
Sterling J. Kernek — How "Realistic" is Reagan's Diplomacy?

Robert Grant — French Defense Policy and European Security

Charles Murray
Sar A. Levitan — Government Programs and the Poor: Two Views

William E. Hudson — The Feasibility of a Comprehensive U.S. Industrial Policy

Sidney M. Milkis — FDR and the Transcendence of Partisan Politics

Book Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

HUGH HECLO
Harvard University

ROBERT L. JERVIS
Columbia University

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

IRA KATZNELSON
New School for Social Research

LAWRENCE KRAUSE
The Brookings Institution

EVERETT CARLL LADD
University of Connecticut

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
The Lehrman Institute

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

JOHN R. PETROCIK
University of California, Los Angeles

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
The Urban Institution

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin-Madison

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

LEONARD SILK
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $25.00 a year. Three years, $58.00. Students, $16.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $35.00 a year. Foreign postage, $6.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 100 Number 3 Fall 1985

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Managing Editor
TILLY FRIEDMAN-LICHTSCHEIN

Manuscript Editor
JEAN HIGHLAND

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Photocopying articles

Up to fifty copies of individual articles in the *Political Science Quarterly* may be reproduced for classroom use without permission. For permission to reproduce more than fifty copies, please write the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.

Correct preparation of manuscripts expedites production and therefore contributors must observe the following requirements: Submit manuscripts in triplicate, all copy double-spaced including main text, quotations, and footnotes. Place tables, graphs, and numbered footnotes on separate pages at end of manuscript. Include an abstract of 100 to 200 words that specifies the article's main theme or conclusions. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index.* Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci,* the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index,* and *Book Review Digest.* A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $6.25. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Toll free number: 800-521-0600. One copy, $10.00. Additional copies, $1.50 each. Complete issue, $0.20 a page with a $20.00 minimum charge. All prices are subject to change.

Copyright © 1985 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 100
Number 3
Fall 1985

Contents

The Meaning of Equality in America — SIDNEY VERBA, GARY R. ORREN — 369

How "Realistic" is Reagan's Diplomacy? — WILLIAM D. ANDERSON, STERLING J. KERNEK — 389

French Defense Policy and European Security — ROBERT GRANT — 411

Government Programs and the Poor: Two Views
Have the Poor Been "Losing Ground"? — CHARLES MURRAY — 427
How the Welfare System Promotes Economic Security — SAR A. LEVITAN — 447

The Feasibility of a Comprehensive U.S. Industrial Policy — WILLIAM E. HUDSON — 461

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transcendence of Partisan Politics — SIDNEY M. MILKIS — 479

Book Reviews — 505

Reference Books and Source Materials Received — 537

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution — Richard W. Bulliet 505

Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography — Robert A. Divine 506

Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees; **Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Political Action Committees,** What Price PACs? — David Adamany 508

McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman — Alonzo L. Hamby 510

Pyle and **Pious,** The President, Congress, and the Constitution: Power and Legitimacy in American Politics — Louis Fisher 511

McCloskey and **Brill,** Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe About Civil Liberties — Shanto Iyengar 512

Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission — George L. Sherry 514

Hess, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices — Doris A. Graber 515

Tirman, ed., The Militarization of High Technology — Harvey Picker 516

Weintraub, Free Trade between Mexico and the United States? — Cathryn Thorup 518

Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939–1941, Volume VI — Thomas William Heyck 519

Borthwick and **Spence,** eds., British Politics in Perspective — Anthony King 520

Kindleberger, Multinational Excursions — Gustav F. Papanek 521

Segal and **Tow,** eds., Chinese Defence Policy — Steven I. Levine 523

Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession — Joel Glassman 524

Woolsey, ed., Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics — James G. Blight 526

Stohl and **Lopez,** eds., The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression — Thomas M. Callaghy 527

Smith, ed., The Higher Civil Service in Europe and Canada: Lessons for the United States — Joel D. Aberbach 528

Browning et al., Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics — Charles P. Henry 530

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Naison, *Communists in Harlem during the Depression* JOHN A. DAVIS 531

Rothenberg, The Neoliberals: Creating the New American Politics HARVARD SITKOFF 532

Ippolito, Hidden Spending: The Politics of Federal Credit Programs ELSIE M. WATTERS 533

Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy DWIGHT WALDO 535

Bell, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics CLIFTON MCCLESKEY 536

The Academy of Political Science
and the East Asian Institute of
Columbia University

will sponsor a conference on

THE PACIFIC BASIN:

New Challenges for the United States

11 November 1985

1501 International Affairs Building
Columbia University
New York City

Programs will be mailed to members of the Academy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

SIDNEY VERBA and GARY R. ORREN analyze American beliefs and values on the issue of equality, basing their conclusions mostly on a large-scale survey of American leaders. They demonstrate that American thinking about equality is multidimensional, explaining why conflicts over equality defy easy resolution.

WILLIAM D. ANDERSON and STERLING J. KERNEK dispute Ronald Reagan's notion that he practices realistic diplomacy. They characterize the President as a conservative romantic with an unrealistic vision of the world, a taste for hard-line gestures of power politics, but a talent for developing versatile rationalizations when he refuses to employ force.

ROBERT GRANT examines the tensions in French defense policy between the often conflicting goals of assuring the protection of French territory and of participating in the collective defense of Western Europe with France's allies.

CHARLES MURRAY examines responses to his book *Losing Ground*, which denied the efficacy of the governmental reforms of the 1960s in helping the poor. He argues that attempts to prove *Losing Ground* "wrong" have fallen short and offers some suggestions for exploring the causal issues that have been at the center of the debate.

SAR A. LEVITAN reflects on the American welfare system as it evolved over the years and contends it is a product of a sustained and successful drive for greater economic security by all income groups, not merely a vehicle for providing assistance to the poor.

WILLIAM E. HUDSON looks at the political prospects of several recent proposals for creating a national industrial policy. He finds the approach in these proposals politically flawed and suggests that incremental changes utilizing existing governmental institutions are more likely to improve America's industrial policies.

SIDNEY M. MILKIS focuses on the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, suggesting that the New Deal transformed the Democratic party by replacing party politics with governmental programs that executive branch administrators implemented.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Meaning of Equality in America

SIDNEY VERBA
GARY R. ORREN

In the United States, equality is a recurring theme. It has flared into a fervent moral issue at crucial stages of American history: the Revolutionary and Jacksonian periods, the Civil War, the populist and progressive eras, the New Deal, and the 1960s and 1980s. In each era, the legitimacy of American society is challenged by some set of people unhappy with the degree of equality. New claims are laid, new understandings are reached, and new policies for political or economic equality are instituted. But the equality issue endures outside these moments of fervor. Ideologies in favor of extending equality are arrayed against others that would limit its scope; advocates of social justice confront defenders of liberty. In the moments of egalitarian ascendancy, libertarians are on the defensive. In the moments of retrenchment, egalitarians cling to previous gains. And in either period the enemy is likely to be the "special interests" that have too much power. In egalitarian times, these are the moneyed interests. In times of retrenchment, these are labor or big government and its beneficiaries.[1]

The periods of fervor in American politics—the moments of creedal passion,

[1] For a fuller discussion of the debate about equality in American history see Sidney Verba and Gary R. Orren, *Equality in America: The View from the Top* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 21–51.

SIDNEY VERBA is the Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor, Harvard University. He is author and coauthor of numerous books including *The Civic Culture* and *The Changing American Voter.* GARY R. ORREN is associate professor of public policy, Harvard University. He has served as a consultant on public opinion polling to both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and written widely on American politics. Verba and Orren have recently published the book *Equality in America: The View from the Top* (Harvard University Press) from which this article is adapted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Samuel Huntington's words[2]—have usually been outbursts of egalitarianism. In part, the passion springs from the self-interest of those who would benefit from a more equal distribution of goods or political influence. But the passion also springs from ideology and values, including deep religious justifications for equality. The passion accompanying the discovery or rediscovery that ideals do not match reality is particularly intense when the ideal is as deeply felt as is equality. Yet there can be passion on the inegalitarian side as well. The self-interested passion to protect an established position may be even more powerful than the passion to redress inequality, though its expression may be more muted. Devotion to inequality may also be based on ideals, such as liberty, individualism, and the free market, which are no less ancient and venerable. Like the ideals of equality, these alternative ideals serve as yardsticks for measuring whether society has moved away from its true principles.

Historically, each of the political upheavals that spawned egalitarian reform also provoked antegalitarian backlash. The spirit of reform during Reconstruction dissipated in the face of spent political struggles, sluggish social institutions, and outright mendacity. Society's entrepreneurial energy was channeled into economic activity, and the courts failed to endorse many of the reformers' grandest visions. The egalitarian thrust of the Populists around the turn of the century inspired an antiegalitarian counterthrust over the next two decades.

The Reagan presidency, beginning in 1981, ushered in the latest spell of antiegalitarian fervor. Intellectuals—new and old conservatives alike—criticized the egalitarian thrust of previous decades. The Reagan administration tried to turn back the tide, with some success. The administration approached its task, in the tradition of American politics, by seeking to reduce the disparity between ideal and reality. The Reagan ideal, however, was found not in the egalitarian symbols of the Declaration of Independence but in the individualistic symbols of the marketplace. The biggest affront to American ideals was not the inequality produced by discrimination or uncontrolled economic fluctuations. Rather, it was the artificial equality imposed by institutions that interfered with the free market. American ideals would become closer to reality with the elimination of regulations, high taxes, and the nonmarket provision of social services. As Reagan put it, "the central political error of our time [is] the view that government and bureaucracy [are] the primary vehicle for social change."[3] The administration's arguments followed the well-trodden path of American political discourse against the power of special interests, in this case government, bureaucrats, and their clients for special programs. The purpose of the Reagan program, as one sympathetic observer put it, was to restore "incentives in our economy to produce income and wealth and raise the absolute level of income on average . . . and this in turn depends in no small measure on our ability to

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), chap. 5.

[3] *New York Times*, 10 May 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

achieve a degree of control over the exploding growth of transfer payment programs."[4]

The program was accompanied by a rise in inequality. Although the extent of the growing inequality and whether it derived partly from changing labor markets brought by changing technology are open to debate, the policies of the administration, stressing tax advantages for the relatively affluent and reductions in poverty programs, clearly widened the income gap between rich and poor.[5] In the ensuing controversy over the administration's approach, opponents of it argued that it was depriving individuals of the basic level of government support necessary for a decent life. But these opponents did not call for major income redistribution. They merely wanted the basic social protections of the welfare state to be maintained. Indeed, the Reagan administration upheld such a social safety net; it disagreed only on how much safety the net should provide.

The Role of Values

Thus, the equality debate goes on. Concern with that debate and with the concomitant beliefs about equality might seem irrelevant to people who hold that beliefs and values have little to do with the real conditions of equality or inequality. Indeed, the two dominant philosophies of resource distribution—free-market theory on the right, Marxism on the left—consider self-interest rather than ideology to be the driving force behind individual and collective behavior. They minimize the role of values and ideas, subordinating them to individual or class interests. Our view, however, is that values and the conflict over values play an important part in determining the nature and extent of equality. Ideas, after all, have consequences.

In recent years, there has been a steady accumulation of evidence that values are autonomous. One of the most compelling and counterintuitive discoveries of social science research over the last thirty years is that the influence of self-

[4] Michael J. Boskin, "Reaganomics and Income Distribution: A Longer-Term Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 5 (Summer 1982): 31–44.

[5] See John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Record* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984); Frank Levy and Richard C. Michel, *The Way We'll Be in 1984: Recent Changes in the Level and Distribution of Disposable Income* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, November 1983); Bob Kuttner, "The Declining Middle," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983, 60–72; Bruce Steinberg, "The Mass Market Is Splitting Apart," *Fortune*, 28 November 1983, 76–82; Robert J. Samuelson, "Middle-Class Media Myth," *The National Journal*, 31 December 1983, 2674–2678; Sheldon Danziger, "Poverty and Equality under Reaganomics," *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 5 (Summer 1982): 17–30. Although the data are somewhat sketchy, it appears that the middle class has been declining in size and more families are either in the upper or lower ends of the income hierarchy. Most of the above authors agree that the policies of the Reagan administration in cutting expenditures on such programs as welfare and food stamps and in changing the tax structure increased income inequality. Government transfers had been the main source of the modest reduction in inequality in the fifteen years before the Reagan administration; the Reagan cuts in these programs reversed the trend.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interest on most political thought and action is tenuous. Values do not merely rationalize action in accordance with self-interest. Often they arise quite independently of an individual's life experiences and in turn play an independent role in molding political behavior. Such behavior reflects people's group attachments, antipathies, and concern for larger purposes that transcend their own immediate situation. Thus, politics often resembles more closely the world of religion than the world of economics.

The evidence for this resemblance comes from a wide range of life experiences. Analysis has revealed that it is illogical for rational, self-interested individuals to volunteer for large-scale group endeavor. Yet the ubiquity of collective action in the United States suggests that people in fact pursue goals that transcend their self-interest. Attitudes toward the war in Vietnam were found to be linked much less closely to an individual's own experience with the war—such as personal or family involvement in military service—than to general views on foreign policy. Attitudes on busing to achieve integration were also found to be strikingly disconnected from individuals' own experiences with busing in their communities. What counted was their beliefs and values about busing. Similarly, business people's attitudes on foreign and defense policy were found to depend on their general liberal or conservative outlook rather than on how closely their business was related to defense.

The most consistent evidence for this disjunction between life experiences and politics is found in the economic sphere. Personal economic distress is only weakly related to political action. Being unemployed, for example, appears to have less impact on an individual's political values and behavior than does the individual's attitude toward unemployment. Perceptions of the unemployment rate or beliefs about unemployment policies affect individuals' votes more than do their actual experiences in the job market. Not that unemployment has no effect on attitudes or behavior; it is traumatic, affecting what people do and how they view their lives. But the effects tend to be encapsulated within the personal sphere; values and beliefs about public affairs occupy a separate realm. The findings in relation to unemployment are repeated for other economic matters. For example, people's own financial troubles affect their voting choices much less than do their views on the state of the national economy. Pocketbook politics takes a back seat to macroeconomic politics. This undoubtedly reflects the commanding importance of individualism in American values: people believe that they alone are responsible for their financial successes and that they, not the government, should shoulder the blame for their hardships. In short, self-interest based on personal economic circumstances is not as closely tied to political values and political behavior as might have been expected. Ideas and perceptions about public life are more potent.

These findings about the autonomy of ideas in the public are fully consistent with our own findings. To understand what Americans think about equality we surveyed a substantial sample of leaders from varied segments of American society. We chose leaders rather than average citizens, because they set the terms

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of public debate and play a significant role in determining public policy. The leaders we surveyed included top executives and labor leaders, as well as leaders of the major farm organizations. We also surveyed leaders of civil rights and feminist organizations in order to sample groups that challenge the system. And we included intellectuals, leaders of both political parties, leaders from the media, and a sample of future leaders—students from prestigious colleges. The leaders' views, in fact, encompass the full range of American opinion that is not beyond the fringe.[6]

Among leaders, ideas would be expected to have special potency, for leaders are better educated, more involved in political matters, and more articulate about them. In fact, our study shows that their values about political matters by no means reflect narrow self-interest.[7] One learns little about the equality attitudes of the leadership groups from their demographic characteristics; one learns a lot from their leadership positions. Nowhere is this clearer than in the comparison of the views held by leaders of the two political parties.[8] Their views on matters of equality are widely divergent, whereas their social and economic positions, and by implication their objective interests, are by no means as distinct. The group with the most consistently pro-equality stance, the feminists, is solidly middle-class and socially little different from other much more conservative groups.

The values of individual leaders on equality matters are best predicted by the social group they lead. But the different leadership groups are by no means homogeneous in their attitudes. This variation is not a function of the leaders' social characteristics. Income, for instance, which one would expect to be a powerful predictor of attitudes toward economic redistribution, has nothing to do with leaders' attitudes on the subject. What shapes the leaders' attitudes is their general values on equality. In contrast, views on the question of how wide an income gap between themselves and others would be fair depends much more on the leaders' own income than on their general ideology.

These facts are crucial to an understanding of the equality issue. Few issues so strongly affect the interests of so many people. To talk of more or less equality is to talk of policies that deprive some and advantage others: you win, I lose. To be sure, the clash over equality issues reflects the self-interest of the participants. Those in the leadership study who hold conservative ideologies about equality are likely to enjoy established and privileged positions, which they want to protect. Those who would supplant the existing distribution with a more equal one generally come from those segments of society most likely to benefit. But the clash over equality entails much more. It is also a clash over ideas, over the nature of a just society. And much as cynics may doubt it, the idea of what is just does not merely reflect what is self-serving.

[6] A detailed discussion of the leadership sample and how it was selected appears in Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*, 269–76.

[7] Ibid., 115–20, 172–80, and 211–14.

[8] Ibid., 52–70 and 124–47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Equality Puzzle

Equality values, whether formed by self-interest or founded on a sense of justice, are complex. This complexity has many roots. Chief among them are the tensions between competing ideals of equality (opportunity versus result), competing units of comparison (individual versus group equality), competing standards of judgment (reality versus ideal), and competing domains (politics versus economics). Furthermore, there is no single norm of equality. As our leadership study shows, different values may be applied, often by the same individual, in different domains. Michael Walzer has argued that the various spheres of equality should be separated to prevent any one from influencing or "contaminating" any other.[9] This separation finds support both among American leaders and, more generally, in American ideology about equality. Economic inequality is accepted and justified because it is believed to originate in the differences of talent and effort among individuals. Economic inequality falls into disrepute only when it intrudes too noticeably in other spheres, especially the sphere of politics. There are no laws setting a top limit on income, and leadership groups as well as the public at large oppose such laws. But there are laws limiting the extent to which individuals can use their financial resources in political campaigns. And such laws receive widespread approval. But while the isolation of one realm of equality from another may be a sound ideal for a just society, this separation is far from perfect in reality. Indeed, most of the real-world conflicts about equality and many of the difficulties in achieving equality in any single domain arise from the difficulty of keeping the domains of equality separate.

The various equality domains are linked in intricate ways. Imagine a Rubik's cube, each many-celled face representing a different aspect of equality. When the cube is manipulated so that the desired outcome, such as a certain pattern of colors, is achieved on one face, the other faces are thrown into disarray. Each adjustment on one face necessitates an adjustment on some other face of the cube—in some other domain of equality. Only the most adroit and complicated strategies have a chance of achieving acceptable outcomes in more than one domain at once.

So it goes in the real mechanism of the American economy and polity. One gear turns another; changes in the distribution of wealth inevitably affect the allocations of political power, and vice versa. Achieve one form of equality and another may be lost. Equalize income between two groups, blacks and whites, for instance, and the result may be greater inequality within the groups. Increase equality between men and women and risk decreasing it between blacks and whites. The domains of equality are connected by diverse and often obscure linkages; because of these linkages, American beliefs have far-ranging and unforeseen effects, which could lead to a rethinking of the beliefs themselves.

Given the complexity of the domains of equality and the interrelationships im-

[9] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 10–20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

posed upon them by the real world, American attitudes about equality are of necessity multidimensional. There are no egalitarians or antiegalitarians in any straightforward sense, for there is no single continuum along which to place their beliefs. Our leadership study isolated six issues upon which Americans might be more liberal or more conservative, each determined by a set of values considerably more complex than any simple "American ideology" might suggest.[10] There is not one equality issue, but many; not one set of beliefs about equality, but many.

The overlap of equality issues accounts for their salience on the American political agenda. Their complexity makes the United States at once the most and the least equal of modern democracies. Because no single aspect of the equality question dominates, the question is never fully resolved in favor of one extreme or the other. If this were not the case—if, for example, racial equality had clear priority over economic equality—American society would have a simpler normative structure and clearer issue choices. With one dominant issue, the conflict over equality would be more intense, but its conclusion would be swifter and surer.

In reality, however, the conflict is not nearly so linear, and thus it is not easily concluded. The resolution of one aspect of equality runs up against the continuing dispute over another. None of the issues of equality can be settled before settling them all, and to settle them all is unlikely, given the many contradictions in the concept of equality. Race issues crisscross economic considerations, and both overlap perspectives of gender and region. Therefore, American society can emerge neither clearly egalitarian nor clearly inegalitarian.

The complexity of equality is such that egalitarian forces within each domain are countered by inegalitarian reactions, and the intertwining of the domains creates further countervailing pressures. Three areas of struggle for equal treatment and equal position illustrate the different barriers that both channel that struggle and keep it alive: the conflicts over economic equality, over political equality, and among groups—especially racial and gender groups. In the political domain, Americans cannot decide who has power; in the economic domain they cannot decide who should have wealth. The groups face a reckoning of a different sort: they must decide whether they want to be equal as members of a group or as individuals.

Economic Equality

Nearly all issues of equality have an economic component. If income were equal across individuals, it would also be equal between blacks and whites, men and women. Furthermore, the main threat to political equality, the inequality of individual resources, would be eliminated. Income equality might be the key to equality in general, but it is unlikely to be achieved. Americans of every political

[10] Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*, 89–100.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Commitment to Income Equality by Liberal Groups in the United States

	Those who call themselves "far left" or "very liberal" among			
Commitment	*Democrats*	*Union*	*Blacks*	*Feminists*
Favor equality of results (%)	20	14	9	10
Favor equal pay (%)	26	23	23	25
Favor top limit on income (%)	45	32	22	37
Fair income ratio of executive/ elevator operator[a]	12.0	9.8	12.2	8.2
Proportion of group far left and liberal (%)	23	22	32	46

[a] The leaders were asked what would be a fair income for people in different occupations. The above ratio is based on what they thought the president of one of the top hundred corporations should earn compared to what they thought an elevator operator ought to earn.

stripe accept the premises of the capitalist system. They agree that rewards should be based on success in the competitive market; the distribution of wealth should be based on skill and effort. This belief system judges the competitive market to be highly egalitarian, and capitalism's compatibility with equality partly explains its attraction in America. The market is deemed egalitarian because it judges everyone in the same way—by how well they compete—with no reference to characteristics such as race or gender. Champions of the market as an indispensable adjunct to democracy argue rightly that it rejects the structured hierarchies of closed systems like feudalism. In practice, however, the market system, even in its own terms, is less than egalitarian. Opportunities are far from equal. Those who win at first are at a distinct advantage in further play. But the underlying premise that rewards can be widely disparate yet fair is generally accepted.

The findings of our leadership study are that some groups want more income equality, but almost none wants complete equality. Equality of results has few proponents among American leaders. Nor does any group want the government to put a ceiling on income. The most telling indication of this consensus against radical equalization occurs in attitudes toward income distribution. For example, even the group with the most egalitarian view of income considers a ratio of more than eight to one between the incomes of a top executive and an unskilled worker to be legitimate. Public opinion surveys similarly reveal little support for radical redistribution. These views are consistent with the income distribution that actually prevails. The United States is a far remove from the level of equality that has been achieved in many other industrialized democracies. Furthermore, income distribution in the United States has been remarkably stable for a long time. The consensus against redistribution hampers any radical movement toward greater equality.

Even though most leaders and citizens accept and even favor fairly wide income disparities, the United States might be pushed toward greater equality if

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Commitment to Income Equality in Sweden and the United States

Commitment	*Social Democrats (Sweden)*	*Democrats (U.S.)*	*Blue-collar union (Sweden)*	*Union (U.S.)*
Favor equality of results (%)	21	9	14	4
Favor equal pay (%)	58	12	68	11
Favor top limit on income (%)	44	17	51	13
Fair income ratio of executive/dishwasher in Sweden and executive/elevator operator in U.S.	2.4	15.2	2.2	11.3

a small and articulate vanguard of leaders held more radically redistributionist views. But there is no such group. Even among feminist, black, union, and Democratic party leaders—the leaders most critical of the current distribution in the United States—radical views are few. Such views are strikingly absent even among the members of these groups who consider themselves to be "far left" or "very liberal." About one-fourth of Democrats and union leaders, one-third of blacks, and close to one-half of feminists so label themselves. Their stance on income equality, as shown by their views on redistribution, is hardly radical (Table 1). In no case do as many as a quarter endorse strong redistribution on the issues of equality of opportunity versus result or of differential versus equal pay. There is more support for a top limit on income, a policy that still would not preclude wide income differentiation, but in no group does a majority support this position. Most revealing are the desired income ratios between the top and bottom earning categories.[11] All are substantial. None are sharply different from the responses expected from the more conservative groups.

This evidence might seem to reveal little about what makes American leaders distinctive. Strict income equality is perhaps such an extreme proposition that one would expect little support for it anywhere, at least in any country that upholds personal freedom and individual development. Furthermore, if income gaps are needed to drive economic productivity, as many sociologists and most economists argue, one would be surprised to find informed opinion anywhere favoring radical redistribution. However, opposition like that found in the United States to income equality is not universal, even in democracies. Consider Sweden, which is a democratic system with a working economy.[12] Comparison of the views of two sets of American leaders with those of their Swedish counterparts—Democratic party leaders in the United States with Social-Democratic party leaders in Sweden, and union leaders in the United States with

[11] See footnote a in Table 1 of this article. For a full discussion see Ibid., 148–80.

[12] A comparison of data for the United States and Sweden (as well as Japan) will appear in Sidney Verba, Donald Ferree, Ikuo Kabashima, Steven Kelman, Ichiro Miyake, Gary Orren, and Joji Watanuki, *Equality: A Comparative Perspective* (in progress).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders of the largest Swedish labor federation—reveals striking differences (Table 2). The Swedes do not endorse full equality of result, but equal pay is supported by over half of the party and union leaders. And the acceptance of a top limit on pay is fairly wide in Sweden. More revealing, the proper income gap between top and bottom earners—between top executives and dishwashers in Sweden and top executives and elevator operators in the United States—differs sharply. The ratio between top and bottom earnings considered to be fair is a little over two to one in Sweden, compared with ratios of more than eleven to one in the United States. The Swedish leaders do not want full equality, but their views depart startlingly from those of their American counterparts.

This comparison may be somewhat misleading, since the groups in each country are not equivalent. The Democratic party represents a broader coalition than the Swedish Social Democrats. Furthermore, unions in the United States include blue- and white-collar workers, while the Swedish union is blue-collar. Swedish leaders thus represent a more radical segment of their society than American leaders of theirs. The gulf between American and Swedish attitudes is highlighted dramatically by the views of conservative Swedish leaders. Even the least egalitarian leaders in Sweden, those of big business, are considerably more egalitarian not only than their business counterparts in the United States but also than the most radical American groups. When asked about the proper earnings ratio between a top and bottom earner, Swedish big business leaders suggest a ratio of 4.7 to 1. The parallel business group in the United States endorses a ratio of 26 to 1. More striking is the fact that Swedish business leaders are sharply more egalitarian than any group in the United States, including left-liberal groups. Few American leaders take as egalitarian a position on the proper gap between top and bottom incomes as does the average Swedish business leader. In sum, American leaders stand out in their lack of support for radical redistribution.

Attitudes and preferences, though abstract in themselves, have practical implications. The acceptance in principle of wide income differentials affects actual differentials through both private and public policies. Earnings for various occupations are set in the private sector. These earnings reflect market forces, union bargaining power, and the like. But some earnings, particularly the executive earnings at the top, which set a boundary for the income gaps, reflect norms as to what is appropriate.

The broad consensus against radical redistribution also affects actual earnings through its effect on public policy. It is not that there is no controversy over public policies relating to equality, but the consensus sets the boundaries of that controversy. The controversy exists despite Americans' ideological acceptance of the market system, because the market is imperfectly egalitarian, even in its own terms. All may begin at the same place with equal opportunity, but those who succeed in the first round will parlay that success into second-round advantages for themselves or their children. This is where politics enters the picture. Those who are successful in the market can then use their new wealth to protect their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gains. Success is converted into privilege through laws that favor the accumulation of wealth, such as tax programs that are generous in their treatment of capital gains or inheritances.

The market, moreover, has never been fully open and free. Despite Americans' individualistic ideology, competition has often been limited through discrimination. Blacks and women are the most obvious examples, but other groups have suffered as well. The group that is denied an equal start in the race labors under a severe handicap.

The market's failure to live up to its own ideals fuels policy controversy. The agreement among leaders on the market norm of equality of opportunity carries with it a good deal of disagreement over the extent to which the United States lives up to that norm and, in turn, the extent to which the government should interfere with the workings of the market. The policy controversy, however, remains within bounds set by the broad value consensus. The American public largely accepts a government-supported floor under income, but only so long as the floor consists of a government guarantee of a job so one can earn that minimum. American leaders, even the most egalitarian ones, similarly opt for measures to increase equality that are consistent with the norm of opportunity.

That actual policy proposals for increasing income equality, even somewhat radical proposals, tend to fall within the domain of equality of opportunity is illustrated by the controversy over "comparable worth" compensation. In what many consider a radical proposal, feminists and some unions insist that equal pay for equal work be replaced by equal pay for work in different jobs of comparable worth. The purpose of the proposal, which has received some support in the courts, is to eliminate the pay bias remaining from the days of sex-segregated jobs whereby "women's work" receives less pay than jobs of comparable skill and responsibility that are reserved for men. This proposal may be radical, but it harmonizes with the ethic of opportunity. The goal is not to reduce the income gap between the top and bottom of the earnings hierarchy. Rather, the goal is the typically American one of reconciling earnings with skill and effort—a goal fully consistent with the American dream of equal opportunity.[13] In sum, a turn toward a more radical economic egalitarianism in the United States is unlikely, because it would go against widely held values.

Political Equality

The obstacles to political equality are different from, but no less significant than, those constraining economic equality. One obstacle is the mutual rein-

[13] Tamar Lewin, "A New Push to Raise Women's Pay," *New York Times*, 1 January 1984. Aside from the argument that it is difficult if not impossible to define and measure "comparable worth," the opponents also phrase their opposition in opportunity terms. As a Justice Department lawyer who opposed the proposal put it, "If the women with low-paying jobs had an equal opportunity to work at the jobs with higher salaries but never took advantage of that opportunity, if they never sought the higher paying jobs, where's the discrimination?" *The New York Times*, 22 January 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forcement of economic and political inequality; money is converted into political influence. A more equal polity may elude Americans without a more equal distribution of economic resources. But the impetus for economic leveling may be hard to find. There is little desire for radical redistribution even among the more radical groups and even less among groups whose affluence gives them more political clout. Economic equality is hard to achieve, both because few want it and because those who want it least have the most say. This in turn affects the political system, as economic inequality becomes political inequality, which makes the antiredistributionists more politically potent—thereby closing the circle.

In politics the norm is more egalitarian. Traditionally, Americans object more to differing levels of political influence than to differing levels of affluence. Violations of a one-person, one-vote rule or gross variations across individuals in campaign contributions are offensive. Americans have tried to limit these inequities by law. If they cannot and do not want to equalize income as a means of equalizing political influence, perhaps the solution is to insulate politics from economic inequalities—to keep politics, in Walzer's terminology, in its proper "sphere of justice." This is, in a sense, the logic behind laws eliminating the poll tax or limiting each citizen, rich or poor, to one vote. As the Supreme Court put it in declaring the poll tax unconstitutional, a state "violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or the payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualification has no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax."[14]

Equalization of political influence by severing its connection to economic resources may be a more promising approach than attempting to establish political equality on a base of economic equality. This insulation might in turn bring about greater economic equality. If the polity were equal—if no bias were built into the system in favor of the affluent—more extensive governmental intervention aimed at economic equality might then follow. Even if it did not, this fact would reflect more certainly the preferences of the American public as expressed through an equal political process than the preferences of the better-off as expressed through the workings of a skewed political process.

Such insulation, however, is probably impossible. Given the wide disparity of economic resources, they cannot easily be prevented from leaking into the political realm. A transfer of economic resources into politics can take place directly or indirectly. Direct transfer is hard to control; indirect is even harder.

Consider the direct use of economic resources in politics:

Income/wealth→Political influence

This takes place when an individual spends money on election campaigns or in other ways directly employs economic resources to influence political outcomes. Controlling such use of money is daunting. In the first place, appropriate legisla-

[14] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice; Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections* 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion is hard to pass, and once passed, it is often ineffective. The Campaign Finance Act, for instance, was slow in coming and mixed in result. In the second place, controls on the use of money in politics may run up against the First Amendment. Witness the Supreme Court's decision allowing individuals to spend freely on their own to support candidates.[15] If it is legitimate to have a disparity in income or wealth, it is legitimate to use that wealth politically.

Although direct controls over spending may be hard to achieve, they are much easier than controlling the indirect effect of unequal resources. The wealthy are more likely to be highly educated, to be informed about political matters, to feel that they can influence politics, and to be acquainted with people in politics or in the media. They have, in short, more resources and stronger motivation than do the less affluent. The effect is indirect:

Income/wealth→Education/skills/motivation→Political influence

The assets found among politically influential citizens, including money, education, political involvement, information, a sense of competence, and connections, are linked: wealth buys education, which fosters motivation that leads to acquiring information, and so on. Public policies could help to equalize matters by bestowing some of these assets upon the less affluent. Such policies might include free public higher education, campaigns to increase citizen motivation and awareness, open public hearings, ombudspersons, and poverty lawyers. These policies might help motivate some people who would otherwise be inactive and might instill political activism in those at lower levels of motivation and resources. It is unlikely, though, that they would fully redress the imbalance. Stronger policies would be needed to limit the use of the resources and the motivation of advantaged citizens. But such policies might be impossible to reconcile with democratic rights.

All this saps the practical effect of the norm of equality in politics. In the economic sphere equality is seen as opportunity, and the result is stratification in wealth and income. Equality in the political sphere, in turn, cannot defend itself from the effects of economic inequality. As long as wide disparities in economic position are legitimate and individuals are free to participate in politics, the translation of economic advantage into political advantage will be hard to limit.

A further obstacle to insulating politics from economic inequality is the unevenness of perceptions. In the absence of a metric for determining who has most political influence, the exact degree of inequality in the political system remains unclear. In the few cases where inequality is noticeable and measurable, there may be attempts to eliminate it. As Robert Dahl has pointed out, Americans would be outraged if asked to accept a three-tier system of voting as in pre-World War I Prussia, where the value of the vote varied sharply across social strata.[16] Similarly, gross disparities in campaign contributions, because they

[15] *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

[16] Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 174.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are observable, are subject to egalitarian attention. After these inequities had become especially blatant around the time of Watergate, attempts were made to reduce them. However, political activity and influence assume a myriad of forms, some more visible than others. Differences in political influence are easily obscured and, therefore, likely to be overlooked.

This means that political equality is elusive even if all agree that it is desirable. Each group would find the others' definition of an equitable distribution to be quite unfair.[17] For instance, labor and business might agree that America should move closer to the goal of equal political influence but they would march off in opposite directions. Furthermore, we find that the inconsistent perceptions across groups are not fully symmetrical. They tend to be biased against the disadvantaged. The more established groups, especially business, rely on less overt forms of political activity which they may not even consider to be political. Though more politically active, they tend to be less visible in their activity than the disadvantaged groups. They are thus more likely than other groups to underestimate their own influence. Less advantaged groups, lacking routine inside channels, engage in more conspicuous activity. Thus, whatever influence they have is fully acknowledged and perhaps overestimated. Business, for example, considers consumer groups to be more influential than business.

Even if each individual and group could be audited and its share of "Gross National Political Influence" measured, and even if all Americans agreed that influence shares should be equal, there would still be debate on the issue of which units should be equal. It makes a difference whether all individuals, or all significant social groups, are to have equal influence. Even if each individual could be given an equal amount of political influence—such as one person, one vote, if only voting counts; or one person, one unit of participation, if there is some more general metric of influence—each individual might not be guaranteed to feel equally influential. Members of minority groups, who are in the minority on most issues, would feel disenfranchised. One person, one vote is not a comforting principle for black Americans, who would be politically disadvantaged for all time if the issues they care about pitted one race against the other. They might want special guarantees, such as a veto over legislation that is damaging to them, or other provisions recognizing a special status. At that point, one person, one vote ceases to be the generally accepted equality principle. It is replaced by some form of group-based equality.

But this kind of equality raises other difficulties. Equality among groups is all but impossible to put into operation. There would be no easy agreement on which groups to make equal, whether classes, races, ethnic groups, or sexes. And equality among groups would receive the opposite criticism from equality among individuals: members of large groups would be deprived of political influence. Like citizens of large states in matters of senatorial voting, their individual votes would count less.

[17] Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*, 181–217.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The political road to equality contains deep potholes. The spillover effects of economic inequality, as well as the differences in perception, counteract the pressure that the general consensus on equality would otherwise exert. This is unfortunate from the point of view of social harmony. Political inequality creates especially sharp resentments. For one thing, it does violence to deeply held norms. For another, because political conflict is constant-sum, or is perceived to be so, inequality in politics is particularly damaging to the actor who feels disadvantaged, and all actors see themselves as disadvantaged.[18] Self-perceived disadvantage raises the political stakes. It makes political equality harder to achieve; groups and individuals are unwilling to yield influence to others, for that would mean worsening their own position. Thus the constant-sum nature of political influence makes both political equality harder to achieve and political inequality more damaging to social harmony.

Group Equality: The Divided Voices

Neither the economic nor the political route to equality is promising. But there is another route. The drive for equality in America has been more intense when more narrowly directed toward specific groups. Here there is a passion for equality unlike the ambivalence associated with the drive for economic equality. The strength of campaigns for equality by particular groups and the weakness of more general movements for income equality are not unrelated. Equality in America has by definition always involved equality among individuals in the opportunities open to them. Furthermore, class conflict based on economic position has never been as pronounced as conflict based on other social characteristics, such as race or ethnicity. This suggests that Americans think in terms of both individuals and groups. Indeed, the two modes of thought about equality are not contradictory. The serious group-based conflicts in the United States, whether on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, region, or more recently gender, have crosscut economic differences. In this way, they have diminished the importance of class as an organizing principle of social conflict. Thus, economic equality is relegated more to individual than to class competition.

One paradox is that despite the American individualistic ethic, effective egalitarian movements are likely to be based on group distinctions. Theodore White has described the strategy of blacks in the 1984 election as one designed to "transform the traditional credo of American politics, 'equality,' into the credo of 'group equality' . . . what blacks want most is public acceptance of equality, not only on the basis of individual merit, but the group results and group shares." The rising forces include not only blacks but women, homosexuals, and groups emerging from the new waves of immigration and

[18] Ibid., 181–221 and 229–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ethnic pride.[19] These forces, though especially potent in 1984, are certainly not new. They represent the latest version of the group-based claims to equality that have always been a counterpoint to the dominant individualistic theme.

The race for the presidency in 1984 provided a stage for lively debate over group equality. White, a veteran campaign chronicler, anticipated that as the campaign drama unfolded, its underlying plot would be the "testing . . . of the meaning of the word 'equality,'" with blacks and women playing leading roles.[20] With the first serious black candidate seeking a party's presidential nomination and the first woman running on a major party's presidential ticket, 1984 was a watershed in group political gains. Significantly, the announcement of the selection of the first woman vice presidential candidate was couched in language that put it squarely within the American equality ethic. Opponents criticized the selection of Geraldine Ferraro, implying that it was not based on merit, even charging that it was a case of affirmative action.[21] The Democrats claimed that the motives were egalitarian, but individual not group-based, reflecting the norm of equal opportunity rather than equal result. At the announcement ceremony Ferraro said, "American history is about doors being opened, doors of opportunity, for everyone no matter who you are as long as you're willing to earn it." Vice President Mondale praised his running mate as a person who "earned her way here today. Our message is that America is for everyone who works hard and contributes to our blessed country."[22] Other equality issues formed subplots of the campaign, including the Democratic attack against Reagan's generosity to the rich and unfairness to the poor, and the counterattack which portrayed Walter Mondale as the captive of special interest groups.

If the drive for equality continues, it may come from an alliance of disadvantaged minorities rather than from a broad majority of the less affluent. An alliance of equality-oriented minorities, each with its own agenda, seems more workable than an equality-oriented coalition including the less affluent 51 percent of the population. The less affluent coalition would be so diverse in other ways, and indeed in income, that it would lack sufficient cohesiveness and motivation to be effective.

But the prospects for an alliance of disadvantaged groups, each with its own grievance somehow related to equality, are mixed. The three challenging groups in our leadership study—blacks, feminists, and labor—each representing different equality constituencies, could together form a general equality coalition; indeed they already function as such on many issues. The concerns that bind them together tend to be economic. The three groups are close in their sup-

[19] Theodore H. White, "New Powers, New Politics," *New York Times Magazine*, 5 February 1984, 22.

[20] White, "New Powers, New Politics," 51.

[21] Comments by Ronald Reagan, *New York Times*, 14 July 1984; and Patrick Buchanan, ABC-TV "Nightline," 12 July 1984.

[22] *New York Times*, 13 July 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

port of New Deal policies.[23] They cluster together in favor of a more egalitarian distribution of income across occupations. When economic controversies arise, such as those over the Reagan administration's proposed tax changes or cuts in social welfare programs, these groups can be expected to line up together.

As an equality coalition, however, these groups have weaknesses. For one thing, each has its own set of priorities. Economic issues hold them together, but on core issues, the alliance disintegrates.[24] Blacks rate racial equality just below jobs in importance, much higher than do the other groups. Labor puts racial equality quite far down on its list, below crime reduction, national defense, and other issues. Feminists rank racial equality higher than does labor but closer to the middle than to the top of the list. As for gender equality, blacks and union leaders rank it near the bottom of their priorities. In sum, an equality coalition might be held together by economic concerns, but because the equality issues that animate blacks and feminists differ, they are not effective political adhesives.[25]

Relations among the three challenging groups are uneasy largely because the different themes of equality tend to clash. Racial equality may conflict with gender equality when choosing goals for a jobs program or an affirmative action campaign. Gender or racial equality may conflict with economic equality if the basis for special social programs is gender or race rather than poverty. Poor white males, for example, may wind up worse off while somewhat more affluent women or blacks take advantage of the programs. And labor leaders' desire to help their own clientele may conflict with gender, racial, and even economic equality insofar as unionized workers are disproportionately white, male, and well-paid. The permutations of conflict are almost endless. In the 1984 primary election campaign, Jesse Jackson echoed a frequently heard criticism of the women's movement when he chided black women for supporting a movement that speaks for the narrow interests of "upper middle-class white females."[26] Here class, gender, and race are all intertwined. The promise of an effective merger of the challenging groups begins to erode when these conflicts appear.

One organization that is in a strategic position to assemble an equality coalition is the Democratic party. The several egalitarian interest groups are all overwhelmingly committed to the Democratic party. Moreover, the major parties are hardly identical on the issue of equality. Even if they offer no coherent ideologies opposed to one another, differences on equality appear at all party levels—among organizational leaders, elected officials, partisan identifiers, and voters.[27]

[23] Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*, 105–109, 120–23.

[24] Ibid., 105–15, 120–23.

[25] Labor, civil rights groups, and feminist groups form a liberal coalition on issues of manpower policy and employment, but each group has a more central set of priorities that limits its commitment on that issue. Kay L. Schlozman and Sidney Verba, *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class, and Political Response* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[26] "Sexism vs. Racism," *The Boston Globe*, 18 January 1984.

[27] Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*, 124–47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The differences are confirmed in opinion surveys, official platforms, and congressional voting. And they cut across the equality domains of race, gender, and economic well-being.

In this sense, equality appears on the public agenda as a thoroughly partisan issue. There are substantial differences between the two parties. Economic inequality would be significantly diminished in the United States if the nation had an income gap of the magnitude desired by Democratic rather than Republican leaders. Nevertheless, Democratic leaders, even those who describe themselves as most liberal, do not opt for extreme egalitarian distributions, nor do they favor such radical measures as hiring quotas. They are not ready to spearhead an equality coalition.

In addition, the divisions within the Democratic party confuse its stand on equality. If economic equality were the only equality issue on the agenda, the position of the Democratic leaders would be as simple as that of the Republican leaders. Democratic leaders stand on the liberal side of the fence on economic issues, quite close to their most potent allies, labor leaders. Black and feminist leaders fall somewhat further to the left of these issues, and the Democratic public somewhat further to the right. The gaps among the groups are moderately wide, which may cause problems for party leaders trying to balance the positions of their black and feminist allies and their mass support groups. But the problem is eased by the fact that the mass of Democratic supporters, though nearer the center than the Democratic leaders, are still much closer to the leaders of their own party than they are to the Republican leaders. If both Democratic and Republican leaders presented policy positions consistent with their own views, Democratic voters would, on that basis at least, be drawn to the Democratic party.

The Democratic position is complicated by the fact that the positions of the groups allied to it are quite inconsistent one with another across the other equality issues. In particular, labor divides from blacks and feminists on race issues, while both blacks and labor divide from feminists on gender issues. This makes it difficult for Democratic leaders to take positions that satisfy their disparate allies. Furthermore, on these two concerns, the majority of Democratic supporters are in fact closer to the Republican leaders than to the Democrats.

In all three equality domains, then, the positions of Democratic leaders are quite distinct from those of Republican leaders. In this sense the parties do offer alternatives to the public. But the range of these alternatives is restricted, particularly in the economic realm. Furthermore, an equality coalition in the Democratic party would be a most uneasy one, with the allied groups pursuing divergent equality agendas.

CONCLUSION

At first blush, the American ideology toward equality appears straightforward. It does not take an Alexis de Tocqueville or a Gunnar Myrdal to ascertain that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the nation is fundamentally concerned with equality. Americans approve of equality and actively seek it through the powers of the state and the actions of individuals. It is the *form* of equality that arouses debate. For a nation so taken with equality, there is a striking degree of contention over the goal. Americans can agree on equality only by disagreeing on what it means.

Different facets of equality have vied for political attention throughout American history. There has been calm, and there has been conflict; there have been advances and retreats. The historical struggle over equality traces a pattern that seems to have no end. There are boundaries to the extremes of equality and inequality precisely because there are few boundaries that define and constrain the American social structure. That structure is porous: classes meld, hierarchies shift, the economy permeates the polity and vice versa. When one form of equality is advanced or rebuffed, there are reactions in equality's other domains; new claims are forwarded, and new defenses thrown up, as the balance is struck once again.

The future will doubtless bring more conflict but little more equality. There is no relentless march to the perfectly egalitarian society, for there can be no such society. As Samuel Huntington has observed, to have faith in all forms of equality is incoherent. Yet Americans do not have an ideology that assigns clear priority to one value over any other. At every historical juncture where equality was an issue, its proponents failed to do all that they had set out to do. By the same token, the swell of conservatism embodied in the Reagan administration will find its limits too. Swings in the equality of social conditions are restrained not just by institutional obstacles but by fundamental conflicts of values that are a traditional element of American politics. Faith in the individualistic work ethic and belief in the legitimacy of unequal wealth retard progression to the egalitarian left. As for contemporary conservatism, the indelible tenet of political equality firmly restrains the right. A swing to the right does not eliminate America's commitment to the disadvantaged. In seeking equal opportunity over equal result, Americans forego a ceiling, not a floor. Americans may amend the uneven distribution of affluence and influence, but they will not abolish it. Intense conflict within narrow confines will remain the hallmark of the American politics of equality.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How "Realistic" Is Reagan's Diplomacy?

WILLIAM D. ANDERSON
STERLING J. KERNEK

Ronald Reagan has cultivated the notion that he practices realistic diplomacy. On 17 July 1980, in his acceptance speech before the Republican National Convention, he asserted that the Carter administration lived "in the world of make-believe." Then he added that "you and I live in a real world, where disasters are overtaking our nation without any real response from Washington."[1] On 16 January 1984, Reagan delivered a major address in which he identified "realism, strength and dialog" as the three principles guiding his foreign policy. "Realism," in his view, "means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in."[2] On 21 October, in his second televised debate with Walter Mondale, Reagan asserted that "in dealing with the Soviet Union one has to be realistic." Then he went on to say that "Mr. Mondale in the past has made statements as if they [the Soviets] were just people like ourselves, and if we are kind and good and did something nice, they would respond accordingly, and the result was unilateral disarmament."[3]

[1] Presidential Nomination Acceptance Address, 17 July 1980, reprinted in *A Time for Choosing: The Speeches of Ronald Reagan, 1961–1982* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983), 229.

[2] Reagan's Address to the Nation, U.S. Allies, and the Soviet Union, 16 January 1984, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 20 (23 January 1984): 43. Hereafter this source will be cited as *Weekly Compilation*.

[3] "Transcript of the Reagan-Mondale Debate on Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, 23 October 1984.

WILLIAM D. ANDERSON is associate professor of political science at Western Illinois University. STERLING J. KERNEK is professor of history and director of the Honors Program at Western Illinois University. He is the author of numerous articles and monographs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reagan has cultivated the theme of realism because it works well—especially among male voters in the United States. One sign of that effectiveness is that Walter Mondale altered his rhetoric. On 19 July 1984, accepting his party's nomination for the presidency, Mondale announced: "Tonight, we come to you with a new realism: ready for the future. . . . We know that America must have a strong defense, and a sober view of the Soviets."[4] Reagan had, however, preempted that position, and public opinion favored his leadership in dealing with the Soviets despite the lack of progress in arms control negotiations. Indeed, on the eve of his election victory, Gallup and Harris polls even showed that a majority preferred Reagan over Mondale on arms control negotiations.[5]

To academic students of international relations, Reagan's endorsement of "realism," together with his scorn for an idealistic "world of make-believe," evokes memories of the American "realist-idealist" debate of the 1950s. At that time, a number of American writers and diplomats, including Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Robert Osgood, and Kenneth Thompson, tried to persuade Americans to adopt the "realist" perspective that seemed characteristic of the best European and American statecraft. These authors traced the failures of American foreign policy in the early twentieth century to the excessive idealism allegedly exemplified by Woodrow Wilson and Cordell Hull, and put forth Bismarck, Churchill, Talleyrand and the American Founding Fathers as exemplars of successful, realistic diplomacy.[6] Reagan's comments, coming against this intellectual background, may tempt some future authors of international affairs textbooks to contrast the allegedly naive idealism of Jimmy Carter (and his vice president) with the power-oriented realism of Ronald Reagan. To do so, we believe, would be a mistake.

Ronald Reagan is not a true realist. He can more accurately be described as a conservative American romantic with an unrealistic vision of the world, a taste for hard-line gestures of power politics and a talent for developing versatile rationalizations. Substantiating that conclusion is the main burden of this article.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that just as Reagan's claim to realism is misleading, the characterization of Carter as a naive idealist is also problematical.[7] Even the popular image of that prototypical "idealist," Woodrow Wilson,

[4] "Text of Mondale Address Accepting Presidential Nomination," *New York Times*, 20 July 1984.

[5] See the Gallup poll in *Newsweek*, 5 November 1984, 30. For the Harris poll, see *Business Week*, 5 November 1984, 32.

[6] See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 142; George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), 13–14; Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953; reprint ed., Phoenix Books, 1964), 262, 286–288, 303; Kenneth W. Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1960), 5–7, 12, 63–70, 159.

[7] Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 464–481.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seems obsolete in the light of research during the 1970s and early 1980s that discovered many elements of realism hidden behind his moralistic rhetoric.[8]

Concluding that Reagan is not a genuine "realist" is more than a verbal quibble; the analysis behind it illuminates important aspects of his foreign policy. Realism is, to be sure, no longer a voguish, preeminent "paradigm" among American academicians studying international affairs. However, it may still have more followers than any others, and certainly it is attractive to many decision makers. A critic, writing in this journal, has bemoaned the fact that "despite Realism's increasing irrelevance as an interpretation of the external world, its hold over the mind of the practitioner is still formidable."[9] Two stern academic critics of realism have recently acknowledged that, its faults notwithstanding, as yet no other "paradigm" for understanding international politics has been proven superior.[10] Whatever its limitations may be as a comprehensive theory of international politics, realism still provides an interesting angle of vision on Reagan's diplomacy. Interest is, of course, heightened by the fact that he himself has tried to exploit realism's prestige by claiming that his conduct of foreign affairs reflects it. We will begin by noting the grains of truth in that claim.

Elements of Realism in Reagan's World View

Although Reagan lacked experience in international affairs when he entered the White House, he did not have what realists would, at first glance, regard as naive basic assumptions. He recognized the central role that power plays in relations between competitive sovereign states. Just as realists assume that international politics are shaped primarily by considerations of power and self-interest,[11] Reagan assumed that economic and military strength are the crucial bases of American security and leadership. Thus, the two major goals proclaimed by his administration were a strong economy and a strong national defense. To be sure, his predecessors (including Carter in 1980) pursued those goals, but Reagan gave them greater emphasis.

Obviously Reagan's two major goals are interrelated in many ways. For instance, a revitalized economy would help sustain military spending and techno-

[8] See, for example, Sterling J. Kernek, "Woodrow Wilson and National Self-determination Along Italy's Frontier: A Study of the Manipulation of Principles in the Pursuit of Political Interests," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 126 (August 1982): 243–300.

[9] Robert L. Rothstein, "On the Costs of Realism," *Political Science Quarterly* 87 (September 1972): 360.

[10] Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 12.

[11] For a classic statement of this characteristic realist concept, see Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5. For a more recent statement, consult Kenneth W. Thompson, *Winston Churchill's World View: Statesmanship and Power* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 54–57.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logical improvements in weapons. Yet, military power—the central concern of political realists—has priority in his thinking about national interest. His administration's focus upon its economic program early in 1981 does not belie this point. He insisted upon promoting a massive military build-up before economic recovery was achieved. Certainly the administration's initial five-year plan to spend 1.6 trillion dollars on defense is an impressive manifestation of Reagan's convictions about military power. Faced with ballooning federal deficits and mounting criticism of defense spending since 1982 he has, moreover, shown great reluctance to trim the Pentagon's budget.

Reagan regards the 1970s as a period when national security was neglected. During the summer of 1981 he asserted: ". . . the Soviet Union has been engaged in the greatest military buildup in the history of man. . . ." He insisted, moreover, "It is plainly a build-up that is offensive in nature."[12] He repeated this theme in the spring of 1984, claiming that "Our ability to deter war and protect our security declined dangerously during the 1970s."[13]

The assumption that the Soviet Union's power poses a dangerous challenge pervades Reagan's world view. This does not mean that he expects a war. Instead, he believes that Soviet leaders hope to spread their influence by intimidating other powers with awesome military forces. The Soviets, in addition, threaten the interests of the United States through indirect and subversive tactics, using such client states as Cuba or East Germany as well as manipulating various terrorist groups. Reagan warns that the Soviets are determined to shift the balance of power in their favor by small steps. During the 1980 election campaign he probably benefited from the widespread chorus of alarm about Moscow's expansionist opportunism in Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Reagan did well among the electorate on the defense issue and poorly on the peace issue. Concern about Soviet expansionist moves helped him largely nullify Carter's advantage on the question of keeping the U.S. out of war.[14]

Reagan has often denounced the détente policies of the 1970s as a one-sided enterprise which allowed the Soviet Union to increase its power while the United States and its allies naively hoped for a new era of cooperation and mutual restraint.[15] He would not have to undergo the kind of disillusionment that Carter

[12] Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, 13 August 1981, *Weekly Compilation*, 17 (17 August 1981): 874.

[13] Radio Address to the Nation, 26 May 1984, *Weekly Compilation*, 20 (4 June 1984): 771.

[14] See William Schneider, "The November 4 Vote for President: What did It Mean?" in Austin Ranney, ed., *The American Elections of 1980* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 233.

[15] See Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak, *The Reagan Revolution* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981), 47. For an earlier expression of doubt about détente, see Reagan's speech to the World Affairs Council, 12 October 1972, reprinted in *A Time for Choosing*, 102. See also his Remarks to the Representatives of the U.S. International Youth Year Commission, 22 June 1984, *Weekly Compilation*, 20 (25 June 1984): 925.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seemed to suffer after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. His attitude is reminiscent of realists who have criticized the naivete of various international reformers ranging from those regarded as liberal idealists to well-meaning conservative appeasers such as Neville Chamberlain.

Reagan has frequently been explicit about his aversion to appeasement. He shares a popular belief in the validity of the Munich analogy when it is applied to Soviet expansionism. During March 1983, he described the arguments of congressional critics opposed to his proposed increases in defense spending as "the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930s and invited the tragedy of World War II."[16] In addition to military preparedness, he advocates prompt and firm resistance to the expansionist schemes of his Soviet adversaries, and he tends to regard any policy akin to appeasement as dangerous and counterproductive. During the 1980 election campaign he capitalized on the widespread impression that under Jimmy Carter's leadership the United States was becoming impotent. In his first inaugural address he asserted: "When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act."[17]

Just what actions he might take aroused fear in some quarters. Indeed, early in his presidency, Reagan projected an image of bellicosity. He remains convinced, however, that his emphasis upon military preparedness and firmness increases the likelihood that shooting will be unnecessary. In his 1981 inaugural address he stated, "We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength." Thus Reagan has embraced the realist notion expressed in the ancient dictum *si vis pacem para bellum.*[18]

Believing that power determines the course of negotiations, the administration also argues that the rapid military build-up will increase pressure on the Kremlin to reach an accommodation with Washington. Reagan assumes that because of the Soviet Union's relative economic weakness, Moscow wants to avoid an intensified arms race with the United States. Thus, he feels that the Soviets will be induced to seek arms limitation agreements.[19]

In fairness to the President, it must be emphasized that his strategy regarding arms limitation has another important goal. Expressing his sense of urgency in

[16] Address to the Nation, 23 March 1983, *Weekly Compilation*, 19 (28 March 1983): 447. See also his Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, 8 March 1983, *Weekly Compilation*, 19 (14 March 1983): 368–369. Warnings about appeasement actually constitute a longstanding theme in Reagan's rhetoric. See, for example, the text of his famous televised address of 27 October 1964, reprinted in *A Time for Choosing*, 56–57. For a realist view of appeasement, see Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 6, 65–72. See also, John H. Herz, "The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement," *Social Research* 31 (Autumn 1964): 296–320.

[17] Inaugural Address, 20 January 1981, *Weekly Compilation*, 17 (26 January 1981): 4.

[18] If you want peace, prepare for war. Ian Clark has identified this notion as a prevalent element in twentieth-century realist thought. See his *Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 68.

[19] This attitude brings to mind Frederick the Great's remark that "diplomacy without armaments is like music without instruments."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 1980 election campaign, he used a catch phrase—"window of vulnerability"—to arouse public concern. This famous phrase refers primarily to the vulnerability of our intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to a Soviet first strike. This problem arose with the development of missiles with sufficient accuracy to be used as counterforce weapons. The vulnerability of land-based systems has been illustrated by the difficulty of finding a basing mode for the MX missiles. The counterforce weapons clearly undermine confidence in nuclear deterrents, and one possible way to reverse that trend would be to reduce the numbers of such missiles. Thus, Reagan's emphasis upon strategic arms reductions addresses that problem. In that context he argues that the MX will provide leverage to help induce the Russians to reduce their ICBMs. This is characteristic of his conviction that favorable agreements can be achieved by power and hard bargaining, not by displaying goodwill towards our adversaries or by misguided efforts to cultivate mutual trust.

The administration's ideas for promoting trust were directed at America's allies and other friendly governments. It is important to note that the President did not conceive of the task of checking Soviet expansionism as a unilateral project. He was anxious to encourage other states to stand firm against Soviet pressure and subversion.

During the 1980 election campaign Reagan developed this theme by criticizing Jimmy Carter's shortcomings as a leader of the "free world." Carter appeared inconsistent—even erratic—and this seemed to undermine the confidence of our allies, thus weakening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Reagan and his supporters argued that the prestige of the United States was eroding everywhere. He even suggested that this was one reason that the United States suffered the humiliation of the hostage crisis in Iran. Part of the proposed remedy was to establish a reputation for consistency and reliability—especially among friends of the United States.

Reagan's approach to friendly governments included what might delicately be described as worldly discretion when dealing with the unsavory aspects of certain regimes. The President and his advisers viewed Carter's human rights campaign as naive, unfair, and counterproductive.[20] When he entered the White House, Reagan was obviously reluctant to press for reform in the Philippines, South Korea, or Argentina. Where Congress demanded certification that progress was being made on human rights before aid could be delivered—as in El Salvador—the Reagan administration acted as a friendly judge who wanted to avoid expressing a judgment. In those instances where the administration has increased its support for human rights—as in the Philippines following the assassination of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. or in El Salvador since the end of 1983—political pressures, not idealism, have forced the change.

[20] Reagan admired Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's statement of this position in "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 34–45 and in "U.S. Security & Latin America," *Commentary* 71 (January 1981): 29–40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The shades of political realism in this approach to international relations come readily to mind. Just as Carter's human rights campaign seemed to echo Wilsonian idealism, the Reagan administration's attitude resembles realist critiques of that kind of moralism. Realism does not imply indifference to ideals and moral principles, but political realists try to distinguish clearly between what is merely desirable and what is both desirable and prudent.[21] The Reagan administration's notion that ardent, highly publicized campaigns for human rights can be counterproductive harmonizes with that perspective. A characteristically realist point is that the need to compromise particular moral principles in the pursuit of major national interests inevitably exposes moralistic statesmen to embarrassing charges of hypocrisy. Carter was, of course, vulnerable to that kind of criticism. From Reagan's point of view, however, the most serious drawback to Carter's human rights campaign was that it undermined the confidence of friendly non-Communist governments in long-term American support and made them more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation or to subversion by totalitarian groups. Moreover, totalitarian governments which displaced autocratic regimes would increase the violations of human rights.

Reagan's interest in cultivating good relations with friendly governments also reflects a sense of limits which is consistent with political realism.[22] Since the gap between American and Soviet power has narrowed, the need to maintain and improve alliances has accordingly increased. Thus he has actively encouraged the Japanese to expand their military role in the Far East. He has tried to induce certain nonallied but non-Communist governments to help their counterparts in states threatened by Marxist-Leninist subversion. The administration hoped before the Falklands War that Argentina might render military assistance to the government of El Salvador. Similarly, the Reagan administration attempted to cultivate a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East to meet the threat of Soviet expansionism.

The President's penchant for military solutions has not overridden his sense of limits. Although the President often seems eager for the United States to help friendly governments that are threatened by subversion or Soviet intimidation, he realizes that the post-Vietnam aversion to direct military involvement remains a potent political factor in the United States. Reagan does not suggest that American support must take the form of direct military intervention. Despite his denunciation of insurgents in El Salvador, he is anxious to avoid sending American troops there. So far he has not exceeded the limit of fifty-five "trainers." (The term "advisers" is avoided because it evokes memories of American involvement in Vietnam.) Instead, additional "trainers" were sent to Honduras, where El Salvadoran troops could be taught American techniques. Continuing turmoil

[21] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 7.

[22] Morgenthau wrote that political realism requires "a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible—between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place." See *Politics Among Nations*, 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Central America is generating pressures to send further aid to that region, and Reagan will be inclined to support those demands. Yet, he obviously hopes that economic aid combined with weapons, military training, advice, the buildup in Honduras, intimidating naval maneuvers, and covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (including support for the Nicaraguan *contras*) will be effective without direct military intervention by U.S. forces. The invasion of Grenada was an exceptional case—an easy, relatively inexpensive victory that can be used as a threat to the Nicaraguan government.[23] Reagan also hopes, of course, that the American military build-up will help deter his adversaries.

His sense of limits is apparent even in regard to his campaign for military preparedness—the scale of his projected Pentagon budget notwithstanding. Indeed, given his emphasis on military strength, it is remarkable that he has not pushed for a reintroduction of military conscription—an option which would probably seem very impressive to Soviet leaders if it could be implemented. He obviously realized the importance of relying on all-volunteer armed forces throughout his first term. Returning to a draft would have quickly revived memories of the Vietnam conflict and provoked massive protests.

Before ending this brief search for political realism in Reagan's diplomacy, one other way in which he has demonstrated a sense of limits should be noted. Since gaining power, he has adjusted various policies to accommodate opposing influences and stubborn facts. For example, although he wanted to wait until America's military build-up substantially increased his bargaining power before entering arms negotiations, he realized during his first year in the White House that he must pursue the "two track" approach—negotiate on arms limitation while proceeding with a build-up. That is the approach strongly favored by America's allies in Western Europe. The antinuclear movement there as well as the freeze movement in the United States forced the President to try to counter Soviet propaganda. Thus, Reagan agreed to begin negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces late in 1981 and during the following year talks began on strategic arms reductions. In addition to his shifts on arms control, he has altered his policies not only toward the Middle East but also toward China. To the considerable extent that political flexibility in response to inconvenient facts harmonizes with political realism, this behavior seems to bolster his realist credentials; however, the fact that some of his early policies needed to be changed calls his realism into question.

Why were adjustments necessary? Was he pursuing unrealistic (or mistaken) policies? If so, were his mistakes basically tactical fumbling due primarily to a lack of experience in foreign affairs, or had Reagan been acting on the basis of unrealistic assumptions and attitudes? These questions turn the discussion to the grounds where realists and Reagan part company.

[23] To be sure, the invasion of Grenada was not Reagan's only inexpensive show of force. His challenge to Libyan claims to the Gulf of Sidra also provided a easy tactical victory in August 1981. Two Libyan SU-22 Fitters were shot down by missiles fired from F-14 Tomcats. See Laurence I. Barrett, *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House*, (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 212.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unrealistic Aspects of a Hard-Liner's Foreign Policies

At the core of realism is an aspiration to base policy on a worldly-wise appreciation of existing circumstances. The best realist writing approaches this task with some idea of balance, moderation, restraint, and finiteness. International politics seem too complex for simplistic analyses or dogmatic remedies. From the perspective of political realism, any attempt to conduct foreign policy according to abstract principles is misguided.[24] This applies to conservative anti-Communist, anti-Soviet zealots just as it does to utopian liberal idealists.

As a candidate and during his first years as President, Reagan stressed ideological principles in a way that was inconsistent with political realism. A case can clearly be made that Reagan's strong ideological convictions have provided flawed guidelines for American foreign policy. His statesmanship has been handicapped by his monochromatic vision, which exaggerates the Soviet threat. The likelihood that the Soviets will depart from their characteristic pattern of cautious probing and low-risk expansion seems remote. Recent Soviet foreign policy reflects a period of consolidation.[25] By impeding his appreciation of this and other important considerations, Reagan's monochromatic vision has fostered faulty analyses of complicated problems.

If the Carter administration characteristically overestimated the internal or regional causes of strife abroad, the Reagan team has been at the other end of the spectrum. This was reflected first in the latter's controversial approach to the crises in Central America. During its first months in power, the Reagan administration argued that the Soviet Union and Cuba were the principal sources of trouble in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Nicaragua was described as an increasingly threatening base of operations for Communist subversion in neighboring countries. The hard-line rhetoric of the President and his first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, portrayed El Salvador as a test case of indirect, armed Communist aggression. Their bellicose tone helped to provoke the widespread fears in the United States that the Reagan administration might drag the country into "another Vietnam." Furthermore, the administration's early emphasis upon the Soviet-Cuban role and the military dimension of the problem seemed simplistic. Critics repeatedly cited the importance of indigenous factors and the desirability of seeking a political solution.

Painful experience, pressures from Congress, and electoral considerations have helped to make Reagan's Central American policies more sophisticated, but his hard-line position in the early days of his administration probably delayed this improvement. For example, he trapped himself in an embarrassing commitment to the government of El Salvador. Until late in 1983, the right-wing terrorists linked to (or unrestrained by) that government were confident that certification, however dubious, would be forthcoming and that aid from the United States

[24] For a classic expression of this perspective, see Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest* 438–439.

[25] Seweryn Bailer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Winter 1982/83): 258.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would continue to flow to them. By publicizing his support for a regime which used (or at least shielded) right-wing terrorists, the President unnecessarily helped Soviet and Cuban propagandists for over two years. Reagan's monochromatic vision made it difficult for him to achieve a realistic understanding of the situation, and even after he adjusted his policies on human rights, he showed a tendency to revert to his initial position. The President appointed a commission headed by Henry Kissinger during the summer of 1983 to help create a consensus on policy toward Central America, but he unnecessarily stirred further controversy by his unfavorable reaction in January 1984 to the commission report's suggestion that aid to El Salvador be linked to progress on human rights.

The administration's focus on the Soviet-Cuban threat has also hampered American policies in Africa. By supporting South Africa's demand that Cuban troops be withdrawn from Angola before agreement is reached on Namibian independence, Reagan has made the United States vulnerable to Soviet propaganda that Washington is supporting white supremacy and racism.[26] His position has also given the Soviets a positive incentive to keep the Cubans in Angola. By trapping Washington in a position that helps the South African government keep their troops in Namibia, the Kremlin is able to keep Reagan in an unfavorable light.

In the Middle East the administration's emphasis on East-West rivalry fostered an unpersuasive campaign during 1981 to create an anti-Soviet strategic consensus in the area. Various Arab leaders were more interested in the Palestinian question and other regional issues. The administration seemed slow to grasp this reality. Classic realist works criticize "utopians" for assuming that an automatic "harmony of interests" exists among nations.[27] Reagan's realism is inadequate in this sense, because he tends to focus ideologically on the conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and the so-called free world. This impairs his appreciation of local and regional disputes, because he is inclined to assume that the Soviet threat creates an overriding harmony of interest in the free world. Thus, Reagan has violated his own definition of realism as requiring "a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in."

His obtuseness about local conflicts in the Middle East is ironic in the sense that slighting the Palestinian problem enhances the Soviet Union's opportunities in the region. To be sure, he deserves some credit for the presentation in September 1982 of proposals concerning a basis for negotiations regarding Pales-

[26] This is only one reason why Reagan's monochromatic vision is counterproductive. For a list of drawbacks, see Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill, "From Carter to Reagan: The Global Perspective on Africa Becomes Ascendant," in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 362–363. At the end of their list, these authors observe: "Genuine realism . . . eschews an ideological mind set and requires an accurate assessment of the regional forces at work. An anti-Soviet orientation *not grounded in regional reality* is not likely to prove effective in the long run."

[27] See Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946; reprint ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 41–88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinian autonomy on the West Bank. That was a skillful, if tardy, move. Unfortunately, Reagan failed to follow through, and he eventually drifted into a confrontation with Syria over the future of Lebanon.

Despite his ideological emphasis on the importance of military power, Reagan pursued amibitious aims in Lebanon without making a commensurate commitment of military force. Yet, the United States paid a far greater price in lost lives than had occurred in the Carter years, and Reagan retreated in circumstances that left American credibility in the region at the lowest level in memory.[28] Part of the explanation for this policy failure lies in Reagan's predisposition to perceive the world in terms of East-West conflict. If he had not waited until 1984 to begin treating Syria as a regional power, rather than essentially as a Soviet client, his policy in Lebanon might have avoided several painful disasters.

At home the most persistent and controversial reflection of the President's preoccupation with the Soviet threat is his defense program. Many domestic critics argued that the rapid military build-up would do so much damage to the American economy that it would be counterproductive, and the massive budget deficits perpetuate similar concerns. Reagan, however, has steadfastly refused to cut out a single major weapons system from his original five-year plan.

By refusing to set a narrower range of priorities or to slow the rate of increases in military spending, the Reagan administration may have helped set the stage for a backlash against continuing the defense build-up in his second term. This backlash could damage the improvements being made at the conventional level, which are more necessary than some of the President's proposals for strategic weapons. Presumably a massive shift in opinion against defense spending will not develop if the economic recovery continues, although support for the military build-up has been declining since 1981. Reagan's determination is bolstered by apparent confidence that prosperity will, in fact, not only last but will also result in a reduction of the deficit.

The pragmatism of political realists tends to be mixed with pessimism and caution—a strong sense that things can and often do go wrong in human affairs.[29] Reagan is different. He combines an emphasis on power politics with romantic optimism about the possibility of overcoming complicated problems by bold and simple measures. Indeed, he has a penchant for nostrums. It must be acknowledged that his nostrums characteristically are pragmatic in a restricted sense. They have short-term political advantages. He packages them in his rhetorical themes about America's "can-do" spirit and they give him opportunities to appear as a strong leader who inspires hope. Indeed, he portrays his nostrums as inspiring initiatives of historic proportions—turning points that will lead to

[28] For a detailed examination of how Reagan's Lebanon policy failed to relate ends and means realistically, see William B. Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error," *The Middle East Journal* 38 (Spring 1984): 237–254.

[29] The pessimistic themes of twentieth-century realism are in "a tradition of despair bequeathed by Rousseau." See Clark, *Reform and Resistance*, 67–68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a better world. Alternatively, they can be regarded as irresponsible gambles. Among political realists, such imprudence resembles sin.

The tax cut was the nostrum which he used to explain how he could simultaneously fulfill his promise of tax relief, economic prosperity, a trend toward balanced budgets, and a massive defense build-up. Reagan argued that the tax relief would stimulate economic growth, which would produce enough additional revenue to reduce budget deficits. Moreover, he pushed hard for and secured a series of large tax cuts despite warnings that they would, in fact, help create enormous federal budget deficits—especially if the administration substantially increased defense spending without simultaneously cutting entitlement programs that benefit the middle class. The risk is that gigantic deficits in future years will necessitate massive government borrowing, which will, in turn, drive up interest rates to levels that could thwart the recovery and disrupt relations with important allies. Reagan continues to assert that a rising tide of American prosperity will help every country in the free world, but allied leaders are clearly worried about the adverse impact high American interest rates seem to have on their economies. Thus, the tax cut nostrum tends indirectly to undermine the unity of NATO at the same time that it endangers the long-term American military build-up.

The President has resorted to another nostrum to deflect criticism of his attitude toward strategic weapons. In late March and early April 1983, he called for the development of defensive weapons capable of rendering offensive nuclear missiles impotent and obsolete. The idea of lasers or particle beams destroying enemy missiles in outer space is a dazzling vision. Reagan declared that this could change the course of human history. Potentially the idea could transform strategic thinking and provide an apparent alternative to the doctrines of deterrence that rely on the threat of retaliation to insure security.

Unfortunately, Reagan's promotion of an antimissile system also raises disturbing questions. Will it foster a new, more intensive arms race? Will it be destabilizing in the long run? Will it not complicate rather than ameliorate strategic arms problems? Moreover, it seems noteworthy that his strategic defense initiative has not apparently altered his determination to proceed with the development of the MX and other weapons systems.

The question which lurks around all of the administration's moves in the field of arms control is whether or not the overriding goal is American nuclear superiority. There are indications that it is, despite Reagan's realization that explicit talk of superiority is impolitic. The President publicly asserted in 1982 that the United States was inferior to the Soviet Union in strategic weapons and that the margin of safety must be greatly improved. This is, at best, a controversial conclusion. Any sophisticated comparison of the superpowers' arsenals or strategic positions reveals many ambiguities and complexities.[30] In Reagan's mind, how-

[30] See Albert Carnesale and others (the Harvard Nuclear Study Group), *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983) 1, 115–132.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever, even the ambiguous nature of the issue tends to intensify his determination to expand American military forces. He wants to offset any apparent Soviet advantages—even some questionable ones. To justify this attitude, the administration has argued that it must not take any chances when the national security is at stake. Thus, it must deal with the worst possible case. Although that line of thought seems reasonable, it tends to foster efforts to achieve an ever greater margin of safety. In effect, the President seems to equate a satisfactory margin of safety with American superiority.

This attitude reflects an unrealistic vision. Reagan looks nostalgically back to the time when the United States enjoyed strategic primacy, and he believes that misguided détente policies and other factors lulled Washington into permitting the Soviets to catch up and even forge ahead. Part of his dream is to restore America to a dominant position. Apparently he finds that goal much more sensible and emotionally satisfying than striving for an accommodation with the Soviet Union on the basis of parity.

Reagan's attitudes towards the arms race are characteristic of a hard-liner. Indeed, unlike the term "political realist," the profile of a hard-liner fits him in virtually all respects. In the mid-1970s, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, using the "ideal type" as a methodological tool, described the essential attributes of a hard-liner as follows:

> The hard-line actor typically sees world politics as highly conflict-ridden. Consequently, he is sensitive to power-strategic considerations, to the potential aggressiveness of other states, and to the need to preserve or improve the power and security position of his own state. The best road to peace as well as security for his own state is via military strength, deterrence, and firmness in crises. . . .[31]

This theoretical construct brings Reagan instantly to mind in a striking way. Except for a couple of qualifications to be mentioned later, he personifies the abstraction, and it, in turn, sheds light on his character. Hard-liners have characteristic strengths and weaknesses. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain should have heeded the astute advice of certain hard-liners in the 1930s. Perhaps Reagan's hard-line attitudes helped him avoid being caught up in the enthusiasm for détente in the early 1970s. The other side of the coin, however, is that a hard-liner fails to see how his actions can strike the opponent as being signs of aggressive tendencies. "He is quite insensitive," Snyder and Diesing wrote, "to the possibility that the accumulation of power and uncompromising stance of his own state, undertaken for defensive purposes, could be interpreted by the adversary as threatening."[32] Indeed, hard-liners are insensitive to the possibility that the actions they favor may set off, or continue pushing upward, a spiral of tension and

[31] Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 298.

[32] Ibid., 298.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hostility.[33] These points ring a bell when they are read in the context of the deterioration of Soviet-American relations during Reagan's first term.

The outcome of the President's military build-up and approach to arms control negotiations remains to be seen, but there are strong signs that his efforts to maximize the margin of safety are incompatible with the pursuit of arms limitation or reduction. This seems true even when evidence of his flexibility is considered.

Reagan's handling of arms negotiations can plausibly be interpreted as a series of adjustments which he made in an effort to cope with political complications such as the peace-antinuclear movement without undermining his pursuit of American superiority. After being forced to promote arms negotiations sooner than he originally intended, his political strategy was to put forward proposals which are favorable to the United States but which seem to demonstrate flexibility even though they are unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Reagan proposed arms reductions designed to cut the Soviets' large land-based missiles, the weapons in which they are superior, and shift competition to other weapons systems where the U.S. is either superior or where American technology provides potential advantages. The pressure to show more flexibility increased during 1983, and he had to make further concessions in order to secure support in Congress for funding of the MX program. He decided to accept the "build-down" approach advocated by some key senators, and he was receptive to the "midgetman" concept—an attempt to reduce the chances of a first strike by deploying relatively small, mobile intercontinental missiles, each with only a single warhead. It is, of course, ironic that these adjustments seem to have been motivated in part by his desire to begin deploying the MX, a large missile with ten warheads.

To be sure, Reagan was not pleased by the suspension of arms control talks late in 1983. He undoubtedly felt that signs of progress or, better yet, a breakthrough could have yielded major benefits in the election campaign of 1984. Still, as a hard-liner he was willing to make further concessions only if they did not erode the essence of his program—more security through greater military strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Snyder and Diesing noted that the hard-liner "is typically wary of accommodative moves, fearing they will be interpreted as weakness."[34] Thus, Reagan's flexibility on arms control and other issues constitutes only a partial qualification of his hard-liner profile.

He would have endorsed proposals acceptable to the Soviet Union only if he concluded that major concessions were essential to his reelection. Reagan's big lead in the polls throughout the campaign ensured that concessions were unnecessary. In the future he might give way on an arms control issue that is important to the Soviets if he concludes that his military build-up has given him enough bargaining leverage to ensure that the overall impact of the arms agreement will

[33] Ibid., 306, 513.
[34] Ibid., 298.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seem to strengthen the relative position of the United States. Any apparent gains can be used to justify his military build-up.

Unfortunately, the Soviets are not likely to cooperate. Realists tend to look at history, and the historical record shows that during the 1960s and 1970s the Soviets exerted massive efforts to match the power of American strategic weapons.[35] They perceive the arms control agreements of the 1970s as evidence of military parity, an achievement that Reagan's build-up puts at risk. One factor which bolsters the Soviet Union's confidence in its ability to compete with the United States is its perception of the potential opposition in Congress and within NATO to the military spending plans that Reagan continues to champion. One of the ironies is, of course, that Reagan's tough rhetoric and hard-line stance became a potential threat to the build-up in NATO because, in part, he helped to stir up the so-called peace movement. Indeed, the bellicose image that Reagan projected in 1981 quickly became a liability in the propaganda battle with the Kremlin for the hearts and minds of Western Europeans.

His hard-line temperament may help explain why he was slow to understand that an American build-up must not be accompanied by bellicose rhetoric, but by pious declarations of the importance of arms control. It may, incidentally, also help explain why he seems so easily and frequently to lapse into his tough phraseology after periods of calculated moderation, even though his strident outbursts help the Soviets counter his policies.

A more important source of Soviet confidence is its ability to sustain even an accelerated arms race. The administration's plan to establish American leverage in arms negotiations by outstripping the Soviet arms build-up is actually based on a paradoxical conclusion. While Reagan exaggerates the Soviet threat, he also exaggerates the Soviet Union's economic weaknesses and its vulnerability to pressure. On this point he should heed the analysis of experts in and out of government.[36]

A related flaw in the administration's outlook is its exaggeration of the ability of the United States to hobble the Soviet Union by imposing trade restrictions. The abortive—actually counterproductive—attempt to obstruct construction of the Siberian gas pipeline revealed the limitations of such a policy. The American restrictions on the transfer of pipeline technology to the Soviets provoked anger and defiance among the NATO allies. It was a blunder which, as Jonathan P. Stern observed, handed the Soviets "a political success they could not have dreamed of achieving by their own efforts."[37] Secretary of State George Shultz had difficulty finding a graceful way for the administration to back down.

[35] Strobe Talbott, *The Russians and Reagan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 49–50.

[36] For example, a well-publicized study by the CIA in 1982 cast doubt on the notion that the Soviet economy is susceptible to Western pressure. See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Survey Shows a Steady Growth in Soviets' G.N.P.," *New York Times*, 26 December 1982. One of the most persuasive studies of this subject is David Fewtrell's "The Soviet Economic Crisis: Prospects for the Military and the Consumer," *Adelphi Papers* no. 186 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983).

[37] Jonathan P. Stern, "Specters and Pipe Dreams," *Foreign Policy* 48 (Fall 1982): 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another irony of Reagan's diplomacy during his first years as President is that while he readily grasped the importance of allies, he was slow to understand their interests and aims. He was, in fact, obtuse about Western Europe's interest in détente with the Soviet Union. Even now he seems reluctant to accept the implications of that interest, although his handling of relations among the allies has noticeably improved.

Reagan's mistakes in NATO relations stemmed, in part, from his ignorance and his excessive reliance on advisers who were neither foreign policy experts nor experienced diplomats. This brings up another way in which Reagan does not fit the profile of a political realist. Because they try to maximize their chances of success by basing policy decisions on a sound appreciation of existing circumstances, political realists tend to be responsive to the advice of professionals. Some Reagan decisions, however, such as the pipeline embargo, have been heavily influenced by advisers with limited backgrounds in foreign affairs. Listening to experts and professionals by no means insures success, but it is preferable to the decision-making method Reagan used. If he had sought and heeded the advice of Alexander Haig, who had a deep understanding of NATO, and others experienced in European affairs, he would have avoided the pipeline embargo fiasco.

Perhaps Reagan was also handicapped by an unrealistic view of the way that the United States should lead the West. Before entering the White House, he seemed to assume that the allies in Europe wanted strong American leadership and that his tough policies would unify and strengthen NATO. I. M. Destler succinctly described this naive expectation as follows: "A certain American trumpet would rally our friends and impress our foes."[38] One wonders if the President's vision of the future was conditioned by a nostalgic desire to restore the kind of primacy the United States held during the first two decades after World War II. In any case, Reagan can be characterized as a romantic with a dream of American power and pride rather than the attitudes of a political realist.[39] During the 1984 campaign he frequently reiterated the theme of America "standing tall" again.

His view of Soviet-American competition moves him still further away from political realism. Whereas Reagan tends to interpret the superpower rivalry as a struggle between good and evil, political realists are reluctant to identify a particular policy with moral righteousness or God's will. Reagan has expressed himself in terms which became famous. On 29 January 1981, the newly inaugurated President, using very undiplomatic language, asserted that Soviet leaders "re-

[38] I. M. Destler, "The Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy," in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 140–141.

[39] For a vivid expression of Reagan's nostalgia, see Evans and Novak, *The Reagan Revolution*, 159. Also see Reagan's speech to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 24 August 1984, *Weekly Compilation*, 20 (3 September 1984): 1180–1181.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat . . . ."[40] On 8 March 1983, he characterized the Soviet Union as the "focus of evil."[41]

The belief that the Soviet Union constitutes an intrinsically dangerous, untrustworthy, "evil empire" seems to be related to Reagan's assessment of America's security needs. The only real long-term solution to our key security problem would, in his view, be the reform or collapse of the communist system within the Soviet Union and its satellites. It should be noted that he qualified this view during the 1984 election by denying that he was out to change the Soviet system.[42] If this reflects a genuine change of attitude (a possibility contradicted by other statements),[43] it moves the President closer to realism.

Political realists are sceptical of schemes to eradicate political evil, and they accordingly eschew moral or idealistic crusades. For example, they have been critical of the popular notions during and after World War I that the spread of democracy or the establishment of a League of Nations would transform international relations and make the world safe.[44] While Reagan has, of course, deep doubts about the benefits of international organizations, he has promoted a campaign for democracy that he hopes will weaken the Soviet Union in particular and Marxism-Leninism in general. He seems to believe that the world could be transformed by the demise of Marxism-Leninism. In a major address to the British Parliament during 1982, he asserted that a "crisis is happening . . . in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union." Moreover, he called for a long-term crusade for freedom "which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history. . . ."[45] That speech seemed to reflect a deep anti-Communist urge, which might again be boldly expressed during his second term.

It is interesting to contemplate what the consequence would be if Reagan could fulfill his dream of shoving Marxism-Leninism into the ash heap of history. He apparently assumes that a more capitalist government in Russia would be less threatening than a communist regime, but this is highly questionable. Even a cursory study of history reminds us that Russian expansion was a problem long before the Bolshevik revolution. If Reagan would focus more exclusively on power factors—as a more consistent realist would—he might fear the consequences of capitalism in Russia. Since he apparently assumes that the stultifying, overcentralized, excessively bureaucratic totalitarian regime in the

[40] News Conference, 29 January 1981, *Weekly Compilation*, 17 (2 February 1981): 66–67.

[41] Remarks at annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, 8 March 1983, *Weekly Compilation*, 19 (8 March 1983): 369.

[42] "Reagan: Realism with Soviets; Patience in Mideast," *U.S. News and World Report*, 22 October 1984, 29.

[43] See Reagan's remarks marking the fortieth anniversary of the Warsaw uprising, 17 August 1984, *Weekly Compilation*, 20 (20 August 1984): 1132–1133.

[44] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 10–11, 253–256. See also, Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 262–307.

[45] Address to British Parliament, 8 June 1982, *Weekly Compilation*, 18 (14 June 1982): 766, 769.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union is economically inefficient and since he surely believes in the efficacy of capitalism, he should fear that capitalism would make Russia more dynamic and productive economically. The power that a more capitalist Russia could generate would be truly alarming.

Political realism provides other grounds for criticizing Reagan's goal. The archetypical realist (especially the leader of a status quo power) is very concerned about maintaining a balance of power.[46] He regards policies that would undermine an equilibrium as imprudent, and he would not want to aggravate the dangers inherent in the decline of a major state or empire. The Reagan administration has perceived that the Soviet Union faces serious difficulties. In addition to slow economic growth, inability to originate new technology, spiritual malaise, and unrest among its satellites, it suffers from disturbing demographic trends, for example, the explosive growth of non-Russian ethnic groups, especially Central Asian Muslims. The Reagan administration's arms build-up, trade restrictions, and propaganda campaigns are designed to exploit these weaknesses. If his efforts succeeded in accelerating the decay of the Soviet Union, they might provoke dangerous responses. A government in decline—especially one with a great military establishment—might resort to adventures abroad in order to justify the repression of domestic dissent.[47]

Reagan does not seem acutely concerned about this, even though Soviet leaders have angrily accused him of scheming to ruin their state. Snyder and Diesing noted that a hard-liner "discounts the importance of emotional factors in international politics and crises, believing that the others are as cool, calculating, and 'unprovokable' as he is.[48] Reagan may reflect that point of view, and he may be correct about the group of Soviet leaders he has faced so far. If so, he should feel fortunate that his adversaries in the Kremlin have not been rash, fanatical, or impetuous like the evildoers in Berlin in the 1930s. If a less cautious and calculating group of leaders is now coming to power in Moscow, Reagan's hard-line, romantic, anti-Soviet campaign might be more dangerous.

Fortunately, this possibility seems unlikely. Moreover, it is improbable that the President will succeed in undermining the Soviet system in the forseeable future. It is doubtful that his call for a crusade will be translated into any moves beyond largely symbolic gestures. His painful experience with the pipeline embargo, his sense of limits, and his attention to domestic politics have combined to keep his decisions within a distinctly cautious pattern. As frustrated neo-conservatives have loudly observed, he has not yet lived up to his hard-line attitudes. In his policies one can find much Carterite substance concealed by Reaganite rhetoric. On some issues such as Afghanistan his attempts to put pressure on the Soviet Union have been less vigorous than those of his prececessor. His military build-up, the militaristic gestures in Central America, his penchant for nostrums, and

[46] Consider, for example, Otto von Bismarck's policies between 1871 and 1890.

[47] For a more complete explanation of this point, see Sterling J. Kernek, "Historical Reflections on the Dangers Ahead,"; *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 60 (Spring 1984): 200–203.

[48] Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 298.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his hard-line anti-Soviet convictions suggest the possibility of drastic moves in the future, but caution also seems to be an important element of the President's conservatism.

Staying the Course

Reagan's basic assumptions and romantic aspirations were firmly set when he began his on-the-job training as President at the age of sixty-nine. As has been the case with many of his predecessors, he entered the White House with a conspicuous lack of experience in foreign affairs. Since 1981 he has developed greater finesse. He is more tactful with allies, and he tends more often to adopt a moderate tone when discussing relations with the Soviet Union. But he has not yet significantly changed course, and since his foreign policies did not endanger his chances of reelection in 1984, he is unlikely to reappraise his basic notions.

Critics will continue to raise a fuss and Reagan's diplomacy will remain controversial for the foreseeable future, but he will heavily influence the debate in his favor. Because of the shortcomings of his policies and the changing tides of American public opinion, the Democrats thought he would be vulnerable on foreign policy issues in 1984, but he was well equipped to minimize the damage. Taking full advantage of the fact that he occupies a "bully pulpit," he has developed and refined popular rationalizations which not only enable him to explain away disappointments but also to claim credit for any beneficent developments.

Consider, for example, the way he can capitalize upon the Soviet Union's current foreign policy consolidation. After only twenty months in the White House, he began suggesting that it is his tough stance in opposition to Soviet expansionism which has fostered the Kremlin's circumspection. In a news conference on 28 September 1982, he said:

> I think there's a pretty good understanding on their part as to where we stand. And I can only say this: In 20 months—and I'm going to knock on wood—the Soviet Union which has been expanding over the years, vastly in the territory and the people coming under its control, they haven't expanded into an extra square inch since we've been here. So maybe we do have an understanding of each other.[49]

In his acceptance speech before the Republican National Convention during August 1984, Reagan received his greatest applause upon asserting: "Since January 20th, 1981, not one inch of soil has fallen to the communists."[50]

Because Soviet overextension (among other factors) is a more plausible reason for the Soviet Union's recent caution than the President's hard line, his analysis is unconvincing to many serious observers.[51] But his political timing must be admired in at least one respect. While the Soviets were overextending themselves,

[49] News Conference, 28 September 1982, *Weekly Compilation*, 18 (4 October 1982): 1224.

[50] Remarks accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 1984 Republican National Convention, 23 August 1984, *Weekly Compilation*, 20 (3 September 1984): 1169.

[51] See Bialer and Afferica, "Reagan and Russia." According to Dimitri K. Simes, "Conversations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he won support by sounding the alarm. After they overextended themselves, he claimed credit for their caution.

Reagan subsequently stretched this theme to counter the accusation of his political opponents that he has made the world more dangerous. On 16 January 1984, the President declared that "America's deterrence is more credible, and it is making the world a safer place—safer now because there is less danger that Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve."[52]

This was the speech, quoted at the beginning of this article, in which he identified three principles: "realism, strength and dialog." Characteristically, his definition of realism was actually an expression of his anti-Soviet preoccupation. To Reagan, having "a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in" meant that "we must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad."[53] His second principle—strength—is, of course, central to realism. He went on to stress that America's increased strength was necessary not only to deter war but to "facilitate negotiated solutions." With the characteristic attitude of a hard-liner, he added:

> Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. Well, America can now offer something in return. Strength and dialog go hand in hand.[54]

The President then declared that he would "never retreat from negotiations." This is ironic since he was very reluctant to enter arms control negotiations in 1981. Politically wiser, the President deftly maneuvered into a more easily defensible position after the Soviets suspended various arms control negotiations at the end of 1983. More confident of his bargaining power, he was, however, not inclined to make concessions as the Soviet-American arms negotiations resumed in March 1985. He can also derive confidence from the versatile rationalizations he has at hand for various contingencies. On the one hand, he will be able to attribute the resumption of negotiations and any signs of progress to his policies.[55] On the other hand, if the Soviets again walk away from negotiations or refuse to make further concessions, he will place the blame on the Kremlin and argue—as he did in 1984—that the West must not reward intransigent, uncompromising behavior. He has also seized his opportunity to cite the need for a united, firm front at home to justify continued funding of the MX. Moreover,

with Soviet officials and experts suggest that the USSR already feels overextended." See "America's New Edge," *Foreign Policy* 56 (Fall 1984): 30.

[52] Address to the Nation, U.S. and the Soviet Union, 16 January 1984, *Weekly Compilation*, 20 (23 January 1984): 41, 42.

[53] Ibid., 43.

[54] Ibid., 43.

[55] In his State of the Union address on 6 February 1985, Reagan asserted that "our determination to maintain a strong defense has influenced the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table." *Weekly Compilation*, 21 (11 February 1985): 145. Such boasts could, of course, prove counterproductive. Realists would recommend that Reagan refrain from this kind of statement—especially as his scheduled meeting with Mikhail S. Gorbachev approaches.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this puts him in a position to ascribe frustrations or failures in arms control to those who would not support his hard line.

The President also has versatile rationalizations to deal with the ongoing problems of revolution and conflict in the Third World. The administration (despite setbacks and internal debates) can be counted on to continue advocating strong countermeasures in certain areas, especially Central America. On the one hand, the opposition—some of it in Congress— will criticize such policies and may substantially impede the flow of military aid from the United States. If governments unfriendly to the United States subsequently come to power, the President will attribute their hostility to Soviet influence and their victory to the combined effects of Soviet aid and congressional opposition. On the other hand, where governments friendly to the United States survive, even with the support of only modest amounts of aid, he will be able to cite his steadfast support for America's allies.

His reiteration of familiar themes may obscure the extent to which Reagan has grown in his first term as president. When he entered the White House, his hard-line version of realism was conspicuously warped in the direction of relying on force without serious negotiations. He was leading a reaction to what was widely perceived as the naive reliance of his predecessors on diplomacy without adequate force. Gradually, Reagan has moved back toward greater emphasis on negotiations. This has been most noticeable in his handling of arms control issues with the Soviets, but it is also apparent in his modified policies in Central America.

A genuine realist integrates force and negotiations on a case-by-case basis to fit complex and changing conditions. This requires a sense of balance that is lacking in ideological hard-liners, who involuntarily tilt in the direction of force. Reagan has presumably not been studying realist authors, but first-hand experience in dealing with complex political realities has ameliorated his hard-line biases. If he would reflect on the lessons to be learned from that experience, he could alter his hard-line attitudes.

His ambition to achieve something in foreign affairs could also foster the transformation of President Reagan into an exponent of balanced realism. With an eye on what historians will write about him and faced with intractable budget problems, he could more actively pursue productive negotiations with the Soviets on arms control as an outlet for his desire to play a great role. A crucial obstacle to success would be partly his own creation; the Soviets are unlikely to sign an agreement that would seem to validate a hard-liner's claim that America's military build-up forced them to accept Reagan's terms. To achieve successful arms negotiations, the President would have to make concessions, and this would lead to ironic ramifications. At the close of his presidency, Reagan, who rose to power denouncing the Panama Canal treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II, might find himself rebuking hard-liners who criticize his accommodation with the Soviets. In short, perhaps conservative critics will force Ronald Reagan to adopt the rhetoric of genuine realism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French Defense Policy and European Security

ROBERT GRANT

French defense policy under General Charles de Gaulle during the 1960s accorded a distinct priority to the exclusive protection of French territory as opposed to the collective security of France and her allies. During 1982 an ongoing debate over the extent to which France should enhance its contribution to allied security intensified. The debate has been two-pronged, focusing on measures that remain within the parameters of current defense doctrine and on possible modifications of that doctrine. This article examines that debate, the decisions it has already produced, and where French policy may go in the future.

Gaullist Defense Policy Objectives

The two characteristics of French defense policy most associated with Gaullism are the independent nuclear deterrent and the withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) integrated military command, both of which fulfilled six broad objectives that still motivate French policy.

Three of the objectives are purely political. The French express near unanimous agreement with the view that a nuclear arsenal brings "uncontestable prestige" to France across the world.[1] Maintaining France's international "rank," power, and prestige has been a fundamental foreign policy goal of all French governments. An independent nuclear force is also the condition *sine qua non*

[1] See "La France est-elle encore une grande puissance?" the cover story of the magazine *L'Express*, 3 February 1984, 24–35.

ROBERT GRANT is a research associate at International Energy Associates Ltd. in Washington, D.C., where he works on nuclear energy and nonproliferation issues. He has had articles on defense and arms control published in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and in *Stratégie et Défense.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of "national independence," the foreign policy leitmotif that de Gaulle introduced in order to regain a suitable world role for France. Finally, American dominance of the integrated NATO command placed France in an unacceptable subordinate position vis-à-vis the United States.

The two Gaullist defense initiatives also fulfilled three military objectives. First, doubting the long-term credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, the French saw their own deterrent force as the best means of ultimately safeguarding their territory and national sovereignty. Second, de Gaulle viewed integrated military forces as courting potential disaster for France in a war. French political scientist Alfred Grosser has noted that in terms of psychological consequences the most significant Franco-American confrontation of World War II occurred in January 1945 when General Dwight D. Eisenhower, reacting to the last German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, ordered the French Army to evacuate Strasbourg. De Gaulle, fearing massive German reprisals against the Strasbourg population, ordered the French army to remain, and won Eisenhower's acquiescence after threatening American lines of communication in France. For de Gaulle, the incident demonstrated that even the most benevolent of allied generals could not be trusted to take French interests sufficiently into account.[2]

Lastly, an independent foreign policy meant that France had to avoid becoming engaged in armed conflict without making a deliberate and thoroughly-considered decision to do so. This "no automaticity" requirement led to France's removing its forces from front-line positions in Germany in mid-1965, one year before its withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command. Although de Gaulle did stress the military goals of his policy, and was apparently genuinely concerned that American global interventionism could lead France unwillingly into war, political motives undoubtedly carried the most immediacy in determining his defense initiatives. Today, while these political motives do retain considerable significance, increased support in France for a national nuclear force has also resulted from the perception that Gaullist predictions of an increasingly permeable American nuclear umbrella have proven accurate.

Continuities from de Gaulle to Mitterrand

From Charles de Gaulle to François Mitterrand, French doctrine and force posture have remained within certain well-defined parameters. The concept of deterrence "by the weak of the strong," or "proportional deterrence," continues to provide theoretical credibility for French strategic nuclear forces (FNS). In essence, "The thermonuclear force can be proportional to the value of the stake it is defending".[3] To meet this requirement, France only needed a second strike counter-city force.

[2] Alfred Grosser, *Les Occidentaux* (Paris: Fayard, 1978), 43.

[3] Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite this rationale, the credibility of France's strategic nuclear deterrent remained open to doubt. In France, the late Raymond Aron forcefully argued that a strategy of massive retaliation against Soviet cities in reply to a Soviet conventional attack against France, while not devoid of credibility, suffered from serious weaknesses.[4] An iron will on the part of the French head of state is critical to this scenario, and Mitterrand may have been guilty of only moderate simplification when he recently uttered the phrase, "La pièce maîtresse de la stratégie de dissuasion en France . . . C'est moi".[5] Put simply, "I am the deterrent."

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1970s resulted in the enhancement of French deterrent strategy aimed at boosting the credibility of the strategic forces. French conventional forces would provide a first "test" of the enemy's intention to attack France by conventional forces on the ground. If the enemy pursued its attack, the use of tactical nuclear weapons would serve as a "last warning" that France would retaliate massively. Official French doctrine has more recently placed added emphasis on the fact that in order for the enemy to perceive clearly France's last warning, the tactical nuclear strike should have as great a military impact as possible.[6]

In spite of these modifications, the French generally deny that their doctrine bears any relation to NATO's flexible response policy. According to NATO doctrine, the allies must be able to respond to an aggression with a proportionate level of force, while still maintaining in reserve a credible escalatory threat should the initial defense fail. In other words, conventional attack should be met with conventional defense, but since it is not at all certain that NATO would be able to resist superior Soviet conventional forces, the Alliance reserves the option to escalate to increasingly greater levels of nuclear destruction. Most French commentators disregard the ambiguities of flexible response and interpret NATO plans for tactical nuclear weapons use as aimed exclusively at reestablishing a deteriorating battlefield situation. By ignoring the potential political purposes of NATO tactical weapons use, the French are able to indicate a nearly diametrical opposition between flexible response and their last warning strike concept.[7]

The French present their doctrine as a strategy of "non-war," as opposed to NATO strategy which "explicitly envisages the possibility of a conflict."[8] French doctrine only envisages that possibility to the extent necessary to test the enemy's intentions prior to FNS use. Deterrence is consequently equated with the impossibility of war.[9]

[4] See for example, Raymond Aron, "French Deterrent Capabilities and the Atlantic Alliance," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 15 (Summer 1977): 155–167.

[5] Quoted in *Le Monde* (International Edition), 17–23 November 1983.

[6] See General Jeannou Lacaze, "Politique de défense et stratégie militaire de la france," *Défense Nationale* 39 (June 1983): 13–18.

[7] For example, Paul-Marie de la Gorce, "La France et la défense de l'europe," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (January 1984): 29.

[8] These are the words of Jacques Soppelsa, a Socialist Party defense specialist, in "Défense de la france et désarmement," *Stratégie et Défense* (December 1982): 13.

[9] See Claude Cheysson's statements in *Le Monde*, 18 January 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French adherence to an almost pure deterrence doctrine has been the result of two factors. First, a more variegated strategy has clearly been beyond French means. The only possibility for an independent defense policy was simply to threaten massive retaliation. Second, France has also maintained its commitment to pure deterrence out of conviction. There is widespread consensus in France that high-intensity conventional war would destroy Europe—and France—just as thoroughly as nuclear war.[10] The marked French and European preference has been to rely on the dissuasive value of the massive nuclear retaliatory threat. Unlike most of the other European countries, the French were able to put their preferences into practice.

At all levels of force, French policy emphasized France's own security to the detriment of that of its allies. The only explicit commitment of the FNS was to the defense of France's "vital interests," which were defined as the protection of the "national sanctuary" and of the immediate approaches to it.[11] It is a matter of official ambiguity exactly when an enemy army approaching French territory might trigger the use of the FNS.

According to French strategists, the uncertainty resulting from doctrinal ambiguity complicates enemy planning and thus enhances the credibility of France's nuclear deterrent. Politically, doctrinal ambiguity plays a key role in maintaining a domestic consensus in support of an independent nuclear force.[12] When the government of Valery Giscard d'Estaing spoke of an "enlarged sanctuary" and gave some indications that French tactical nuclear weapons (ANT) could be assigned missions related to European defense, it provoked much controversy.[13] Subsequent government statements on nuclear weapons emphasized policy continuity and ambiguity.[14] In any event, the short range of French ANT, combined with their being stationed in France, sharply limited their possible contribution to European defense.

The priority generally given in French defense budgets to nuclear weapons has left conventional forces somewhat neglected. Under Giscard d'Estaing, greater attention to European security resulted in additional spending on conventional forces. But well over half of the budgeted funds went into operating expenses, and planned purchases of new conventional equipment had to be stretched out.[15]

[10] See Raymond Aron, "En quête de la sécurité," *Commentaire* 5 (Winter 1982–1983): 558; and Soppelsa, "Défense de la france," 13.

[11] Mitterrand's most recent comments on the subject are in *Le Monde*, 7 February 1984.

[12] See Dominique Moïsi, "Les limites de consensus," in Pierre Lellouche, ed., *Pacifisme et Dissuasion*, (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 1983), 253–265.

[13] See Jean Klein, "Mythes et réalités de la défense de l'europe," *Politique Etrangère* 48 (Summer 1983): 325; and Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 197–198.

[14] David Yost, "The French Defence Debate," *Survival* 23 (January/February 1981): 19–21.

[15] Edward Kolodziej, "French Security Policy: Decisions and Dilemmas," *Armed Forces and Society* 8 (Winter 1982): 194–195; Yves Laulan, "France and her Army in the 1980s" in Gregory Flynn,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to the guidelines of the Socialist government's 1984–1988 defense program, 30 percent of equipment credits will be spent on strategic and tactical nuclear forces, as compared with approximately 18 percent during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. The current French government believes more strongly than the previous one in the benefits of pure deterrence. Defense Minister Charles Hernu has bluntly stated that "those who prefer an armored division to an additional ballistic missile submarine have got the wrong war."[16]

The 1972 French defense White Paper cast doubt on the ability of the First Army to fulfill its assigned role as a NATO reserve force. The problem was the role given to the First Army in France's strategic deterrent manoeuver. Five regiments of Pluton short range missiles were assigned to be deployed into combat with the First Army. The First Army had to be sufficiently powerful to force the concentration of Soviet troops that would make the tactical strike an effective one. The predominantly political role of the tactical nuclear strike meant that French ANT had to remain under the strict control of the French president. This crucial requirement would be difficult to fulfill if the Plutons advanced into the NATO-Warsaw Pact battlefield area.[17] The White Paper added that attrition of French forces in the so-called European battle could leave France without the means to carry out her own deterrent strategy. The practical impact of the White Paper's guidelines was that either NATO would stop the Warsaw Pact without any significant French assistance, or France would be left face-to-face with the Red Army.

Official statements during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing attempted to dispel allied doubts concerning French fulfillment of its planned NATO conventional role.[18] The central operational problem, however, remained unsolved. Innovations in defense policy introduced by the Socialists have been above all directed toward resolving this operational dilemma.

Changing Assumptions

During the 1980s there has been a broad degree of consensus among the noncommunist French political parties that old assumptions about the European security environment were no longer valid. This spurred defense policy innovations. Two assumptions had been critical to the formulation of Gaullist defense policy.

First, the Soviet Union no longer posed a serious military threat to Western Europe. When U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen asked de Gaulle in 1965

---

ed., *The Internal Fabric of Western Security* (Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1981), 106; and Harrison, *Reluctant Ally*, 199–200.

[16] Quoted in *Le Monde*, 28 June 1983.

[17] See Robbin F. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980's and 1990's" *Comparative Strategy* 4 (1984): 400–403.

[18] Guy Méry, "Une Armée pour quoi faire et comment?," *Défense Nationale* 32 (June 1976): 11–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether the less menacing Soviet attitude "could be regarded as more than transitory," the French President replied that "prudence was necessary in this regard."[19] But four factors resulted in a continued tendency on the part of French governments to minimize the Soviet threat. For Gaullists, the belief in the tradition of nations over regimes led to emphasizing the "eternal Russia" with which France had a long history of relations, as opposed to the more recent "Soviet" enemy. Gaullists also remained attached to the idea of using good relations with Moscow to enhance France's diplomatic position. Giscard d'Estaing firmly believed that détente and trade could lead to a democratization of the Soviet regime. Harmonious relations with the Soviet Union also attenuated French Communist opposition to conservative governments, thus helping to keep the Left from assuming power in France.[20] In both 1974 and 1981, the Soviet Union tacitly endorsed Giscard d'Estaing for president against François Mitterrand.

The second assumption behind Gaullist defense policy was that West Germany would continue to provide a stable security shield for France. This assumption had two corollaries; the United States would maintain a strong commitment to West German security and thus the West Germans would remain relatively content with their security situation.

On all counts, the assumptions that have come to dominate French views of the 1980s indicate serious difficulties in the security field. A perception of the Soviet Union as a significant politico-military threat predominates within the three main non-Communist French political formations: the Socialist Party, the neo-Gaullist Rassemblement pour la république (RPR), and the centrist Union pour la démocratie française (UDF), an alliance of three small parties.

The breakup of the Union of the Left in 1977 started an anti-Soviet evolution within the Socialist party that was spurred on by the human rights issue.[21] The growth of Soviet military power and the series of military interventions by the Soviet Union and its proxies in Africa and Afghanistan led to genuine perceptions of a threatened East-West politico-military balance.[22] During the 1981 presidential campaign, Mitterrand, who is reputed to hold visceral anti-Soviet feelings,[23] was extremely critical of Giscard d'Estaing's "ostpolitik." Once Mitterrand became president, a firm policy towards the Soviet Union was critical in order to demonstrate to the NATO allies that Communist participation in the

[19] Telegram 2337, American Embassy, Paris, to the Secretary of State, 28 October 1965, *Carrollton Index of Recently Declassified Documents* (Arlington, Va: Carrollton Press, 1980), 77A.

[20] See Pierre Hassner, "Western European Perceptions of the USSR," *Daedalus* 108 (Winter 1979): 122–124, 130; and Alfred Grosser, "Les Européens et l'union soviétique," *Le Monde*, 14 February 1984.

[21] Pierre Hassner, "Western European Perceptions," 143; and Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "France: Attachment to a Nonbinding Relationship," in Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds., *The Public and Atlantic Defense* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 70–77.

[22] For French perceptions of Soviet military options, see Robbin F. Laird, "The French Strategic Dilemma," *Orbis* 28 (Summer 1984): 314–317.

[23] Charles Hargrove, "Claude Cheysson, pour le meilleur et pour le pire," *Jeune Afrique*, 28 December 1983–4 January 1984, 98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government would not affect French foreign policy. Mitterrand's strong public endorsements of the Pershing II and cruise missile deployment in Europe contrast with his predecessor's official silence on the issue.

Concern over American policy accelerated during the 1980s. The strong French belief in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence results in a general suspicion of any American-sponsored efforts to raise NATO's nuclear threshold. The French fear that American policy is evolving toward the elimination of the last vestiges of a credible extended nuclear deterrent. The marked tendency in France is to equate the "no first use" option with the proposals put forward by General Bernard Rogers. The formulation may be different but the practical outcome is seen to be identical.[24] Rogers advocates the use of emerging technology to strengthen greatly NATO's conventional forces and potentially enable NATO to repel a conventional attack without resorting to nuclear escalation. Charles Hernu has warned that the Rogers's proposals would "excessively raise the nuclear threshold" and that they "ignore nuclear deterrence to the greatest possible extent."[25] The Soviet Union might thus come to believe that a European war could remain limited to the conventional level for a protracted period, a situation in which the costs to Moscow of an aggression might not outweigh the gains.

The Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars, has aroused additional French uneasiness. In the short term, the French fear that President Reagan's "messianic statements" on the possibility of total nuclear disarmament will further erode public support in the West for nuclear deterrence.[26] The prospect of an eventual deployment of extensive ballistic missile defenses by the United States and the USSR raises a host of concerns over future East-West strategic stability and over the credibility of France's independent nuclear force.[27]

Finally, French preoccupation with the three West German isms—nationalism, neutralism, and pacifism—has been thoroughly documented. The perceptions of a more menacing Soviet Union, of an increasingly uncertain American nuclear guarantee, and of political unrest in West Germany have greatly fueled French fears over the future solidity of their West German security shield.

[24] For sampling of this view, see Michel Tatu, "Le Problème amèricain," *Défense Nationale* 38 (December 1982): 68; and Michel Aurillac, "Une Garantie nucléaire française pour l'europe est-elle possible?" *Politique Etrangère* 48 (Summer 1983): 373.

[25] Charles Hernu, "Face à la logique des blocs, une france indépendante et solidaire," *Défense Nationale* 38 (December 1982): 12–13. A more recent official expression of the same view is in General Jeannou Lacaze, "Concept de défense et sécurité en europe," *Défense Nationale* 40 (July 1984): 22.

[26] Jacques Amalric, "Paris voudrait unifier les positions européennes face aux etats-unis," *Le Monde*, 22 March 1985.

[27] The French perceive nuclear deterrence as being undermined from "below" (the Roger's proposals) and from "above" (SDI). See Jacques Isnard, "Un Arsénal pré-stratégique," *Le Monde*, 31 October 1984; also Paul E. Gallis, Mark M. Lowenthal, and Marcia S. Smith, *The Strategic Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 1, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Socialist Innovations

The Socialist government consequently elaborated its Five Year Defense Program during 1982 and early 1983 amidst considerable political backing for the idea that France should attenuate the nationalistic bent of her defense posture and take steps to manifest greater military solidarity with its allies, West Germany in particular.[28] The response of Mitterrand's government centered around a restructuring of French conventional forces and a modernization of France's tactical nuclear weapons.

France is creating a conventionally armed five division rapid assistance force (FAR) which, without occupying a front line position, will be able to intervene alongside NATO forces prior to or at the outset of a European conflict. Official statements have confirmed that the major purpose of the FAR is to eliminate all ambiguity concerning the ability of French conventional forces to contribute to West European defense.[29] The restructuring of conventional forces also includes, however, a reduction in army manpower of 22,000 and a loss by the First Army of two armored divisions. Remaining armored divisions will receive additional main-battle tanks, and the heart of the FAR, an airmobile division and a light armored division, appears to be capable of militarily effective action in a central European conflict. But the restructuring of the French army has clearly been a difficult juggling act between the goals of remaining within the parameters of inherited doctrine, affirming the French conventional contribution to European defense, and keeping down spending on conventional forces.

The Hadès ground-launched missile is the centerpiece of the tactical nuclear weapons modernization. Its significance lies in its range of 350 kilometers, as opposed to 120 kilometers for the Pluton missile. The greater range of the Hadès will enable France to decouple its last warning tactical nuclear strike from the operations of the First Army. According to current plans, the Hadès will remain in France, facilitating tight political control, and the First Army will acquire greater flexibility to execute its mission as a NATO reserve force.[30]

The Hadès missile and a new air-to-surface medium-range missile (ASMP) will result in greatly increased tactical nuclear target coverage and firepower. However, the French Government has stressed that tactical nuclear weapons will not be used to conduct a "nuclear battle."[31] To emphasize this point, Hernu has

[28] This view is, of course, not unanimous. Most non-Communist reticence can be found in the RPR. See Robbin F. Laird, "The French Strategic Dilemma," 320–322; and Maurice Couve de Murville, "La Défense de la france," *Politique Etrangère* 48 (Summer 1983): 357–362.

[29] See the interview with Charles Hernu in *Le Monde*, 18 June 1983; and the statements of the Director of the General Studies Bureau of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff, also in *Le Monde*, 14 February 1984.

[30] Jacques Isnard, "Du Missile Hadès aux hélicoptères antichars," *Le Monde*, 16 December 1982; and Lacaze, "Politique de défense," 16–17.

[31] Charles Hernu, "Face à la logique des blocs," 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

renamed French ANT as "pre-strategic" weapons.[32] According to official pronouncements, the ANT modernization will bring three benefits.

It will enable France to execute its tactical warning strike without hitting West German soil. Superior firepower will render the warning strike more devastating and effective. The decoupling of the tactical nuclear force from the operations of the First Army accentuates the tactical nuclear role of a last warning. This is because decoupling will:

> eliminate the ever present temptation to regard tactical nuclear weapons as a battlefield super-artillery that can make a breach in enemy lines, which then leads to an attempted counter-attack. Decided far from the forces in contact, the tactical strike can now only appear for what it is in French strategy: the last warning. . . .[33]

Yet, other statements have ambiguously hinted at an expanded role for tactical nuclear weapons. Officials have noted that the tactical modernization will increase Soviet uncertainty as to when France might cross the nuclear threshold. The added flexibility concerning the moment of use and the targeting of the Hadès-ASMP duo, will, according to the head of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff, increase Soviet uncertainty as to exactly where French vital interests begin.[34] Hernu has noted that because of the FAR and the ANT modernization, the Soviet Union, in launching an attack in Central Europe, would immediately run the risk of confronting at a "more or less brief delay the conventional forces and/or the nuclear forces of the only independent nuclear power of the continent."[35] The insistence on ANT-FNS coupling that is underscored by the use of the term pre-strategic, combined with hints that the French government is moving toward a doctrine of earlier ANT use and greater French nuclear coverage of West Germany, strongly implies a greater willingness to consider the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany a vital interest for France.[36]

Future Alternatives

The creation of the FAR and the tactical nuclear modernization have not substantially diminished pressures for France to increase its contribution to allied defense. Although the French feel that West Germany now has "some good reasons to be a bit more reassured" when she looks towards France,[37] West Germans continue to express dissatisfaction with French defense policy. Their

[32] Jacques Isnard, "Un Arsénal pré-stratégique."

[33] Interview with Hernu, *Le Monde*, 18 June 1983.

[34] Lacaze, "Politique de défense," 16–17.

[35] Charles Hernu, *Défendre la Paix* (Paris: J. C. Lattés, 1985), 64–65.

[36] On French television Hernu suggested that a large scale Soviet chemical attack in Europe might "immediately" threaten France's vital interests, and would consequently call for a French nuclear response. See Jacques Isnard, "La France n'exclut pas d'employer l'arme nucléaire contre un agresseur qui userait de moyens chimiques," *Le Monde*, 19 April 1985.

[37] Jérôme DuMoulin, "L'Allemagne de l'ouest en première ligne," *L'Express*, 26 October 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perception that French nuclear forces almost exclusively serve French interests has not changed.[38] Politicians from the social democratic and conservative parties have demanded a German input on policy concerning any Western nuclear weapons that are deployed or targeted on German soil. As Franz Josef Strauss stated, "Germany also includes, of course, the German Democratic Republic."[39] All current and planned French ANT are targeted on either West or East German territory. At the conventional level, West Germans would like to see more robust French forces and even greater cooperation with NATO.

Three factors will hinder any significant French reinforcement of conventional capabilities. These factors are the limitations on defense spending growth due to the economic recession,[40] the continued priority accorded to nuclear weapons, and the doctrinal reticence to envisage prolonged conventional warfare. Even the UDF, the most "conventionally oriented" of the French parties, has endorsed the nuclear priority. When the UDF general secretary sharply attacked the nuclear orientation of French defense policy,[41] the UDF president and other prominent officials of the party disavowed his remarks.[42] The neo-Gaullist RPR favors accelerating the procurement of nuclear missile carrying submarines (SSBN).[43]

Ways exist, however, for France to help reinforce NATO's conventional defense without spending much additional money. The most likely initiative France might take in the area of conventional cooperation with NATO is to increase logistical support, with contingency planning for full wartime use of French territory, facilities, and lines of communication. This contingency planning would be of considerable military importance to NATO.[44] Certain French initiatives point in this direction. During a large NATO sea-air exercise in June 1983, France, for the first time since 1966, allowed NATO planes to refuel in French airspace. Hernu has openly acknowledged that deployment of the FAR would necessitate allied air cover and logistical support.[45] And although France is at-

[38] See, for example, Helmut Schmidt's speech to the Bundestag, 28 June 1984, reprinted in *Commentaire*, 7 (Autumn 1984): 409–417.

[39] See François de Rose, "La France et l'avenir de la dissuasion," *Politique Internationale* (Summer 1984): 118–120.

[40] The 1985 defense budget represents only a 0.5 percent real increase over that of 1984. See Georges Vincent, "Budget de la défense 1985," *Défense Nationale* 40 (December 1984): 161–165.

[41] He did so in a *Le Monde* commentary, 16 June 1983.

[42] *Le Monde*, 19–20 June 1983.

[43] The sixth SSBN was entered into service on 25 May 1985. The government plans to have a seventh operational SSBN by 1994, but the oldest one will be retired in 1997, making an operational force of six SSBNs for most of the period from 1985 to the turn of the century. See Laird, "French Nuclear Forces," 397–398. In 1983 the RPR proposed having nine operational SSBNs by 1994. More recently, they have advocated having an operational force of seven SSBNs. See *Contre-projet de loi de programmation militaire, 1984–1988* (Paris: RPR, 1983); and *Projet pour la france: libre et responsable*, (Paris: RPR, 1984).

[44] See Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Summer 1982): 1138–1139.

[45] *Le Monde*, 24 June 1983; also Georges Vincent, "Réflexions à bâtons rompus sur l'emploi de la force d'action rapide," *Défense Nationale* 40 (November 1984): 164–166.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tempting to enhance its target acquisition capabilities, notably through airborne radar and reconnaissance drones,[46] it seems likely that France will need to rely on cooperation with NATO in order to assure adequate target acquisition for its new, longer-range ANT.[47]

Another possible step would be for France to deploy forces in a front-line position.[48] Some authors note that part of de Gaulle's motive for the no-automaticity requirement, the fear of America leading France unwillingly into war, is less valid in the current post-Vietnam era of United States foreign policy.[49] On the other hand, opposition in Europe to the U.S. Pershing II and cruise missile deployment has stemmed in some part from exactly that fear. The RPR in particular is extremely sensitive to anything that smacks of "reintegration" into NATO. The RPR opposed the 350 kilometer range of the Hadès because of the probable dependence on NATO for target acquisition and also accused the government of using the FAR to disguise a French return to NATO integration.[50] Many would interpret deployment to a front-line position as a complete de facto return to NATO.

If the change to proportional representation in the French electoral system breaks the left-right bipolarization of French politics and, as Raymond Aron put it, enables the Socialists to "rediscover their centrist friends of the Fourth Republic," additional defense cooperation with NATO would perhaps become more feasible. But on the whole, basic changes in French policy will require significant progress in European defense cooperation. The goal of European defense cooperation receives more attention in France than in any other European country. In no other country does the idea of European defense without the United States attract as much debate and interest. Respected defense specialists have written books attempting to prove that European military autonomy is a viable goal.[51] President Mitterrand has declared that he understands the "force" of the idea and that it "must constitute an important objective for all West European leaders, subject to the condition of advancing prudently."[52] However, most French analysts view an independent European defense as a utopian goal for the near and medium-term period. The European countries must, therefore, refrain from any initiative capable of endangering the NATO alliance.[53] Debate in

[46] France would like to buy two or three AWACS, but is holding out for an American commitment to purchase a French battlefield communications system. Jacques Isnard, "Avions radars contre téléphone du champ de bataille," *Le Monde*, 27 March 1985.

[47] Jean-Yves le Drian, *Défense* (Paris: Assemblée Nationale, October 6, 1983), 23–24; and Jacques Chaumont, *Défense: Forces Terrestres* (Paris: Sénat, November 21, 1983) 38.

[48] Thierry de Montbrial, director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, is a prominent proponent of this option. See *Défense Nationale* 39 (April 1983): 170.

[49] For example, François Valentin, "L'arête étroite," *Défense Nationale* 39 (May 1983): 47–48.

[50] *Contre-projet*; and *Le Monde*, 4–5 December 1983.

[51] Notably Jean-Paul Pigasse, *Le Bouclier de l'europe* (Paris: Seghers, 1982); and Michel Manel, *L'Europe sans défense* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1982).

[52] *Le Monde* (International Edition), 17–23 November 1983.

[53] See for example, Hernu's interview with *Valeurs Actuelles*, 31 December 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France consequently centers around ways to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.

A very ambitious suggestion from the French Institute for International Relations and four other European research institutes involves an explicit extension of British and French deterrence to their allies and the creation of a European nuclear planning group that would provide a framework for joint discussion of nuclear targeting and for an eventual European financial contribution to the modernization of French and British nuclear forces.[54] RPR leader Jacques Chirac, after boldly stating in late 1983 that British and French nuclear forces could soon join with American ones to guarantee European security, subsequently retreated to more cautious language, but he still implicitly maintained that one day France and Britain should guarantee West Germany's borders.[55]

In his speech of 28 June 1984 to the Bundestag, former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt proposed a joint Franco-German defense initiative that would combine the extension of French deterrence to include Germany with a sufficient upgrading of German and French reserves to enable the two countries to deploy thirty fully-equipped land divisions in the event of mobilization. Germany would largely finance the required conventional improvements. Although Schmidt is reported to have discussed his proposal with President Mitterrand,[56] it provoked only limited analysis and debate in France.

French officials have categorically stated, however, that the FNS cannot be extended to cover France's allies.[57] Considerable obstacles confront this option. Even with the planned modernization of the FNS,[58] French capabilities for attacking Soviet nuclear forces will remain at best greatly circumscribed. The current government portrays its augmentation of strategic warheads as necessary in order to preserve a massive retaliation capacity against potential Soviet preemptive strikes and ballistic missile defenses.[59] French SSBN at sea are potentially

[54] Karl Kaiser et al., *La Communauté européenne: déclin ou renouveau* (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 1983) 81–87.

[55] *Le Monde*, 28 October 1983.

[56] William Drozdiak, "Schmidt Proposes Defense Merger by France, W. Germany," *Washington Post*, 29 June 1984.

[57] See Mitterrand's statements, for example, in *Le Monde*, 9 February 1984. General W. Y. Smith, "Alternative Strategies for NATO," Paper Presented at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 11 December 1984, 27–32, states that Schmidt's proposal would be a sound one even without France's extending its deterrent to cover Germany. However it is unlikely that Bonn would care to finance a substantial part of the equipment for French reserve forces without the incentive of a more German-oriented French nuclear doctrine. In any event, both Bonn and Paris would be hard put to find the funds needed for beefing up reserve forces.

[58] SLBM warheads will increase from 80 to 592.

[59] See Laird, "The French Strategic Dilemma," 13–14; and Kolodziej, "French Security Policy," 191–193. As a further hedge against ballistic missile defense, France is beginning research on penetration aids for its newest SLBM, the M4. See Charles Hernu, "Défendre la Paix," 44–47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vulnerable to Soviet attack submarines and to a nuclear barrage attack.[60] Improving command and control facilities is an important French objective, but it is problematical whether French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) will acquire the flexibility needed to execute many counter-force options. France plans to develop and deploy a mobile intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), but is likely to experience difficulty in keeping it sufficiently mobile to avoid preemption.

The mushrooming of European antinuclear movements in the 1980s demonstrates that open discussion of a nuclear "war-fighting" doctrine could only undermine public opinion support for the FNS and reinforces the arguments of those who favor the doctrinal status quo. An unambiguous extension of French strategic deterrence to West Germany must overcome either the technical and political problems of moving from massive retaliation to counter-force, or the exclusively political difficulties of a posture that offers the prospect of the annihilation of France before the threat to French territory could be clearly established. Even the UDF has expressed great caution on the potential European role of the FNS, calling it in March 1984 "a delicate problem."[61]

In view of these technical and political difficulties, medium-term European cooperation in the nuclear area will, if it occurs at all, center on tactical weapons. One RPR defense specialist has argued in favor of a French declaration proclaiming that "the security and liberty of its allies is a vital interest for France, indistinguishable from its own liberty and its own security." He added that France should deploy tactical nuclear weapons, including future neutron warheads, into Germany, where they would back up the declaration that French vital interests include the Federal Republic.[62] The UDF has long formally supported this option.[63] Although considerable opposition to the initiative exists within the RPR,[64] Chirac, who wields enormous influence over party policy, would appear to be favorably inclined.[65]

Towards the end of March 1984, Mitterrand stated that France could produce neutron bombs in several months, but was not proceeding in order to avoid exacerbating international tension.[66] For the moment the French government cer-

[60] George M. Seignious and Jonathan Paul Yates, "Europe's Nuclear Superpowers," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1984): 50.

[61] *Défendre l'Europe: propositions de l'union pour la démocratie française* (Paris, UDF, 1 March, 1984), 33, 40–41.

[62] Aurillac, "Une Garantie nucléaire française," 376–377; and *Le Monde*, 10 August 1983.

[63] See *Une Doctrine de défense pour la france* (Paris, UDF, May 1980), 38–39.

[64] The RPR's official defense spokesman has even argued that tactical nuclear weapons should only be marginal instruments of French defense policy. See François Fillon, "A quoi sert l'armament nucléaire tactique?" *Le Monde*, 10 November 1984.

[65] In a speech to the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Chirac stated that conventional *and* tactical nuclear forces could contribute to the common defense. See Jacques Chirac, "Le Rôle de la france dans les relations est-ouest," *Politique Etrangère* 49 (Autumn 1984): 683–684.

[66] *Le Monde*, 20 March 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tainly does not want to focus renewed European attention on nuclear issues, but in all likelihood France will eventually deploy neutron warheads.

The French government apparently flirted with the idea of stationing some French ANT in West Germany under a dual key system.[67] *Le Monde* editorialist Michel Tatu has written in support of this option.[68] The government does seem, however, eventually to have decisively rejected the idea.[69] Any stationing of French ANT in West Germany would of course require extensive Franco-German consultations and significant German influence on targeting policy. Apparent French reluctance to contemplate such close nuclear collaboration[70] indicates continued French uncertainty over future policy on ANT. But the evolution of political discourse and even more of operational capabilities seems to indicate that, seen at least from France, the tactical nuclear option in European defense cooperation enjoys some medium-term prospect of implementation. In this future French defense posture, some ambiguity on FNS use would undoubtedly be maintained, although French strategic forces would clearly be far more implicated than at present in assuring West European security.

French adherence to a nuclear use doctrine of "political signalling only" could enable French nuclear weapons to escape the war-fighting label attached to American ones.[71] In a speech to the February 1985 Munich Wehrkunde Conference, Hernu sought to allay West German fears that their country could become a nuclear battlefield by emphasizing the unacceptability for France of "any concept of limited [nuclear] war."[72]

Progress in European defense cooperation will inevitably be slow and incremental. European efforts are at the moment focused on defense policy formulation and on weapons development and procurement. The French government pushed hard to reactivate the Western European Union (WEU) as a forum for discussions in these two areas[73] and has also played a key role in efforts to include security issues and arms collaboration within the framework of European Economic Community (EEC) political cooperation.[74] While the Independent

[67] Roland Evans and Robert Novak, "Mitterrand Looks to Germany," *Washington Post*, 16 December 1983.

[68] *Le Monde*, 4–5 December 1983.

[69] See the authoritative article by André Adrets (pseudonym), "Les Relations Franco-Allemandes et le fait nucléaire dans une europe divisée," *Politique Etrangère* 49 (Autumn 1984): 656–657.

[70] William Drozdiak, "Bonn Seeks More Influence On French Nuclear Targeting," *Washington Post*, 20 April 1984; also, Adrets, "Les Relations Franco-Allemandes," 658–661. Adrets nonetheless recommends that France should ask Bonn for its opinion on contingency planning for ANT use.

[71] This label is a significant factor in European concern over nuclear weapons. See Gregory Flynn, "Public Opinion and Atlantic Defence," *NATO Review* 31 (October 1983): 4–11.

[72] Text in Charles Hernu, "Défendre la Paix," 263–274.

[73] France was instrumental in obtaining the abrogation of the remaining restrictions on German conventional armament imposed by the WEU treaty of 1954. This reform was a German condition for reactivating the WEU. See *Le Monde*, 25 February 1984; and *The Sunday Times* (London), 28 October 1984.

[74] The recommendations before the EEC largely cover the same areas that the WEU has taken up. See "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Questions to the European Council," *Europe*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European Program Group has, since its formation in 1976, attempted to promote European arms collaboration, initiatives in this area will undoubtedly be vastly improved if accompanied by a harmonization of national security assessments.[75]

The WEU and EEC initiatives were preceded by the formation in late 1982 of the Franco-German Commission on Security and Defense. The Commission set up three specialized working groups: on arms collaboration, on military cooperation, and on politico-strategic issues. Although the Germans have been frustrated by French reticence in dealing with nuclear issues, the work of the Commission was instrumental to the success of two important 1984 initiatives, the WEU revival and an agreement to produce a Franco-German combat helicopter.[76]

During 1985 the coordination of responses to the American Strategic Defense Initiative and the attempt to reach agreement on the production of the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) will provide key challenges for the process of European defense cooperation.[77] If the Europeans can succeed in defense policy coordination and in collaborative arms production, it will establish the confidence and mutual trust needed to set the stage for more far reaching cooperation in the difficult nuclear area.

The evolution of French policy depends on many factors. Developments in the United States, the Soviet Union, and West Germany will obviously play a large role. Some observers have expressed the view that French assumptions concerning West German "isms" are exaggerated.[78] If the French should reach that conclusion, it will eliminate one of the contributing factors to the recent evolution of their defense policy.[79] Yet, one should not underestimate the potential attraction to the French of constructing a strong European pillar of the alliance. French proposals for the deployment of European military space systems testify to the appeal for a France of "grand designs" in European defense cooperation.[80]

Documents, Nos. 1349/1350, 21 March 1985. However, the EEC and the WEU each bring different strengths and weaknesses to the defense cooperation endeavor. See William Wallace, "European Defence Co-operation: The Reopening Debate," *Survival* 26 (November/December 1984): 260–261.

[75] On reasons for this, see Stanley R. Sloan, "In Search of a New Transatlantic Bargain," *Survival* 26 (November/December 1984): 248–250.

[76] On the critical role of the commission in these two initiatives, see André Adrets, "Les Relations Franco-Allemandes," 650–653. On the helicopter agreement, see Michael Dobbs, "Paris, Bonn Join to Produce Combat Helicopter," *Washington Post*, 29 May 1984; and Germain Chambost and K. G. Benz, "The Franco-German Helicopter: Reconciling Contradictory Requirements," *International Defense Review* 17 (1984): 575–578.

[77] A discussion of EFA's problems is in *The Economist*, 16–25 March 1985.

[78] See, for example, Christoph Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (1984): 627.

[79] French fears concerning Germany do not, however, appear to be abating. For example, see the interview with Thierry de Montbrial, in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 19 April 1985.

[80] See Mitterrand's speech, reprinted in *Le Politique Etrangère de la France, textes et documents*, (Paris: La Documentation Française, January/February 1984), esp. 64: Critias (group of high level defense ministry officials), "Pour une capacité spatiale de l'europe," *Le Monde*, 16 March 1985;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is probable that only progress in European defense cooperation can provide the necessary enthusiasm for any French government to overcome the obstacles in the way of continuing to modify gradually the doctrinal principles which still give French defense policy its strongly nationalistic character. In the view of one French proponent of European defense cooperation, "it goes without saying that the French cannot move alone: one of the merits of Helmut Schmidt's speech is to raise the problem of European compensation for the modifications in the French position."[81] Without this "compensation," the recent evolution of French policy will probably stagnate, and France will eventually use the next favorable shift in the East-West politico-military balance to sink back to a more nationalistic defense posture. Conversely, ultimate French unwillingness to alter the defense dogmas of uncertainty, freedom of decision, and national sanctuary, would of course eliminate any possibility for long-term dramatic improvements in European defense cooperation.

Hernu's interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 March 1985, 476; and the unveiling of the Eureka proposal, *Le Monde*, 19 and 20 April 1985. One French general has even called for the development of an independent European strategic defensive system. John Vinocur, "Star Wars Plan for Europe Urged," *New York Times*, 8 March 1985. This latter idea does not enjoy government support. Although some observers, such as David Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," *The Washington Quarterly* 7 (Fall 1984): 125, interpreted Mitterand's February 1984 speech as a call for a European antiballistic missile program, the only concrete "space" proposal in the speech pertained to the construction of a European space station that would have military surveillance and communications capabilities.

[81] François Gorand, "Les Européens et la politique européenne de défense," *Politique Etrangère* 4 (Winter 1984): 946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Have the Poor Been "Losing Ground"?

CHARLES MURRAY

In the year since it was published, *Losing Ground* has become a political football in the debate about social policy toward the poor, and many of the substantive issues it raises have gotten lost in the melee. What follows recapitulates some of the major sources of controversy as of this writing (April 1985) and my response to them. I should emphasize at the outset that this is not an attempt to prove that *Losing Ground* is "right." The book covers too much ground and makes too many speculative interpretations to lend itself to airtight proof. What can be done at this point is to present reasons why the attempts to prove it is "wrong" are inadequate and to identify some of the gaps in knowledge that need to be filled in.

Let me begin by stating the core contentions of *Losing Ground*. The first is an assertion of fact:

> Basic indicators of well-being took a turn for the worse in the 1960s, most consistently and most drastically for the poor. In some cases, earlier progress slowed; in other cases mild deterioration accelerated; in a few instances advance turned into retreat.[1]

The book documents this assertion in the areas of poverty, employment, education, crime, and family structure.

The second is a causal argument that the governmental reforms of the 1960s were responsible for some unknown but large portion of this turn for the worse. The basic mechanism was summarized as follows:

[1] Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950–1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 8–9.

CHARLES MURRAY is a senior research fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. He was formerly chief scientist at the American Institutes for Research in Washington, D.C., where he conducted evaluations of social action programs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> A government's social policy helps set the rules of the game—the stakes, the risks, the payoffs, the tradeoffs, and the strategies for making a living, raising a family, having fun, defining what "winning" and "success" mean. The more vulnerable a population and the fewer its independent resources, the more decisive is the effect of the rules imposed from above. The most compelling explanation for the marked shift in the fortunes of the poor is that they continue to respond, as they always had, to the world as they found it, but that we—meaning the not-poor and the un-disadvantaged—had changed the rules of their world. . . . The first effect of the new rules was to make it profitable for the poor to behave in the short term in ways that were destructive in the long term. Their second effect was to mask these long-term losses—to subsidize irretrievable mistakes.[2]

These reforms include the Great Society legislation of 1964–66, but also court decisions, changes in bureaucratic regulations, and changes in the intellectual elite wisdom that both preceded and followed the Lyndon Johnson years. In one way or another, the critiques of *Losing Ground* have attempted to demonstrate why these contentions are inaccurate. I group the criticisms under four headings.[3]

The problems are overstated. The book is really talking about black youths, who are a small proportion of the population. Or, another version: welfare dependency is not a major problem.

Forces beyond our control caused the problems. The changes that *Losing Ground* recounts are explained by macroeconomic, demographic, and social trends.

The reforms worked. The job-training and educational programs helped. Medicaid improved the health of the poor. The income transfers have kept people out of poverty.

The causal analysis is contradicted by the available evidence. It has already been demonstrated that the reforms did not lead to illegitimacy and chronic unemployment.

An Overstated Problem

It has been proposed that the problems *Losing Ground* describes are not as serious as they seem. One such contention is that *Losing Ground* is, in effect, about problems of black youth. Black youths constitute a small fraction of the population; therefore, it is inappropriate to use them as a basis for indicting social policy as a whole.[4] The point of *Losing Ground*, however, is that the statistics on blacks are in large part a proxy measure of trends among poor

[2] Ibid., 9.

[3] To date, there have been only minor challenges to *Losing Ground's* description of trends in crime, education, and the family. I use the limited space in this discussion to focus on the major sources of dispute.

[4] Ben Wattenberg has made this point most emphatically in "Poverty's Variables," *The Washington Times*, 9 January 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people of all races. Whenever the data permit us to disaggregate by both race and economic class, as in the case of single-parent families and crime victimization, the behavior and trends we too easily have considered characteristic of blacks turn out to be characteristic of poor whites as well.[5] The alarm expressed in *Losing Ground* is not just that poor blacks are suffering extremely serious problems, but that these phenomena generalize to poor whites; not just that youth are involved, but that their behaviors are affecting life for much larger populations of people even now, and still larger ones in the future.[6]

Others have argued that even when whites are included, the number of permanently poor and dependent people is small and that the existence of an "underclass" has been grossly exaggerated. The primary source for this conclusion is *Years of Poverty Years of Plenty*, a report on analyses of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), in which it is concluded that only 2.0 percent of the U.S. population is "persistently dependent" on welfare income.[7]

The figure is encouragingly low. It is also the result of a definitional artifact. The authors require that any family classified as "dependent" receive more than 50 percent of its income from welfare, *not* including housing assistance, Medicaid, child nutrition, and unemployment payments.[8] Thus, for example, a family living in subsidized housing, receiving food stamps, paying for medical care through Medicaid, and relying on free school breakfasts and lunches for the children would not be classified as dependent if the earned income was greater than the size of the food stamp allowance. Only the food stamps would show up in the authors' calculation of the size of the welfare benefits received by the family. To be classified as "persistently dependent" requires that this condition obtain eight out of the ten years covered by the study. Given this definition, even a mother receiving long-term benefits from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was unlikely to qualify as "persistently dependent" on welfare if she moved in and out of the labor force periodically.

This extraordinarily restrictive conception has nothing to do with the problem of dependency described in *Losing Ground*. Apart from that, it masks a very troubling reality. Since the early 1970s, the United States has had a running population of more than 10 million people on AFDC. According to the PSID data, half the caseload on any given day, comprising more than five million

[5] *Losing Ground*, chaps. 8 and 9.

[6] See ibid., 186–91. A large sociological literature also suggests that black and white lower-class behaviors are essentially similar. See Edward C. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), note 13, 304. Special analyses of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics would permit some quantitative investigation of this proposition for the post-1968 period. Raw data for the Current Population Survey, if made available on public-use tapes, would permit analysis of some critical trendlines by race and economic class back to 1954.

[7] Greg J. Duncan et al., *Years of Poverty, Years of Plenty: The Changing Economic Fortunes of American Workers and Families* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, 1984), 75–78.

[8] Ibid., 73–74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people, are in the midst of a spell on AFDC that will last for at least eight years.[9] Illegitimacy among poor blacks in the early 1980s has been running at ratios of around 80 percent of all live births.[10] The size of the adult male underclass is unknown but large. One clue to its dimensions is that, depending on the specific year one chooses, somewhere between a million and two and a half million healthy, working-aged men, not in school, have no work experience whatsoever.[11]

These numbers are lower bounds, pointing primarily to the hard core. When one begins to add in the young woman who is on AFDC for only three years instead of eight, the young male who works for six weeks out of the year instead of zero, the teenager who does not give birth to an illegitimate child but who must grow up in a neighborhood without fathers, the numbers mushroom. They must be added in, for these people are just as much part of the problem described in *Losing Ground* as the hard core. The situation facing the working-aged poor has been obscured because it tends to exist where the white middle class does not often visit and because so many of its dimensions do not register on the economic indicators that have tended to preoccupy policy makers. But the urgency of the situation is not overstated in *Losing Ground.*

Forces Beyond Our Control

The Flooding of the Labor Market

Losing Ground focuses on two measures, the gap in black and white labor force participation (LFP) and the black-white unemployment ratio, to argue that black youths lost ground to whites in the labor market.[12]

[9] Based on the finding from the Panel Study that 50.2 percent of all persons on AFDC at any point are in the midst of a spell that will last at least eight years. See Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood, "The Dynamics of Dependence: The Routes to Self-Sufficiency," paper prepared for the assistant secretary for planning and evaluation, Department of Health and Human Services, June 1983, Table 1, 11.

[10] The figure of 79.9 percent has been reported for Central Harlem by the New York Department of Health, and Harlem is not by any means comprised entirely of poor people. For the nation as a whole, 1980 figures showed 590,000 live births for blacks, of which 325,700 were out-of-wedlock births—55.2 percent. Meanwhile, 67.5 percent of all blacks were above the poverty line. If it is assumed, as the evidence in Chapter 9 of *Losing Ground* indicates we should, that the illegitimacy rate of the black middle class is much lower than that of the black poor, then, as a few test calculations will reveal, the illegitimacy rate among poor blacks is perforce close to unity. 80 percent is an optimistic estimate. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 104th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), tables 85, 97.

[11] In 1981, when the unemployment rate was 7.6 percent, the number of such men with no work experience was 1.6 million. During the depths of the recession in 1982, the number was 2.5 million. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2199, *Work Experience of the Population in 1981–82* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Tables C-17 and B-17.

[12] The sources for these and other labor force data are Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Labor Force Statistics Derived from the Current Population Survey: A Databook. Vol. 1.* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982). Note that, whereas *Losing Ground* analyzed data for males, all labor force data in this discussion include both males and females. Michael Harrington has used ag-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The trends on both indicators, it has been objected, can be explained by the enormous changes that took place in the size of the labor force. John E. Schwarz, author of *America's Hidden Success*, writes that "Mr. Murray directs attention to the wrong cause. . . . . Swollen by tidal waves of Baby Boomers, the number of Americans aged 16 to 34 looking for employment between 1963 and 1980 expanded by an extraordinary 26 million; a 14-fold increase over the 1947 to 1963 period when the same age group increased in the labor force by fewer than two million."[13] The causal mechanism whereby the baby boom or the influx of women into the labor force produce these effects is competition. More whites are in the job market. Given a choice, employers hire the more attractive candidates, who tend to be white—either because of superior preparation or simple racism. The job market is perceived as a queue in which blacks stand at the end.

Losing Ground argued that such explanations are inadequate because of the peculiar timing of the changes in behavior. The gap in labor force participation did not open up during a time of economic slowdown, but during the boom years of the 1960s, when jobs were being created faster than even the baby-boomers could enter the labor market. I also pointed out in the book that older blacks—who were disproportionately not only poorly educated and holding low-skill jobs, but also without even the benefits of youth and flexibility—should have been most vulnerable to a changing economy and to increased competition from the baby boom and women. But older blacks continued to improve their employment position through the early 1970s.[14] None of the critiques published to date has explained how the swelling labor force hypothesis copes with these objections.

The swelling labor force hypothesis is susceptible, however, to more direct treatment than I presented in the book insofar as it implies that increases in the size of the labor force are associated with the deterioration in the employment position of black youths. Has this been the case? Have, in fact, increases in the number of persons competing for jobs been associated with the increase in the gap in black-white labor force participation or the increase in the black-white unemployment ratio?

If a relationship exists, it is not immediately apparent. From 1955–80, the labor force increased at a mean of 1.7 million persons annually, and the range of the annual increase was great, from a low of 155,000 in 1962 to a high of

---

gregate female LFP rates to argue that the trends in female labor force participation contradict the arguments that apply to males. See Michael Harrington, "Crunched Numbers," *The New Republic*, 28 January 1985, 7–10. In reality, the development of a black-white gap by age group for females parallels the male version almost exactly, as may be verified by plotting the data in Table 10 of the Appendix of Murray, *Losing Ground*, 250.

[13] John E. Schwarz, letter to the editor, *The Wilson Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1985): 172–3. See also the editorial "Losing More Ground," *New York Times*, 3 February 1985. Schwarz's full exposition of this view is in his *America's Hidden Success: A Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983).

[14] Murray, *Losing Ground*, 72–78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3,242,000 in 1978. But there is no direct association between the size of the annual increases and the size of the annual changes in the unemployment and LFP gaps between blacks and whites. Using data for the period 1955–80, the correlation of the size of change in the labor force with the corresponding change in the size of the black-white LFP gap among teenagers is effectively zero (+.03), as is its correlation with change in the black-white teenage unemployment ratio (also +.03).[15] Black teenagers did not experience greater employment problems in years with the larger increases in the labor force.

A more useful representation of change in labor force size is one that takes the job-creation performance of the economy into account. The indicator in this instance is "net work-seekers": the year's increase in the size of the labor force minus the year's change in the number of employed persons. A positive number thus represents more new work-seekers than jobs, and a negative number represents more new jobs than there were new workers to compete for them.

Again using the experience from 1955–80 for black and white teenagers (ages 16–19), the data do not fit the expectations that an excess of job seekers was associated with the deterioration in the employment situation of black youths. For example, in fourteen of those years, there were more new jobs than job seekers. Yet in eleven of those fourteen years, the gap in labor force participation increased. In eleven of those years, the unemployment ratio increased. Overall, the correlation of "net work-seekers" with the first difference in the LFP gap was −.02; the correlation with first difference in the unemployment ratio was strongly inverse: −.53.

We may also explore the hypothesis that it was specifically the increase in the number of teenagers, not general increases, that affected the indicators in question. Here too the bivariate relationships remain low. The correlation of the first difference in the size of the teenage population ages 16–19 with first difference in the gap in LFP is +.16; with first difference in the unemployment ratio, +.06.

Space does not permit extension of these numbers to other age groups, nor will I attempt to develop more complex models here. I will leave it as an assertion (one that can be readily explored from data in the appendix of *Losing Ground*) that the weakness of the relationship between the increase in the labor force, size of the teenage cohorts, and the labor force behavior persists across age groups and across sexes. This does not mean that changes in these demographic variables had no effect at all. I would expect that they did and that a well-specified model will reveal such independent effects. The question is whether the relationships have much explanatory power, and to this the answer so far seems to be

[15] Pearson *r* using annual changes (first differences) in: total civilian labor force, black–white unemployment ratio for 16–19 year-olds, and the black–white percentage gap in LFP for 16–19 year-olds. "Black" in all cases denotes "black and other." It should be noted that comparable results obtain when the change in size of the labor force is expressed as a percentage increase instead of a raw numerical increase.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"no." The more complex modeling that has been done to date supports this conclusion.[16]

Changes in the Job Market

Such relationships between labor force size and the experience of blacks relative to whites do not dispose of the argument that the swelling labor force had something to do with the deterioration of the black employment situation. The next hypothesis to examine is that the job creation was of a kind that was bound to leave blacks behind, and here we begin to touch on a second category of objections to the argument in *Losing Ground* having to do with the overall economic changes that affected the United States during the post-1965 period.

The Oil Shock. Let me first briefly comment on one set of arguments based on the changes brought about by the oil shock that occurred at the end of 1973.[17] By that time, the trends that comprise the main portion of the indictment in *Losing Ground* were already established. By 1973, reductions in poverty among the working-aged had been stopped for three years. The gap in LFP among black and white teenagers had already grown to 16 percentage points. The unemployment ratio of black and white youth was at 2.4:1, compared with the ratio of 1.9:1 that had prevailed through the early 1960s. And the other noneconomic trends as well, in crime, education, and family structure, were already well-established. The oil shock of 1973 and the subsequent economic troubles we have come to associate with it undoubtedly affected a variety of employment and income trends. But trends in the post-1973 period are essentially irrelevant to the argument in *Losing Ground.* The problems it analyzes had begun much earlier.

If we consider the overall period, however, to what extent were blacks being caught in economic transformations that left them at a special disadvantage and that might, therefore, explain the statistics on labor force participation and unemployment relative to whites?[18] From 1965 to 1980, the American economy created an unprecedented number of new jobs. White collar jobs were up 18.2 million. In the skilled blue-collar fields (crafts, operatives), a total of 3.8 million new jobs were created. In the low-skill areas (nonfarm labor, service), another 4.8 million new jobs were created. In farming, 1.3 million jobs were lost.[19] How did blacks fare?

[16] M. L. Wachter and C. Kim, "Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness," unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, 1979.

[17] See Frank Levy, letter to the editor, *The Wilson Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1985): 170–71; and my response, ibid., 174–75.

[18] It has frequently been suggested to me during public discussions of *Losing Ground* that jobs left the central city during this period and this explains the decline in the fortunes of black youth, but the data do not support the proposition. See Diane Westcott, "Youth in the Labor Force: An Area Study," *Monthly Labor Review* 99 (July 1976): 3–9.

[19] *Employment and Training Report of the President* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), Table A-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Farm Employment. We may begin with the diminishing number of farming jobs. Robert Greenstein has argued, using an article by John Cogan as his basis, that this explains away the problem: "Cogan . . . shows that virtually all of the decline in black teenage employment from 1950 to 1970 was caused by the disappearance of low-paying jobs in the South, as southern agriculture was mechanized."[20] One problem with extrapolating from the Cogan article to the argument in *Losing Ground* is that Cogan combined LFP and unemployment data, while the trends in these two indicators showed very different patterns. During the 1950s, while agricultural jobs were vanishing most rapidly and the unemployment ratio was increasing, black teenage labor force participation nonetheless kept pace with that of whites, whereas it abruptly stopped doing so during the slower loss of agricultural jobs in the 1960s. Why should a weakening "cause" suddenly produce a new and very strong "effect"?

A second difficulty with Greenstein's interpretation is that Cogan was limited to decennial census data covering a time when the within-decade trends were changing rapidly. We know that the divergence in white and black economic indicators reported in *Losing Ground* occurred only in the last half of the 1960s; indeed, we know that during the first half of the 1960s the unemployment ratio was holding steady and the LFP gap was actually closing. We further know that the reductions in teenage agricultural employment in the 1960s were concentrated in the early 1960s—of the total loss of teenage agricultural jobs during the 1960s, 71 percent had occurred by 1965. By the last half of the 1960s, only a very small proportion of black teenagers in the labor force were still involved in the agricultural sector (only 8 percent of non-white teenagers in the labor force as of 1967, or 3 percent of the non-white teenage population).[21] If reductions in agricultural employment are to explain the divergence in white and black teenage labor force behavior in the last half of the 1960s, why did they not have a similar effect in the first half of the 1960s?

Combining these observations with Cogan's analysis of the 1960–70 comparison, a specific prediction seems justified: If labor force data by urban versus rural locations for the 1960s are disaggregated by year, they must reveal a rapidly improving black teenage unemployment situation in urban areas during the first half of the 1960s, despite the indifferent performance of the economy during those years, and one that deteriorated just as rapidly during the last half of the 1960s, despite the boom.[22]

Nonfarm Employment. Among nonagricultural jobs, the pie was expanding substantially in all job categories. Given the queue explanation—that blacks would tend to be selected after whites if both were available—of the deteriora-

[20] Robert Greenstein, "Losing Faith in 'Losing Ground,'" *The New Republic*, 25 March 1985, 16; see also John Cogan, "The Decline in Black Teenage Employment: 1950–70," *The American Economic Review* 72 (September 1982): 621–38.

[21] *Labor Force Databook*, vol. 1, Table A-15.

[22] The data for such an analysis can presumably be retrieved from the Current Population Survey (CPS) data tapes, but to my knowledge it has not yet been done.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Percentage of New Jobs Obtained by Blacks

	White Collar	*Craft & Kindred*	*Operatives*	*Nonfarm Labor*	*Service*
1960–65	11.4	16.0	16.6	11.3	24.4
1965–70	14.0	18.2	63.5	(10.4)	(9.1)
1970–75	17.6	12.7	n/a*	(9.4)	7.2
1975–80	14.9	15.8	30.9	(4.2)	13.6

Open figures refer to the net increase in black jobs during that period expressed as a percentage of all new jobs in that category during that period. Figures in parentheses denote a net loss of black jobs, expressed as a percentage of the jobs in that category held by blacks in the baseline year.

* The number of jobs in the "operatives" category decreased during this period.

Source: *Employment and Training Report of the President*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), Table A-20.

tion in the employment of blacks, what proportions of these new jobs might be expected to have gone to blacks? Or to put it another way, for which of these job categories was the competition from the influx of white women and baby-boomers most intense? The reader is invited to answer the question before examining Table 1, which shows the proportion of the new jobs acquired by blacks during the same periods of time.

"Blacks and others" constituted roughly 11 percent of the population in 1960 and 14 percent in 1980. Applying this information to Table 1, it may be said that in the early 1960s blacks were acquiring at least their share of new jobs in nonfarm labor, substantially more than their proportional share of the new skilled blue-collar jobs, and a very high proportion of the new service jobs. Insofar as the proportion of college graduates among blacks in 1960s was far lower than that of the white population, it may also be inferred that blacks were getting a disproportionate number of the new white-collar jobs.

After the mid 1960s, the same generalizations held true for the white-collar and skilled blue-collar occupations. For the low-skill job categories, the situation dramatically reversed. In nonfarm labor, blacks experienced a net *loss* of jobs from 1965 onward, from 966,000 such jobs in 1965 to 866,000 in 1970. By 1980, the figure had dropped to 752,000. During the same period, whites acquired a net of 984,000 additional nonfarm labor jobs. In the service sector, blacks went from an extremely high rate of job acquisition in the early 1960s to a net drop of 220,000 jobs from 1965–70. Only in the last half of the 1970s did blacks once again begin to acquire close to their proportional share of the new service jobs being created.

Losing Ground's explanation of this anomalous pattern is that young blacks changed their posture toward low-skill, low-paying jobs. The alternative proposition is that the extraordinary shift of low-skill jobs from blacks to whites reflects an influx of more qualified (or racially attractive) women and baby-boomers for these jobs. But consider the difficulties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If discrimination is at issue, it must be remembered that women also had to fight discrimination, especially in the nonfarm labor sector. For nonfarm labor and service jobs involving heavy work, women were also at a competitive disadvantage because of size and strength. Nor can it be assumed that employers gave preference to job candidates who had extra academic or other credentials—overqualification can be as much of a handicap as other forms of discrimination. The notion that an employer, given the choice, would naturally rather hire a white woman or a college-educated white than a young, poorly educated black for low-skill labor is not self-evidently valid.

On the face of it, blacks competing for the skilled labor and white-collar positions would seem to have faced the most severe obstacles in a rapidly expanding labor force. The higher the skill, the more likely that licensing restrictions and union rules impeded black entrance into the workplace.[23] Blacks seeking professional positions faced a burgeoning pool of white competitors who had gone to better colleges and had higher grades and test scores.[24] Why then did blacks do so well in getting their share of the higher-skill jobs while doing so poorly in the lower-skill jobs? Affirmative action? But blacks were doing well in *all* job categories in the early 1960s, before the affirmative action legislation and court decisions were made, and continued to do well in the late 1960s in the higher-skill categories, before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had begun to wield enforcement powers.

It may well be that beginning in the mid-1960s, employers did tend to favor whites, women, or Asians for positions that formerly tended to go to blacks, but not necessarily because white employers were waiting for the opportunity to express their racism. Rather, *Losing Ground* argues, job-seeking behaviors and on-the-job behavior were changing in ways that made the youths from working-class and middle-class families more attractive employees than youths from the poorest segments of the community. The explanation presented in *Losing Ground* implies another specific prediction: microeconomic analyses of the employment experience of black youths from blue-collar and middle-class families will reveal that they acquired and held low-paying jobs at rates approaching those of whites. Similar analyses of the experience of poor white youth will reveal that their patterns of low-skill employment are similar to those usually associated with black youth.

The Successes of the Great Society

A third major theme of the critiques of *Losing Ground* is that the book ignores the successes of the Great Society. I will deal with this set of criticisms under three headings: the education and training programs, health and nutrition programs, and income transfer programs.

[23] See Walter Williams, *The State Against Blacks* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).

[24] See Charles Murray, "Affirmative Racism," *The New Republic*, 31 December 1984, 18–23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Education and training. The brunt of *Losing Ground's* argument is that education for blacks was improving until the mid-1960s. Thereafter, education for the population as whole deteriorated substantially. While we do not have adequate longitudinal data to document what happened to blacks during this period, observation of what happened in inner-city schools suggests that the deterioration for blacks seems to have been as great or greater than for whites.[25] This fundamental statement of trends is not especially controversial. Rather, it has been argued that evaluations of some of the specific programs, notably the job training programs, compensatory education, and Head Start, show some successes.

Losing Ground's review of these evaluations does not dispute this. Some programs produced evidence of progress; others did not. Most were ambiguous. Sometimes the results went the wrong way, and the evaluations had to explain why the students in the programs were doing worse than the control group. Making sense of this literature becomes even more difficult because of the widely varying quality of the research.[26]

The point of *Losing Ground*, however, was not that the special educational programs failed, nor that the job training programs failed. They were not the culprit. On the contrary, I advocated more and better educational and training programs as one of our most promising routes for helping the disadvantaged.[27] My criticism was, and remains, of the mind-set that permits one to scrutinize the data for small program-specific effects while ignoring that the desired overall state of affairs—good education, high employment—among the disadvantaged slipped further from reach.

Health. The conventional wisdom holds that the great success story of the Great Society for the non-aged was the dramatic improvement in health among the poor produced by Medicaid and the nutrition programs. Why were these ignored in *Losing Ground*? According to one critic, the reasons were sinister: "[Murray] never refers to any evidence about the health of blacks and the poor since the story there is exactly the reverse of the one he wants to tell."[28] As it happens, the allegation is half right. The original outline for *Losing Ground* included a chapter on health. The reasons that I finally decided to omit it are instructive.

[25] The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) shows that the deterioration after the early 1970s was minor. I will not engage in the very complicated argument about what and how well the NAEP measures. It seems plausible that most of the deterioration in the schools had already taken place by the early 1970s and that the rest of the decade saw a holding action, with some improvement perhaps beginning in the late 1970s.

[26] For a summary of some of the leading literature on the job programs, see Murray, *Losing Ground*, 37–39 and the associated notes. For compensatory education see, for example, the synthesis of evaluations of Title 1 programs from 1966–76 conducted for the National Institute of Education. Robert J. Rossi, Donald H. McLaughlin, Emily A. Campbell, and Bruce E. Everett, *Summaries of Major Title 1 Evaluations, 1966–76* (Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, 1977).

[27] *Losing Ground*, 223–27.

[28] Paul Starr quoted by Greenstein, "Losing Faith," 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Basic Health Indicators: The Black Rate as a Percentage of the White Rate from 1950 to 1980

Year	Infant Mortality	Maternal Mortality	Life Expectancy at Age 20		Low Birth-Weight Births
			Male	Female	
1950	166	363	88	86	144
1960	189	377	91	89	188
1970	174	388	89	91	202
1980	174	296	91	93	219

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, annual). Data refer to blacks and others.

In the field of health, there was every reason to expect that data would in fact tell a success story. Medical science has made major advances since Medicaid began, and access to medical science was surely made more available to the poor through Medicaid. Nor was there any reason to avoid telling of success. The intent of *Losing Ground* was not to claim that the government is powerless to do good in any arena of life, but to try to discriminate the things that social policy can do (or has done) from the things that it cannot do (or has not done).

I examined four measures that seemed appropriate for tracking health of the poor over the period 1950–1980: infant mortality, maternal mortality, low birthweight births (under 2,500 grams), and life expectancy (at age 20, to capture the quality of adult health care).[29] The results were that infant mortality among blacks showed a sharp drop beginning in the late 1960s, maternal mortality showed an equally sharp drop beginning in the mid-1950s, life expectancy showed an increase in the 1970s for black men and an increase more or less throughout the entire three decades among black women, and low birth-weight births showed an increase through the mid-1960s and a slight decrease thereafter.

To what extent did these represent improvements that were occurring as medical science improved, and to what extent did they represent the kind of progress that I was investigating: blacks closing the gap with whites? The results are summarized in Table 2.

The year-by-year plots are even more ambiguous than the trends as indicated in this summary table. Consider, for example, the indicator most widely cited as evidence of the success of the Great Society health programs, the reduction in infant mortality among blacks. The raw reduction was large. Infant deaths among nonwhites fell from 43 per 1,000 live births in 1960, to 31 in 1970, and to 19 by 1980. But as Table 2 indicates, the large raw reduction was small in proportional terms—infant mortality fell for everyone, including blacks. But we

[29] The data to be cited on infant mortality and life expectancy are taken from U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, annual).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may pursue the issue of causation further. Allen Matusow has compared infant mortality statistics during the period 1965–69 for states that had not implemented the Medicaid program during that period and found that the reductions in infant mortality were as large in the states without Medicaid as in those with a fully implemented program. Alabama and Mississippi had no Medicaid during that period, and their infant mortality rates fell by 14.8 and 21.5 percent respectively. Louisiana, a neighboring state with a comparable baseline, implemented the program in 1966 and its rate fell by 18.3 percent. Indiana had no Medicaid during the period, and its rate fell by 13.5 percent. Neighboring Illinois, with a comparable baseline rate, implemented Medicaid in 1966 and its rate fell by 6.3 percent.[30]

I do not use these data to claim that the reductions in infant births were larger in the states without Medicaid, but to point to the extreme difficulty of documenting claims that Medicaid is the cause of substantial improvements. Much the same comments apply to the data purported to show improvements in nutrition among the poor, which I will not attempt to review here.[31]

As I examined the data on health, it soon became clear that the correct answer to the question, "What has happened in health and nutrition?" was that we are not yet sure. To the extent that there has been progress in the health of the poor, it appears to have tracked with improvements among the affluent and was arguably no greater than would have occurred in the absence of the extremely expensive programs that were installed. Given the broad popular conception that substantial progress *has* been made, I decided that an argument otherwise should be made in a full-scale analysis, not in a single chapter of *Losing Ground.*

Poverty. Losing Ground presents trendlines for poverty showing that progress against poverty among the working-aged stopped in the late 1960s, ending progress that had continued, in tandem with economic growth, since the end of World War II.[32] In refutation, it has been argued that given the rising unemployment rates of the 1970s, the income transfers were essential in preventing poverty from rising. The flat poverty rate for the working-aged from 1968 onward is evidence of success, not failure.[33]

[30] Allen Matusow, data compiled from *Vital Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, annual), presented at a symposium, "The Great Society: A 20-Year Critique," Austin, Texas, 19 April 1985.

[31] See George G. Graham, "Searching for Hunger in America," *The Public Interest*, 78 (Winter 1985): 3–17; and James Bovard, "Feeding Everybody," *Policy Review* 26 (Fall 1983): 42–51, for a sense of the confusion surrounding the data on this issue. The bibliography in Bovard's article includes many of the basic Department of Agriculture and General Accounting Office studies of nutritional progress.

[32] Retrospective estimates of the poverty statistics back to 1947 were reported in "Economic Report to the President: Combating Poverty in a Prosperous Economy" (January 1969) reprinted in Molly Orshansky, ed., *The Measure of Poverty, Technical Paper 1*, vol. 1. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), 349.

[33] Example of this argument are in Greenstein, "Losing Faith," and casual assertions in numerous reviews of *Losing Ground.* The most complete exposition is in an article prepared for *Challenge*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Neither side in the dispute can make its case in the absence of some crucial causal assumptions. If the decline in employment among black youths is caused by variables exogenous to social policy, and if the rise in female-headed households among blacks is caused by variables exogenous to social policy, then the conclusion is inescapable: without the increase in transfer payments, poverty among the working-aged would have risen substantially during the 1970s. If these phenomena were in part effects of social policy, then one may examine the massive job creation that occurred and ask why certain segments of the American population opted out of competition. One may ask why increasing numbers of blacks and poor people in general formed single-parent families that virtually guaranteed they would remain poor no matter what happened to the economy. It is the issue at the core of *Losing Ground's* argument: what is causing what?

Causes and The Empirical Record

The test of whether *Losing Ground* is "right" is still in the future. In the classic scientific paradigm, one presents a set of observations, advances a theory to explain them, then tests the theory against new data. *Losing Ground* in effect got through the first two of those steps.

The theory itself has little that is new. Martin Anderson, Edward Banfield, Milton Friedman, George Gilder, Thomas Sowell, and Walter Williams are just a few of the more prominent observers who have recently made similar points.[34] And, as Gertrude Himmelfarb's *The Idea of Poverty* so elegantly describes, the underlying ideas in the debate over helping the poor in the late twentieth century were anticipated, often with more subtlety and rigor, by English intellectuals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[35]

But while the ideas have been around for centuries, social scientists in the modern era have been slow to build testable models worthy of the theories. More bluntly, social scientists who have purported to test "conservative" theory regarding poverty and welfare—including that presented in *Losing Ground*—have seemed determined to cast such theory in terms of stereotypes that are easy to refute.

Illegitimacy. This is most apparent in the causal arguments regarding the illegitimacy rate. In 1984, David T. Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane of Harvard com-

magazine by Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, "Social Programs—A Partial Solution to, But Not a Cause of Poverty: An Alternative to Charles Murray's View."

[34] Each has been prolific. Some basic sources are Martin Anderson, *Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Edward C. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); Thomas Sowell, *Ethnic America: A History* (New York: Basic Books, 1981); and Walter Williams, *The State Against Blacks* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).

[35] Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pleted a study that has since been used as the stock refutation of the proposition that welfare causes illegitimate births.[36] The conclusion is based on regression analyses of the effects of AFDC on divorce, separation, independent living arrangements, and illegitimacy. The analyses revealed that AFDC had substantial effects on living arrangements and lesser effects on separation and divorce. But they found no significant effect of AFDC on illegitimate births. The authors concluded that "[w]elfare simply does not appear to be the underlying cause of the dramatic changes in family structure of the past few decades."[37]

Now let us imagine the conditions under which two different levels of the "cause"—the dollar value of the AFDC payment—might have shown such an effect on illegitimate births. On consideration, it becomes apparent that the model will apply if poor young women accurately figure up the precise amount of the AFDC payment available to them and decide to get pregnant (or, being pregnant, decide to keep the baby) if the prospective welfare check is large enough, and otherwise not to do so. I submit that no serious observer of the phenomenon of rising illegitimate births accepts that stereotype; certainly not me.

Further, the model assumes that the existing range of welfare packages would reveal a causal impact of money payments. Why should this be so? To me, a more plausible model would posit a discontinuous function. At some very low level, welfare benefits have no causal effect on poor single women having and keeping babies. At some high level (higher than any existing package), welfare benefits would make having a baby so economically beneficial for a poor person that it would in itself be a "cause" of such behavior. Between those two extremes, a break point exists at which the level of welfare benefits is sufficiently large that it permits an alternative to not having (or not keeping) the baby that would otherwise not exist. Once this break point is passed, welfare benefits become an enabling factor: they do not cause single women to decide to have a baby, but they enable women who are pregnant to make the decision to keep the baby. If in all states the package of benefits is already large enough to have passed the break point for a large proportion of the potential single mothers, then the effects on increases in the welfare package as measured by Ellwood and Bane will be very small.

How great is the range of welfare benefits? Ellwood and Bane open their report by stating that "the extreme variation in benefits across states seems to offer a marvellous natural experiment for testing the influence of welfare benefits," comparing Mississippi with its $60 monthly AFDC allowance to Michigan's $399. The study limits the independent variable to the value of AFDC, assuming that "total benefits are positively correlated with maximum AFDC benefits across states."[38] But food stamps, Medicaid, and other important benefits are ei-

[36] David T. Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, "The Impact of AFDC on Family Structure and Living Arrangements," Paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under Grant No. 92A-82, March, 1984.

[37] Ibid., Executive Summary, 8.

[38] Ibid., 74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ther invariant across states or subject to much less local discretion than the AFDC payment. As a result, while the correlation with the AFDC payment is surely "positive," the variation in the total welfare package is much narrower than a comparison of AFDC payments would lead one to expect. A study by the General Accounting Office estimated the value of welfare packages available as of 1978 and found that in a stingy location (New Orleans), the monthly dollar package amounted to $654 if housing benefits were obtained, $511 if they were not. In a generous location (San Francisco), the corresponding packages were $867 and $734.[39] This is not a wide range. The package in New Orleans seems large enough to me to have passed the "break point." Then we correct for the difference in the cost of living in San Francisco and New Orleans, and the difference between the two cities is diminished.[40] Correct for the differences in per capita income (to capture income relative to the local standard) and the welfare package in New Orleans puts the recipient at almost exactly the same relative level as the package in San Francisco.[41] The young woman has to be a very precise calculator, extremely sensitive to small differences in real income, and indifferent to considerations of relative income, to figure out why it is sensible to give birth and keep the baby in San Francisco while it is not in New Orleans.

On these grounds alone, I would not expect the Ellwood and Bane approach to detect the effect of welfare on illegitimacy. But perhaps the more important point is that *Losing Ground* explicitly urges that a multidimensional model is essential to understanding illegitimacy rates, or increased unemployment among poor youth, or any of the other trends that the book deplores. It can be extremely important in a young woman's assessment of alternatives that she will be unable to live with the father of the child, or any other man (as was true before the Department of Health, Education and Welfare abandoned enforcement of the "man in the house rule" in the mid-1960s).[42] It can be extremely important for her to know that she cannot supplement the welfare payment with any other income (as was true before the enactment of the "30 and a third" provision in 1967). These changes do not provide a cross-sectional "natural experiment"; they occurred nationwide.

Beyond these considerations, *Losing Ground* argues that the context in which

[39] General Accounting Office, "Public Assistance Benefits Vary Widely from State to State, But Generally Exceed the Poverty Line" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 November 1980), 19–20.

[40] To make a rough estimate from Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, annual), Tables 786 and 788, the cost of living in Atlanta, Ga., (the only southern city in the tables) was about 86 percent of the cost in San Francisco.

[41] With housing benefits, the welfare package amounted to 65.6 percent of median household income in San Francisco and 66.4 percent of median household income in New Orleans. Without housing benefits, the comparable figures were 55.5 percent in San Francisco and 51.9 percent in New Orleans. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), Table C.

[42] This procedural change was made official by the Supreme Court in *King v. Smith*, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the illegitimacy rate among poor women increased cannot be understood without understanding as well the importance of changes in crime, education, and status rewards—an interactive system that was described at length in the book and has scarcely been mentioned in any of the critiques. That "welfare," construed as the dollar payment for AFDC, does not cause higher illegitimacy rates is proven. The thesis in *Losing Ground* has barely been discussed, let alone tested.

Unemployment. Another caricature of *Losing Ground's* position involves the unemployed black youth. The stereotype says that black youths decide they can get more money on welfare than by taking a low-paying job. They are lured onto welfare rather than working for a living. Once on welfare, people become dependent on it and no longer seek work. The children of welfare recipients adopt the same slothful attitudes and themselves become dependent on welfare. This sequence of events is typical of welfare users.

This view is readily refuted by evidence that work pays more than welfare, by survey research that reveals black youths share middle-class aspirations for jobs and high income, and by evidence that most black youths are at least periodically employed, thereby demonstrating their allegiance to the job market. It can be further demonstrated that only small proportions of people who ever use welfare benefits remain on them for prolonged periods of time and that most of the children of welfare-dependent parents are not welfare-dependent as adults.[43]

The argument in *Losing Ground* bears no relationship to the stereotype. *Losing Ground* assumes that the typical poor youth aspires, just as middle-class youths do, to a high income. He or she knows that welfare will not provide a high income. This was as true in 1970 and 1980 as it was in 1950 or 1960. But for a person with limited education and talent, the most reliable way out of poverty is to acquire such a low-income job; keep working as steadily as possible through a succession of such jobs so as to acquire some skills and a good work record; and thereby eventually to move into a relatively secure job with a decent wage.

The reforms of the 1960s—as construed in *Losing Ground*, not reforms limited to "the Great Society"—discouraged poor young people, and especially poor males, from pursuing this slow, incremental approach in four ways. First, they increased the size of the welfare package and transformed the eligibility rules so as to make welfare a more available and attractive *temporary* alternative to a job. Second, the reforms in law enforcement and criminal justice increased access to income from the underground economy. By the 1970s, illegal income (including that from dealing in drugs, gambling, and stolen goods, as well as direct predatory crime) had become a major source of income in poor communi-

[43] The studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are the most commonly cited sources of these data. In addition to Duncan et al., *Years of Poverty* and Bane and Ellwood, "Dynamics of Dependence" cited earlier, also see Martha S. Hill et al., "Motivation and Economic Mobility of the Poor. Part 1: Intergenerational and Short-Run Dynamic Analyses" (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, 3 August 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties. Third, the breakdown in inner-city education reduced job-readiness. Acculturation to the demands of the workplace—arriving every day at the same time, staying there, accepting the role of a subordinate—diminished as these behaviors were no longer required in the schoolroom. Fourth, the reforms diminished the stigma associated with welfare and simultaneously devalued the status associated with working at a menial, low-paying job—indeed, holding onto a menial job became in some poor communities a *source* of stigma.

All of these reasons, separately and interactively, encouraged young people at a critical phase of their lives to move in and out of the job market. The desire for high income remained; but the perceived means to it were more likely to be the "break," either through crime or the materialization of a "good" job. As I put it in *Losing Ground*: "The changes in welfare and changes in the risks attached to crime and changes in the educational environment reinforced each other. Together, they radically altered the incentive structure. I characterize these changes, taken together, as encouraging short cuts in some instances (get rich quick or not at all) and "no cuts" in others—meaning that the link between present behavior and future outcomes was obscured altogether."[44] As in the case of causation and illegitimacy, it is no exaggeration to say that the critiques of *Losing Ground* have not succeeded or failed in discrediting this argument, but rather have ignored it.

Unanswered Questions

In many respects, the chief subject of *Losing Ground's* indictment is not only the governmental reforms of the 1960s, but the inability, or reluctance, of modern social science to explore the issues it raises. *Losing Ground* examines the experience of the last thirty years of social policy and finds a variety of phenomena that demand explanation. I put forward such an explanation, adducing a variety of evidence that the explanation is consistent with what is known. But to prove that I was right or wrong, or partly right, or to demonstrate what the alternative "truth" is, social science will have to develop new tools and ask new questions. Social scientists who leave behind their multiple-choice questionnaires and go out to talk with employers of low-skill labor will find that the reality of the employment problems among poor youth as described in *Losing Ground* are undeniable. How might this reality be calibrated and analyzed? If they talk to young single mothers and their neighbors—not in a formal interview, but in leisurely conversation—they will hear an account of the complicated role of the welfare alternative and its interaction with community norms, spun out openly and with surprising self-awareness. How might these insights be converted to data? Journalists and a few social scientists working in the anthropologists' tradition have shown that the information is out there and can be ob-

[44] Murray, *Losing Ground*, 167–68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tained.[45] It is time that quantitative social scientists became more venturesome in taking advantage of such data to enrich our understanding of the dynamics that link social policy to the problems of the poor and disadvantaged.

[45] A few of the leading examples are Ken Auletta, *The Underclass* (New York: Random House, 1982); George Gilder, *Visible Man* (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Douglas G. Glasgow, *The Black Underclass: Poverty, Unemployment, and Entrapment of Ghetto Youth* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981); John Langston Gwaltney, *Drylongso: A Self-Portrait of Black America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981); and Elliot Liebow's classic *Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How the Welfare System Promotes Economic Security

SAR A. LEVITAN

Underlying the New Deal, the Great Society, and related social legislation is an abiding trust in the potential greatness of American society. The designers of the evolving welfare system have assumed that our future is not predetermined, but can be molded by our energies, resources, and faith in the American future. They also have shared the belief that the United States is not condemned to passive acceptance of inequality of opportunity, poverty, urban blight, and economic booms and busts and that these social and economic ills could be alleviated and hopefully even eventually eradicated.

This vision of our future has been challenged and blunted by recent criticisms. It is ironic that the current most vociferous critics of the welfare system condemn the progress resulting from the social and economic initiatives taken by the New Deal and the Great Society while they accept the worst economic slump faced by the nation in four decades as an inevitable development.

Broadly defined, the American welfare system as it evolved over the past half century is the product of a sustained drive for guaranteeing individual civil rights and providing greater economic security for all income groups, and not merely a vehicle for assisting the poor. Through social insurance programs, tax expenditures, human capital investments, and proscribing discrimination, government aid and protection reach far into the ranks of middle- and upper-income America. Federal social welfare policies not only seek to prevent extreme deprivation among the most disadvantaged, but also attempt to cushion the impact of economic misfortune and uncertainty on more advantaged and affluent

SAR A. LEVITAN is research professor of economics and director of the Center for Social Policy Studies, The George Washington University. He is author and coauthor of numerous books and articles on social programs and poverty, including *Beyond the Safety Net*, *The Great Society's Poor Law*, and *The Promise of Greatness*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members of society. The resulting "safety net" has been remarkably successful in shielding diverse segments of the population from the full brunt of the vagaries and hardships implicit in a free market economy.[1]

The Assault on the Welfare System

Despite these achievements, however, the system has failed to gain universal acceptance. In recent years, attacks on the welfare system have grown more strident and shrill. Critics have sought to link rising incidences of crime, drug abuse, divorce, the problems that plague the educational system, and other social ills with federal social welfare interventions, and some have even claimed that the welfare system is the direct cause of an alleged unraveling of the American social fabric.

The detractors of the welfare system argue that these problems were largely due to the expansion of the welfare system during the late 1960s and 1970s to include not only the aged, disabled, and others who cannot work, but also the unemployed and the working poor as well. Charles Murray, for example, claims that before 1964 welfare for the working poor was anathema, not to be mentioned in polite society. "We did not debate welfare for working people . . ." because "to have a job," he asserts, "was ipso facto to be self-supporting."[2] As long as the choice for able-bodied persons was between work and starvation, presumably they all worked. His assumption is that jobs were available and all able-bodied persons could find work. He ignores the fact that economic recessions were much deeper before the enactment of the New Deal regulatory agencies and that the Great Depression provided the initial impetus for welfare legislation when one of every four Americans was forced into idleness.

George Gilder carries this abiding belief in the availability of jobs even further. Following an old economic theorem that supply creates its own demand, Gilder contended that individuals can "create their own jobs" because "the supplies of work and human capital can engender their own demand."[3]

Variations on the theme of aid to the non-needy abound. Milton and Rose Friedman perceive waste and ineffectiveness as the inevitable result of bureaucrats "spending someone else's money," and they conclude that federal aid

[1] More specific analysis supporting the arguments prescribed in this article will be found in Sar A. Levitan and Clifford M. Johnson, *Beyond the Safety Net: Reviving the Promise of Opportunity in America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984). Other studies by the author that document the broad statements made in this article include: *The Great Society's Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969); *Work and Welfare Go Together* (with Martin Rein and David Marwick) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, 1976); *The Promise of Greatness* (with Robert Taggart) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); *What's Happening to the American Family?* (with Richard Belous) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); *Programs in Aid of the Poor* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 5th ed., 1985).

[2] Charles Murray, *Losing Ground* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 64.

[3] George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 158.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increases poverty by reasoning that "if you start paying people to be poor, you're going to have a lot of poor people."[4]

President Ronald Reagan seems to support these views. He perceives welfare as one of the major problems facing American society because it destroys "self-reliance, dignity and self-respect, the very substance of moral fibre."[5] At the heart of President Reagan's opposition to federal welfare initiatives lies the suspicion that the poor are morally different from the nonpoor—that they do not share the values and aspirations of working Americans, that they do not respond to the incentives and opportunities of the market in the same way as the more prosperous do. Although a very old idea, the association of poverty with deviance seems to acquire new life with every generation, as indicated by the preoccupation in recent years with the pronouncements of Milton and Rose Friedman, George Gilder, and Charles Murray, to single out four prominent representative critics of the welfare system and true believers in the operation of free markets.

As a result of the assaults on the welfare system by President Reagan and various scribes of diverse persuasions, the terms "welfare," "mess," and "crisis" have become virtually inseparable in contemporary public discourse. Liberals have found fault in the absence of federal standards for a comprehensive and universal system of income support and constraints on the more aggressive use of government powers to improve the quality of life. Conservatives contend that the welfare system has grown too large and unwieldy, frequently undermining the very objectives that it is designed to achieve. Under attack from all sides, the image of the welfare system as irrational, unmanageable, and in need of immediate and wholesale reform has come to dominate popular wisdom in the mid-1980s.

The notion of a "welfare crisis" is enhanced by tendencies to define the American welfare system narrowly as providing cash and in-kind assistance only to the poor. Without a perceived stake in the system, the middle class and affluent majority respond quickly to suggestions that "welfare" is a mess—too costly, mismanaged, unfair, and in many cases undeserved. When the welfare system is defined more realistically to include the host of entitlements and protections against economic insecurity available to the nonpoor, perceptions of crisis and prescriptions for sweeping retrenchment lose much of their appeal.

An Evolving Rational System

A balanced and objective analysis would reveal that reports of a "welfare crisis" are greatly exaggerated. Removed from the distortions of budget battles and political ideologies, the record of federal social welfare interventions suggests that the system is a rational and necessary response to emerging societal needs and

[4] Milton and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 108.
[5] Ronald Reagan, *The Creative Society* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1968), 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has functioned relatively well under the pressures of competing interests and conflicting demands.[6]

Viewed in the context of societal goals first articulated half a century ago, the welfare system has nearly achieved its fundamental objectives. Most of the destitute have been assured at least a meager stipend to meet basic needs, and the percentage of Americans living in poverty declined dramatically during the three decades following World War II. Social security and Medicare have removed the greatest threats to solvency in old age. Workers forced into idleness have gained temporary support through unemployment compensation programs, and disabled workers are protected by insurance that provides medical care and basic income. Tax expenditures and federally-sponsored financial institutions have enabled unprecedented numbers to purchase their own homes. Favorable tax policies have spurred the growth of private health insurance, and government regulations have guaranteed employees that their private pensions will be available upon retirement. Finally, substantial public investments in education, training, and employment have enabled millions to enter or remain in the mainstream of the U.S. economy, and thereby reaffirmed the promise of opportunity which lies at the heart of American society.

The role of the welfare system in enhancing economic security across diverse income groups is clearly reflected in its historical development. The cornerstone of the system, the Social Security Act of 1935, was crafted primarily to insure a basic income during the "golden years" or when forced idleness strikes and for persons incapable of self-support. Unemployment and old age insurance provided the bulk of protection against deprivation, while means-tested assitance to the poor was restricted to small numbers of widows and single mothers with dependent children, the aged, and the blind. Subsequent expansions of the social security system—including aid to dependent orphans in the waning days of the New Deal era, support for the disabled under Eisenhower, federally-financed health insurance under Johnson, and improved retirement and disability benefits under Nixon, Ford, and Carter—further increased the use of public funds to minimize economic insecurity without regard to personal income.

Contrary to today's view of the welfare system as synonymous with aid to the poor, public attention did not focus on the plight of the impoverished until the late 1950s, more than two decades after creation of the social security system. The welfare system's goals of expanded opportunity and reduced deprivation throughout the life cycle reflect the maturation of a productive and affluent society and offer a continuing agenda for progress toward a greater society.

Following World War II, social policy was preoccupied with helping veterans adjust to civilian life by subsidizing their health care, training and education,

[6] D. Lee Bawden, ed., *The Social Contract Revisited* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984); and John C. Weicher, ed., *Maintaining the Safety Net* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and, through Veterans Administration mortgages, their housing. The help was offered to all veterans without regard to their economic status. In the 1950s, amidst optimism that rapid economic growth during the postwar period could bring prosperity to the least advantaged, federal policy also focused on economic development efforts within depressed areas rather than direct assistance to those in need.

The persistence of poverty despite rising affluence during the 1960s prompted expansion of cash support under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program for the non-aged poor, including liberalization of eligibility requirements and enhanced benefits that rose more rapidly than average earnings. The federal government also accepted responsibility for expanded direct aid to impoverished aged, blind, and disabled persons through the establishment of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in 1972, and substantial additional help for the needy, including the working poor, was authorized with the creation of the food stamp program and its expansion during the recession in 1974. The working poor were also helped by wider coverage of the minimum wage and unemployment insurance laws during the Carter administration.

In-kind assistance has also been offered to low-income Americans when necessary to compensate for market inadequacies and to insure that public funds would be devoted to the fulfillment of basic human needs. Low-income housing programs were initiated when it became evident that income support alone would not serve as a short-term remedy for an inadequate private housing stock. Health care coverage under Medicaid represented further acknowledgment that cash stipends could not guarantee access to essential services in an efficient manner when individual needs are not directly related to income. In some cases it was easier to persuade Congress to provide in-kind help rather than cash assistance. For example, food stamps gained political support both as a response to the cry of hunger and malnutrition as well as a boost to the U.S. farm economy.

Because assistance to the poor is commonly viewed as "unearned," it attracts the greatest political attention and controversy. Yet means-tested aid constitutes only a sixth of the total transfer payments provided through the broader welfare system and less than a tenth of total federal outlays go to the poor. The federal share of the AFDC budget, commonly associated with "welfare," accounts for only about 2 percent of federal income transfers, and total outlays for the program (including state and local contributions) represent 0.5 percent of personal incomes in the United States. An analysis of in-kind benefits within the welfare system would yield similar results with large portions of aid (including indirect subsidies) for housing, health care, and other supportive services directed to the nonpoor.[7]

[7] D. Lee Bawden and John L. Palmer, "Challenging the Welfare State," in John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds. *The Reagan Record* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), 177–216.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As a matter of policy as well as politics, the American welfare system has never identified income maintenance as an appropriate long-term response to economic misfortune and deprivation. The initiatives of the Great Society were founded upon the premise that only a *two-pronged* assault on poverty could lead to greater economic security for the poor: income support to meet immediate basic needs coupled with attempts to expand economic opportunities and change institutions in order to promote long-term self-sufficiency. Guided by this philosophy, the Great Society sought to stimulate public investments in education and training, seeking to open doors to permanent employment for the disadvantaged. During the late 1960s and 1970s, federal support for educational programs (ranging from primary and secondary schools to vocational and post-secondary education) and job training initiatives increased substantially. All segments of American society shared in the fruits of these investments, although they have not been sufficient to provide alternatives to long-term dependency for a minority of the nation's poor.

The development of diverse tax and sectoral policies not commonly associated with the welfare system further illustrates the extent to which federal social welfare policies have reduced economic insecurity for all income groups, rather than more narrowly aiding only the poor. Tax exemptions and expenditures are now designed to enhance personal economic security in areas ranging from home ownership to employee benefit programs and individual retirement accounts. A wide array of credit programs, supplemented by price supports for many agricultural commodities, also attempt to promote economic stability by aiding financially-troubled businesses. Disaster assistance routinely offers some measure of protection against natural calamities, while trade adjustment assistance and import restrictions have been employed to minimize economic disruptions associated with international trade. Certainly these federal interventions differ in important respects from the social investments and transfer programs typically linked with the welfare system. The point here is simply that a wide range of federal initiatives are part of a quest for economic security and well-being of all Americans and that it is this push for security, more than any narrower effort to help the poor, which defines and sustains the modern welfare system.

The broad layer of additional security provided by the welfare system and related federal initiatives has contributed to greater economic stability since World War II, even though periodic recessions persist. The American public's resistance to major retrenchments attests to the broad support from these reforms and virtually guarantees that an extensive welfare system serving as a buffer against economic uncertainty is here to stay. Indeed, some measure of protection against economic misfortune and some aid to the poor are rational and necessary responses to rising societal affluence. Just as private insurance to reduce financial risk becomes more affordable and attractive as personal income increases, government policies to spread or "socialize" the risks of a free market system become more prudent and popular with growing national wealth. Furthermore, the potential for humanitarian aid to relieve deprivation and for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

longer-term investments to help the deficiently educated, disabled, and discriminated-against become contributing members of society also increases with rising national income. In the absence of federal interventions through the welfare system, the gap between rich and poor would tend to widen in an advanced economy, generating unacceptable income disparities and straining the fabric of an open, free, and democratic society.

Even in the conservative political climate of the late 1970s and the 1980s, the welfare system has continued to respond to changing concepts of need and economic security amidst rising affluence. For example, in 1979 Congress enacted financial support for residential heating costs in response to rising energy prices. Subsidies for phone service in the wake of the American Telephone & Telegraph divestiture have been proposed as part of our definition of "basic needs" for low-income Americans. A parallel extension of the welfare system's scope has occurred in the realm of income security for the nonpoor with the adoption of new tax expenditures for individual retirement accounts. These changes are clear reminders that the welfare system is still evolving, responding to changing economic and social conditions, while also reflecting the higher expectations and aspirations of an increasingly affluent nation.

Lessons of the Past

What of the alleged failures of the modern welfare system? To be sure, federal interventions in the complex realm of social policy have brought their share of frustrations and excesses. Yet the more important issues are the extent to which social welfare policies and programs have been revised to reflect the lessons of the past, and the standards by which progress in the welfare system is measured. A balanced and reasonable assessment suggests that we have learned from our mistakes—some inevitable, others the result of overly ambitious efforts—during two decades of frequently bold innovation and that past gains have been generally encouraging in light of the ambitious and competing goals set out for the modern welfare system.

Varied strategies and multifaceted approaches needed to ameliorate poverty, discrimination, and related social ills. The designers of the emerging welfare system, from the New Deal to the founding of the Great Society, tended to underestimate the deep-seated problems associated with poverty. The authors of the Social Security Act in 1935 assumed that needs-tested public assistance would wither away as younger workers became fully covered by social insurance—an expectation that was shattered by changing demographics and steadily expanding welfare rolls and more generous benefits during the postwar period. Similarly, a central premise of President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty was that investments in education and training, civil rights protections, and community organizations representing the have-nots could dramatically lift this generation's poor out of deprivation and insure their children a decent life; but cycles of poverty and dependency have proved considerably more intractable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet it became increasingly clear that there are no easy answers or quick solutions to discrimination, economic deprivation, and other social ills. As some of the experiments turned out to be counterproductive as well as politically divisive, the ensuing disillusionment sorely taxed the nation's will to sustain the welfare system in pursuit of steady but incremental gains.

Because many social problems have proved more pervasive and persistent than originally believed, the welfare system has been forced to rely upon more varied and costly strategies for their long-term amelioration. Such comprehensive, long-term approaches frequently involved offering preferential treatment to targeted groups at the cost of the legitimate aspirations of those more fortunate. It has proven extremely difficult politically to defend these actions. Social programs requiring high initial investments and yielding delayed or cumulative benefits have often been abandoned, becoming victims of public resentment and insufficient commitments of funds over too brief a period of time. Furthermore, every solution to deep-seated social ills created new problems. Even when government interventions have achieved their intended results, the process of change in some instances has generated unwanted side effects and posed new problems for policy makers. One clear lesson provided by the experience of the past two decades is that the search for remedies to complex social problems is inherently difficult, particularly when the process involves helping the have-nots to compete effectively with those who have made it. In a democratic society, those who have gained privileged status generally have the clout to abort changes that would be contrary to their interests.

The experience of recent decades suggests that the federal government must proceed on several fronts simultaneously if it is to be successful in efforts to alleviate poverty. For example, training of low-income workers is unlikely to have a significant impact on overall poverty levels or welfare caseloads when provided amid high unemployment or in declining economic regions unless suitable employment and economic development programs are also initiated. In contrast, although income transfers address the immediate needs of the poor, they do not result in lasting improvements in earnings capacity and self-sufficiency unless complemented by public efforts to enhance the skills of recipients and to alter the institutions which trap them in poverty. The interdependence of these antipoverty strategies can create the appearance of failure when individual initiatives are viewed in isolation, particularly when concomitant interventions necessary for their success are not undertaken. At the same time, the benefits of comprehensive approaches are cumulative and can far exceed the potential of isolated efforts.

Income transfers are not enough to combat poverty. One of the clearest lessons arising out of America's experience with the welfare system is that poverty cannot be eliminated solely through a reliance upon income transfers. Income maintenance certainly is an essential component of any antipoverty effort, but a strategy relying upon transfers alone can neither enhance self-sufficiency nor avoid conflicts in labor markets.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In a society in which wages for millions of workers are too low to lift them out of poverty, the provision of adequate cash assistance to the nonworking poor, if unaccompanied by incentives to supplement assistance with earnings, inevitably raises serious questions of equity and generates strong political opposition among taxpayers. In addition, income transfers large enough to lift low-income households above the poverty threshold, if not tied to work effort, would trigger large drops in labor force participation or force massive public expenditures to the nonpoor in order to preserve acceptable work incentives. The political and economic realities have contributed to the demise of successive guaranteed income schemes during the past two decades and demonstrate the need for federal strategies that assist both the working and dependent poor.

The welfare system has neglected the expansion of economic opportunity. While the rhetoric of the Great Society and subsequent initiatives often placed heavy emphasis on the expansion of economic opportunity for the less fortunate, this promise has never been fulfilled through a sustained and adequate commitment of societal resources. Many of the dilemmas posed by the modern welfare system—perverse incentives discouraging work by welfare recipients, neglect of the needs of the working poor, high youth and minority unemployment, and burgeoning costs of universal entitlements—arise from an inadequate emphasis on the extension of economic opportunity in current policies. Beyond fundamental guarantees of equal access and civil rights, the welfare system's attempts to broaden opportunity have relied upon relatively small and frequently sporadic investments in job training, public employment, compensatory education, and meaningful work incentives. These initiatives, despite yielding promising results, have fallen far short of their necessary role as equal partners with income maintenance in advancing the goals of the welfare system. To help the millions of the unskilled and deficiently educated, it is necessary to recognize that work and welfare go together as an appropriate public policy.

The difficulties associated with the expansion of economic opportunity through the welfare system are substantial, ranging from the technical and economic to the cultural and political. Certainly the heavy reliance upon transfer programs in recent years reflects the fact that assurances of income security tend to be less threatening to established interests and, therefore, easier to adopt than broader efforts to open avenues to self-support and economic advancement. Yet if the nation is to avoid the debilitating effects of its emphasis on income maintenance, there is no alternative to reviving the promise of opportunity in America. When the nation discards today's prevailing negativism it should turn to this urgent task of broadening access to opportunities for work and self-advancement for all Americans.

Major Challenges

Recognizing that the welfare system is here to stay and that it will continue to evolve, difficult questions and challenges for the future remain. Much concern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is presently focused on the perceived inability of American society to afford the broad range of commitments to economic security already enacted at the federal level. The clamor to rein in public expenditures has profound implications for the political base and stability of the welfare system, generating lasting tensions between universal and means-tested provision of benefits. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the appropriate roles of federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector, in the modern welfare system have been called into serious question in recent years, requiring establishment of a new consensus regarding the legitimacy and optimal scope of federal efforts to bolster the economic security of all Americans.

Maintaining an affordable system. The affordability of the welfare system is, except in the extreme, essentially a normative judgment reflecting society's willingness to forego some measure of personal consumption and alternative public outlays in exchange for greater collective security. In some cases, the exchange of current income for future economic or national security is relatively direct—social insurance programs requiring prior contributions or investments in defense supported by higher taxes. In other instances the decision to sacrifice personal income represents a hedge against unforeseen misfortunes or hardships, an awareness that "there but for the grace of God, go I"—disaster relief, food stamps, and Medicaid. For the most targeted, means-tested initiatives, public expenditures are humanitarian attempts to relieve deprivation and enlightened acknowledgments of the broader societal benefits associated with reductions in poverty. All these societal choices are predicated on an awareness of societal affluence and on the belief that the nation can afford to defer a portion of today's consumption for tomorrow's economic or national security.

Without question, the potential for reasoned assessments of society's capacity to support social investments and protections has been diminished in recent years by the fiscal policies of the Reagan administration. By combining rapid increases in defense spending and deep reductions in the federal tax base, President Reagan has intentionally created budget conditions in which social welfare expenditures appear unaffordable. Both historical and international comparisons suggest that, with the adoption of responsible fiscal policies, the American welfare system has not exceeded the bounds of affordability. With the exception of Japan, the United States has devoted a smaller proportion of its gross national product to social programs than any other advanced industrialized nation.

The Reagan fiscal policy has failed to address the crucial legitimate issue regarding the future affordability of the welfare system. This issue concerns the optimal social investment or protection against economic uncertainty through entitlements and tax expenditures for the nonpoor, while still fulfilling our societal responsibilities to those in need. The rise of federal social welfare expenditures during the 1970s was primarily the result of dramatic increases in the cost of non-means-tested entitlements such as social security and Medicare. Between 1970 and 1984, means-tested programs accounted for one-seventh of the $337 billion rise in total transfer payments. Coupled with open-ended subsidies for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

middle- and upper-income groups through credit and tax policies ranging from student assistance to interest and retirement savings deductions, the principle of universal eligibility in many social welfare programs has clearly strained resources available for other components of the welfare system.

Burgeoning universal entitlements are gradually becoming a focus of potential spending cuts in the continuing budget difficulties precipitated by the Reagan administration. The current debate is hardly conducive to a thoughtful restructuring of the broader welfare system, framed as it is by the artificial pressures of misguided fiscal policies. Yet in some perverse fashion the problem of massive federal deficits may provide the political will for a much-needed reexamination of the balance between help for the needy and subsidies to the more fortunate in the welfare system. By curtailing expenditures for lower-priority initiatives aiding the nonpoor, the Reagan budget reductions of the mid-1980s may create opportunities for the emergence of a more efficient and effective welfare system in the years ahead.

Targeting v. universality. The conflict between goals of targeting and universality within the welfare system can never be fully resolved. Without question, universal provision of cash assistance and social services engenders broad public acceptance and a strong base of political support, as illustrated by the evolution of social security, Medicare, veteran, and college loan programs. Yet the extension of federal aid without regard to income necessarily expands vastly the costs of government interventions and dilutes their effectiveness in helping those most in need. On the other hand, as Wilbur Cohen, a prominent architect of the U.S. welfare system, has often remarked, programs which are narrowly targeted to serve poor people inevitably become poor programs. Thus, the challenge is to strike a balance between the goals of targeting and universality that gives every American a stake in the welfare system while still allocating the requisite resources for those who need them most with due regard to the dignity of recipients.

The Reagan administration's rhetorical crusade to focus federal aid on those with greatest need has not been unfounded. Despite the difficulty of judging the appropriate balance between targeting and universality, a strong case could be made by 1980 that too large a share of scarce federal resources was being diverted into benefits for the non-needy. Unfortunately, the administration's response to this imbalance has proven to be narrow, inequitable, and devoid of vision. Eligibility for programs aiding the poor has been restricted to the most needy as a means of slashing federal outlays.[8] However, no broader effort to shift resources from universal entitlements or subsidies for the affluent to means-tested programs serving low-income Americans has been undertaken. Only this year, with opportunities for significant budget savings from means-tested programs seemingly exhausted, has President Reagan challenged the flow of aid to middle- and upper-income households through the broader welfare system.

[8] Jack A. Meyer, "Budget Cuts in the Reagan Administration" in Bawden, ed., *The Social Contract Revisited*, 33–64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Principle of subsidiarity. The Reagan administration has similarly clouded the perennial debate over the appropriate sharing of social responsibilities among federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector. The Reagan program, under the banner of "New Federalism," has aggressively sought to shift responsibility for the administration and financing of social welfare initiatives to the states. The Reagan administration has also relied heavily upon the conviction that social welfare efforts, whenever feasible, should be left to private voluntary efforts. This perspective, founded on ideology rather than empirical evidence, has been useful in buttressing attempts to reduce federal expenditures, but it has precluded a balanced and reasoned assessment of appropriate public and private roles in the modern welfare system.

Taking the principle of subsidiarity (the belief that the federal government should not undertake functions that can be performed by lower levels of government or private groups) to the extreme, opponents of federal intervention seek to obscure the reasons why much of the responsibility for the welfare system has fallen upon the federal government. Contrary to idealized notions of community responsibility, state and local governments in prior decades consistently failed to marshal the will and the resources to alleviate poverty and expand economic opportunity for the most disadvantaged. By definition, the poorest states and localities faced the most severe problems while having the least capacity to redress them. Competition among states and localities also has discouraged responses to pressing social needs prior to federal intervention, as these smaller jurisdictions have attempted to attract new businesses and industries by holding down tax rates and public expenditures. Finally, because the federal government relies upon more equitable financing structures and a broader revenue base than state or local jurisdictions, its capacity to support large-scale income maintenance and human resource programs is far greater. For all these reasons, any effective welfare system must include a central federal role in setting national priorities, providing direction for equitable policies and program development, and generating the resources necessary to meet social welfare goals.

These principles are not inconsistent with the belief that decentralized program administration can be an appropriate response to regional diversity and bureaucratic inefficiency. In some realms, community decision making and program administration are crucial to the effectiveness of the welfare system, ensuring that interventions are tailored to local needs. Strategies for assisting the disadvantaged that are well suited for conditions in the South Bronx may have little relevance to the problems of rural Appalachia. The existing structure of federal programs in education, employment and training, economic development, and a host of other areas already reflects this need for local control over the specific form and substance of social welfare initiatives.

Given the unwillingness or inability of state and local governments to marshal adequate resources for the amelioration of social problems, the hope advanced by President Reagan that the private sector can fill the breach created by federal retrenchments appears even less credible. The nation's voluntary agencies and as-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sociations certainly have not proven able to compensate for losses in federal aid through greater reliance upon private philanthropy. As a detailed Urban Institute study of some 6,900 nonprofit organizations across the nation has documented, private social welfare agencies have fallen far short in their attempts to fill gaps left by domestic budget cuts.[9] Furthermore, the business community is neither equipped nor inclined to accept responsibility for the wide array of problems confronting the nation's disadvantaged. Even in areas where the private sector presumably has a direct and immediate interest, such as occupational training under the Job Training Partnership Act, the evidence shows that industry molds social programs to serve its own profitability goals, insuring quick and efficient placements to minimize training costs to fill job vacancies, while investing little to develop skills among those most in need. The broader public interest cannot be either adequately protected or promoted through a reliance on private sector initiatives alone.

Renewal of Confidence

The need for a strong federal role in the welfare system is clear, and yet public understanding of this federal responsibility has been undermined by the virulent antigovernment ideology of the New Right and nourished by President Reagan. Thus, the most pressing question for the future of the welfare system may rest upon the nation's ability to regain confidence in government responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry and belief in the legitimacy of collective action to meet societal needs. If America's political leadership continues to denigrate the federal government as a vehicle for advancing the common good, further progress in strengthening and improving the welfare system (as well as in other legitimate and proper realms of government responsibility ranging from protection of the environment to safety in the workplace) will remain stymied. However, through a clearer understanding of past experience, the nation can rekindle its faith in the ability of the welfare system to provide not only income for the poor but also greater opportunity and equity for all Americans. In this era of retrenchment, no challenge is more important than refreshing our memory of past accomplishments and refocusing our vision for the years ahead.

Progress has been made on various social and economic fronts. However, the advances will be halted, if not reversed, unless the challenge for greater social justice is renewed. Only dedicated pessimists and gainsayers can doubt our capacity to achieve further substantial improvements. As the nation prepares to celebrate the bicentennial of its Constitution, there is need for positivism, commitment, and compassion that still remain indispensable in the quest for a better society. We have the power if we have the will to forge an even better society and to promote the general welfare.

[9] Lester M. Salamon, "Nonprofit Organization: The Lost Opportunity," in Palmer and Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Record*, 261–85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Feasibility of a Comprehensive U.S. Industrial Policy

WILLIAM E. HUDSON

The decade of the 1970s witnessed the end of American worldwide economic hegemony. Rising energy costs, Japanese and European economic competition, declining industrial productivity, and persistent stagflation caused many Americans to question a basic assumption of post-World War II political and social life: that American society, whatever its other faults, delivered a continually rising level of material prosperity which was the envy of the world. Not surprisingly, declining economic performance also called into question the traditional approaches to economic policy making. Both the dominant doctrine, Keynesianism (concerned with maintaining adequate levels of aggregate demand) and the dominant method, macroeconomic management, were attacked. Criticism of Keynesian macroeconomic doctrine came primarily from the political right which advocated a traditional alternative, monetarism (concerned with control of the money supply), along with a couple of novel ones, supply-side economics and rational-expectations theory. After the 1980 elections, the Reagan administration carried out an economic program combining all three of these doctrines along with a strong dose of the even more traditional laissez faire.[1] At the same time, liberals too have developed an alternative approach to postwar economic policy making that has come to be labeled "industrial policy." This approach involves moving beyond macroeconomic management to systematic

[1] Isabel Sawhill, "Economic Policy" in John Palmer and Isabel Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1982), 34–38

WILLIAM E. HUDSON is associate professor of political science and chairman of the department of political science, Providence College. He is currently engaged in research on industrial policy making at the state level.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government intervention to restructure the industrial economy and restore America's competitiveness in the international marketplace.

The purpose of this article is to analyze some aspects of the political feasibility of industrial policy. As the concept has moved into the political agenda it has produced numerous critics as well as supporters. Both conservative and liberal economists have questioned the economic wisdom of a comprehensive industrial policy.[2] Though some critics include political arguments in their analyses, a thorough political analysis of the prospects of industrial policy has yet to be made. I will contribute the beginning of such an analysis in this article. First, I wish to examine the corporatist approach to policy making implicit in most proposals for industrial policy. How appropriate is a corporatist approach in the American political context? Second, I will critique the "rational-comprehensive" method of policy analysis proposed by industrial policy advocates.[3] Is an attempt to make industrial policy systematically and coherently likely to succeed, and is such an attempt likely to produce better consequences than current policies?

One factor complicating this analysis is the diversity of proposals from a variety of different policy advocates that constitutes the category "industrial policy proposals." In just a few years a large number of books and articles have been written advocating industrial policy.[4] These proposals are quite different from one another and represent different ideological perspectives. I have chosen to concentrate on the work of just four industrial policy advocates: MIT economist Lester Thurow, Harvard public policy expert Robert Reich, business consultant Ira Magaziner, and New York investment banker Felix Rohatyn. All are among the most prominent industrial policy theorists, and each approaches the issue from a mainstream Democratic liberal ideological perspective.[5] Although there is considerable variation in the specific proposals that these four industrial policy advocates favor, their overall approach to industrial policy making, especially their critique of existing government policies, is sufficiently similar to permit the analysis attempted here.

[2] Charles Schultz, "Industrial Policy: A Dissent," *The Brookings Review* 2 (Fall 1983): 3–12

[3] Charles Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review* 19 (Spring 1959): 79–88. Citations used in this paper are from a reprinting in Richard J. Stillman, *Public Administration* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 238–248.

[4] These works include Ira Magaziner and Robert Reich, *Minding America's Business* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982); Robert Reich, *The Next American Frontier* (New York: Times Books, 1983); Lester Thurow, *The Zero-sum Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); Felix Rohatyn, *The Twenty-Year Century* (New York: Random House, 1984). Other proposals not analyzed here include Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Gar Alperovitz and Jeff Faux, "Beyond Bailouts: Notes for Next Time," *Working Papers for a New Society*, November–December 1980: 14–17; "The Reindustrialization of America," *Business Week*, 30 June 1980; Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf, *Beyond the Wasteland* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983).

[5] For an account of the political involvement of industrial policy advocates, see Sidney Blumenthal, "Drafting a Democratic Industrial Plan," *New York Times Magazine*, 28 August 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What is Industrial Policy?

The essence of an industrial policy is government formulation of a strategy for structuring the shape of national industry. According to Robert Reich, the industrial policies of various nations are "analogous to corporate strategies."[6] Just like large corporations, nations can make critical choices about industrial development in order to improve their capacity to compete successfully in the international economy. Industrial policy proponents differentiate their approach from older notions of comprehensive economic planning by insisting that government should intervene *selectively* to mold market forces rather than attempt government command of the entire economy.[7] Expert analysis of a nation's economy and the international economic environment should permit the choice of specific government policies to improve economic performance beyond what it would be if market forces alone shaped this performance.

Why is an American industrial policy needed? The American economy, according to industrial policy advocates, is undergoing a fundamental restructuring in response to changes in the international economic environment. A key to this restructuring is the end of post-World War II American dominance of the world economy. Many of our basic industries, like automobiles and steel, are failing in competition with European, Japanese and Third World industries, leading to industrial plant closings and the economic decline of industrial regions. This process of deindustrialization creates the risk that America will become "a nation of short-order cooks and saleswomen, xerox operators, and messenger boys."[8] At the same time, technological innovations are creating opportunities for the development of new industries such as manufacturing industrial robots or applying new biotechnology. Major competition is underway to see which countries and firms will become dominant in exploiting these technologies. How American industry is restructured to accommodate declines in basic industry and the emergence of high-technology industry will have profound effects on the absolute standard of living of Americans and the standard relative to the citizens of other nations.

So far, according to industrial policy advocates, the United States has not done very well in international competition.[9] A major reason is the success of industrial policy in other nations and the absence of a coherent industrial policy in the U.S. While American policy makers have relied primarily on macroeconomic policy instruments to promote the general level of economic growth, European and Japanese policy makers have supplemented macroeconomic management with comprehensive structural strategies to improve their overall competitive position. They have developed both the institutions and methods of industrial policy making necessary to shape industry to assure its competitive-

[6] Ibid., 40.

[7] Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 234.

[8] Rohatyn, *Twenty-Year Century*, 127.

[9] Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, chap. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness. In the era of American economic hegemony, macroeconomic management was sufficient to guarantee our competitive position; in this new era of international competition, the U.S. must develop similar instruments of industrial policy making or lose out to the superior strategies of foreign industrial policy makers.

Improving the competitiveness of the economy is the central goal of industrial policy, but all its advocates place an equivalent emphasis on the equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of economic adjustment. Felix Rohatyn has argued that assuring the fairness of economic readjustment is critical for the preservation of democracy.[10] In a series of articles in the *New York Review of Books* he has argued the virtue of industrial policy as a means of easing the decline of industry and regions to assure that all "share the burdens as well as the benefits this country has to offer."[11] The goals of distributional fairness and improved competitiveness are linked in that policies can be devised to restructure declining industries to improve their competitive position as well as focus investment in declining regions to create new industries to absorb workers from declining sectors. Protectionist policies which merely insulate industries from competition are condemned. Instead, comprehensive industrial policy can promote the overall capacity of the economy to compete.[12]

Industrial policy includes a long and varied list of specific policy proposals. To summarize briefly, they can be grouped in five categories:

Policies to ease adjustment to industrial decline. For a variety of reasons, ranging from the age of U.S. plants and equipment to low-wage Third World competition, a sizable portion of certain American industries cannot compete internationally and, unless propped up with ill-advised protectionist measures like quotas or domestic content legislation will not survive. The government should respond to these declining industries in two basic ways: worker retraining programs and investment programs to restructure these industries. Worker retraining might be accomplished through government-run training programs, subsidized programs in industry, or worker vouchers which unemployed workers from declining industries can spend to learn new skills.[13] Those industries that cannot survive international competition in their present form can be restructured to make them more competitive. Rohatyn, an investment banker, conceives this restructuring in financial terms: firms should receive government loans and loan guarantees in exchange for management changes, divestiture of noncompetitive units, and union agreements for wage restraint.[14] Reich has a more complex conception of restructuring involving, first, conversion to "higher value production." By this, he means those types of industrial production requiring

[10] Rohatyn, *Twenty-Year Century*, 77.

[11] Ibid., 129.

[12] In some respects, the focus on improving productivity is similar to "supply-side" economics. See George Gilder, "A Supply-Side Economics of the Left," *The Public Interest* 72 (Summer 1983).

[13] Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 344–346.

[14] Rohatyn, *Twenty-Year Century*, 132–133.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

skilled labor and more sophisticated technology, such as transmission production in automobiles (instead of assembly) or the production of specialized steel products. A second aspect of restructuring involves instituting a more participatory form of workplace organization.[15]

Research and development policies. These include expanded government support for basic research, but also government investments in the commercialization of innovations and market research.[16]

Support for key industries. Steel, autos, energy, computer, and machine tool industries are all examples of industries that have a large impact on the performance of other industries and the whole economy. Industrial policy makers should monitor the performance of these "linkage" industries "to ensure the industries' competitive success."[17]

Investment in the growth of new industries. This aspect of industrial policy involves "picking the winners"—identifying those industries likely to be highly successful in the future. Such industries should receive government subsidy to accelerate their growth and development faster than would be possible through private financial markets.

Coordination of existing policies. There are a variety of existing government subsidies, research grants, defense contracts, tax deductions, and other policies that influence the structure of industry. Without a comprehensive industrial policy there is no way to monitor the combined effect of these policies on the development of the economy and to assure that they promote overall competitiveness. This is a key task for industrial policy.

In arguing for a comprehensive industrial policy, advocates are quick to point out that the United States already has a set of such policies. As Reich puts it: "A nation's industrial policy is the sum of its microeconomic policies—like tax rules, research and development grants, credit subsidies, and import restrictions—as they affect the pace and direction of industrial change."[18] Industrial policy proponents identify four problems with these existing policies. First, they are inadvertent. Present industrial policy emerges as "the fallout from separate government programs designed to achieve all manner of things."[19] When policies such as defense procurement are made, little attention is given to how they affect the structure of the economy. Second, the policies are not coordinated. No agency exists to calculate the cumulative and interactive effects of the various policies.[20] Third, because policies are inadvertent and not coordinated, the political choices and trade-offs inherent in them are rarely debated openly. Present industrial policies are thus covert in the sense that the economic merits of alternatives are not often the subject of public controversy. Finally, the uncoordi-

[15] Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 13, 231, 247–251.
[16] Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 350–351, 354–356.
[17] Ibid., 352. Rohatyn emphasizes the national economy.
[18] Robert Reich, "An Industrial Policy of the Right," *The Public Interest* 73 (Fall 1983): 3.
[19] Ibid., 6.
[20] Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nated, covert nature of existing industrial policies permits their subjection to narrowly focused special interests. The result is particular policies that help narrow sectors of the economy but that may undermine its overall performance. Industrial policy is not so much an expansion of government intervention as it is a replacement of the present hodgepodge of uncoordinated intervention with a single rational industrial strategy more likely to succeed in restoring American economic competitiveness.

The specific proposals advanced for implementing such an industrial strategy vary among the various proponents. Moreover, none of the advocates have formulated a detailed blueprint for how industrial policy should be carried out. Nevertheless, despite the variation among proposals and their ambiguity, the approaches have at least two common features. First, adoption of an industrial policy requires passage into law of a variety of individual programs to reform existing ones and to add other desirable procompetitive ones. These include the changes in tax policy, worker retraining programs, tariff and subsidy reforms, and the like, which will improve competitiveness and fairness. These changes could all be accomplished by the president and Congress without any institutional change, but all the industrial policy advocates think some type of coordinating agency with the appropriate expertise needs to be created. It would recommend the procompetitive reforms described above and pursue the more ambitious program of designing a comprehensive program of industrial restructuring. The models for this industrial policy agency are foreign ones like Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), though these models must be adapted to the American context. Rohatyn initially proposed creation of a new Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) as an independent agency to allocate a pool of equity capital in pursuance of industrial reconstruction. More recently he has modified his proposal, suggesting that the RFC be the implementing arm of a "tripartite" Economic Development Board appointed by the president and representing business, labor, and government.[21] The board, with the support of an expert technical staff, would recommend industrial policy measures and, presumably (though Rohatyn is not specific) implement those which are enacted. Neither Reich and Magaziner nor Thurow are as specific as Rohatyn, but they too see the need for some tripartite agency to coordinate industrial policy.[22] This overall institutional approach can be appropriately labeled "corporatist," because it resembles those processes of policy making through national-level negotiations among government, business, and labor to which political scientists normally attach this term. It is this corporatist political strategy that raises the initial questions of political feasibility addressed in the next section.

[21] Rohatyn, *Twenty-Year Century*, 34.

[22] Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 276; Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 370; Thurow, *Zero-sum Society*, 191.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corporatist Policy Making

Industrial policy advocates would like to avoid the corporatist label, perhaps because of its historical association with Italian fascism, but, although not fascist, the institutional arrangements they recommend conform to a *democratic corporatist* model. According to a leading comparative policy textbook, democratic corporatism is "a system of high-level bargaining and consultation between government officials and leading actors in the private economy . . . a process of continuing negotiation among a small number of highly organized and centralized interest groups . . . and an equally well organized government apparatus that is obliged by law or informal agreement to consider the advice of such groups."[23] This type of arrangement seems to be what Reich has in mind when he calls for the creation of "a national bargaining arena" in which government, business, and labor can fashion agreements "for allocating the burdens and benefits of major adjustment strategies."[24] Elsewhere, Reich specifies the need for "a hierarchy of 'tripartite boards' comprised of the elites of organized labor, big business and finance."[25] Rohatyn's proposal for a tripartite Economic Development Board is even more clearly corporatist in character. These corporatist mechanisms are seen as essential for working out the agreements that a successful comprehensive industrial policy requires.

Why are corporatist mechanisms necessary for carrying out the industrial policy agenda? First, they are needed to build a *consensus* supportive of the specific industrial policy measures. Since industrial policy requires a distribution of costs and benefits among different groups, it can only succeed if there is agreement and cooperation among the affected groups.[26] Corporatist mechanisms can provide the direct representation of affected groups in the formulation of industrial policy providing an improved form of democratic representation.[27] Second, corporatism would provide a new *coherence* to industrial policy making. Existing industrial policy is presently made in a fragmented policy making system dominated by congressional committees and the courts.[28] Such a system is only open to narrowly focused special interests, excludes affected but weak interests, and does not permit consideration of the broader public interest. This leads to a policy "of the 'do it yourself' variety spearheaded by our most politically active and sophisticated industries and firms."[29] This existing policy-

[23] Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, 2nd. ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 162.

[24] Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 276.

[25] Reich, "Industrial Policy of the Right," 16.

[26] Rohatyn, *Twenty-Year Century*, 34; Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 377–379; Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 273–274.

[27] Rohatyn, *Twenty-Year Century*, 35.

[28] Magaziner and Reich, *Minding-America's Business*, 370–371.

[29] Reich, "Industrial Policy of the Right," 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

making pattern must be replaced by a more centralized one in which competing interest groups can confront one another face to face. Third, such a centralized policy-making arena will provide policy *visibility.* Industrial policy advocates object to the existing hidden and unacknowledged industrial policy making. According to Lester Thurow, "We aren't admitting what we are doing. We have a back door, not a front door industrial policy."[30] Covert policy making leads to responsiveness to pressures from individual industries thereby producing narrowly directed policies, such as tariff protection for the Harley-Davidson Corporation, without open public discussion of broader public impacts. A more informed public debate of industrial policy will be brought about by "centralizing its administration and enhancing its visibility."[31] In sum, the centralized corporatist industrial policy making will replace the existing fragmented system with one that is more representative, coherent, and open to public scrutiny.

It is clear from the writings of the industrial policy advocates that their preference for corporatist mechanisms arises from their critique of existing industrial policy making. Political scientists will recognize in this critique, a description of American policy making similar to that found in the works of Theodore Lowi and Grant McConnell.[32] This pattern of "interest groups liberalism" is now one of the leading interpretations of American policy making. Covert policy making on behalf of narrow highly organized groups, excluding the weak and poorly organized and the broader public interest, is said to dominate all American public policy. If the corporatist strategy is intended to overcome a pattern of policy making which many political scientists consider characteristic of nearly all public policy making, what are its prospects for success?

Viewed from the perspective of interest group liberal theory, there is reason to doubt the potential success of these corporatist mechanisms. In fact, the corporatist policy-making model contains within itself some of the very features which McConnell and Lowi identify as leading to interest group liberal policy making.[33] These features include broad delegation of power, direct representation of groups in the bureaucracy, informal policy making, and, implicitly, distrust of government. Instead of producing an industrial policy of greater coherence and openness, corporatist policy making would likely be as covert and incoherent as existing policy. Rather than producing a consensus among all in society, it would probably lead to a consensus among the powerful and well-organized very similar to that which supports existing industrial policy.

Comprehensive industrial policy making through tripartite boards clearly im-

[30] "Do Modern Times Call for an Industrial Policy," *Public Opinion* (August/September 1983): 6; Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 200.

[31] Reich, "Industrial Policy of the Right," 12; Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 201.

[32] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

[33] It is interesting to note that Lowi considers the "corporatist" label to describe the pattern he is concerned with before settling on "interest group liberalism." Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plies broad delegation of congressional authority. In addition, the long list of tasks that comprises the agenda of industrial policy making and the need for the application of technical expertise would require considerable bureaucratic discretion. One can imagine an industrial policy statute including broad delegations of authority to "promote competitive industry in the public interest" and "ease adjustments to industrial restructuring." Such broad delegations are common in the modern bureaucratic state (and perhaps inevitable), but they are also, according to Lowi, the foundation of the interest group liberalism pattern, at least in the United States.[34] Delegation shifts interest groups pressure from Congress to the bureaucracy, the actual site of concrete, substantive policy making. Often, provision is even made for direct representation of interests, as in the corporatist industrial policy-making model. Policy then emerges through informal negotiations among government officials and representatives of affected interests. The result is covert policy making in which the most organized groups represented by technical experts have the most influence. The integration of specialized congressional committees into this informal policy-making process completes the familiar "iron triangle" of interest group liberal theory.

Of course, the industrial policy advocates would agree that such delegations have helped shape existing industrial policy, just as they agree with the overall pattern of interest group liberal politics. Broad delegations to a tripartite industrial policy agency would differ from the existing pattern, they claim, because specific provision would be made to assure representation of all relevant interests, not just narrow special interests. They would also agree that broad delegations will shift group pressures to the industrial policy agency. In fact, such a shift is to be encouraged so that such an agency can become a bargaining arena in which the industrial policy consensus can be reached. Corporatist policy making is supposed to provide adequate representation of all societal interests so that the trap of iron triangle politics can be avoided. Is this claim of the industrial policy advocates plausible, especially in the light of past experience with broad delegation?

It should be pointed out that a key element in the interest group pattern of politics is the claim that relevant interests can be more effectively represented in bureaucratic "bargaining arenas" than in elective political institutions. According to McConnell, an important component of interest group liberal orthodoxy is the belief that turning over public authority to specialized, sometimes "grassroots," organizations will provide superior forms of representation.[35] Whether it was in the creation of the Agricultural Extension Service, the Business Advisory Council, or community action agencies, proponents saw these entities as more than mechanisms for administrative implementation. They were supposed to permit direct representation of all affected interests, including the public interest, in the formation of policy. A major thrust of McConnell's and

[34] Ibid., 94–113.

[35] McConnell, *Private Power*, chap. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lowi's analyses is to show that the representative reality was invariably different from this ideological claim. Instead of widely embracing all relevant interests, policy making within specialized arenas has encouraged the dominance of those groups with the best organizational capacity. In light of this experience, the familiarity of the industrial policy advocates claim should raise some skepticism. Evaluating it requires a careful examination of who they expect to serve the representatives role in industrial policy making and how the public interest is supposed to emerge.

The representative agents usually mentioned in the industrial policy literature are the tripartite "business," "labor," and "government" (sometimes "finance" is included; curiously, "farmers" are never mentioned). These representative categories are, and usually remain in the industrial policy literature, merely reified abstractions.[36] The relevant question is: Who are the concrete groups and individuals who will fill these categories and which concrete groups and individuals will influence industrial policy making? It is likely that representatives of large well-organized groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Council, and the AFL-CIO will serve on tripartite industrial policy boards. Though such groups often claim to speak for "business" and "labor" respectively, it is questionable, given the largely undemocratic character of such organizations, that they represent their own members, let alone a majority of nonunion workers or the many small and large businesses not active in business organizations. It is certainly impossible for such organizations to represent all the other societal interests outside the tripartite categories. A crucial flaw in the corporatist framework of representation is the absence in the United States of genuine "peak associations" or nationwide federations representing entire economic sectors such as labor, business, and farmers, which are characteristic of countries like Sweden, where corporatist policy making prevails. Without such organizations, no concrete group can realistically claim to represent a broad sector of society. This absence of a tradition of broad functional representation also calls into question the prospect of corporatist representation forging an industrial policy consensus. Since many individuals and groups would justifiably deny the representativeness of the corporatist arrangement, many would maneuver to block the decisions adverse to their particular interests in a manner consistent with the existing pattern of veto politics which the industrial policy advocates deplore.[37]

Given the weaknesses of the corporatist model in the American context, it is reasonable to expect any industrial policy agent to be subject over time to the influence of those groups and firms most affected by its decisions in the familiar interest group pattern. Public policies themselves are important forces stimulating and shaping group pressures. As industrial policy makers engage in the day to day responsibility of picking winners and losers, dispensing research

[36] Ibid., 344.

[37] Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 256.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and development grants, and promoting linkage industries, those industries and firms which receive agency support or fear to suffer from agency choices will focus their resources in order to influence policy. Industrial policy will become the specialized concern of these firms and industries and a critical factor in their organizational environments. For its part, the industrial agency will be quite open to the access and influence of its client groups because it will be dependent on them for general political support and, perhaps more importantly, the success of industrial policy.[38] Involvement of congressional specialists will come into play, activated by group pressure in their constituencies. An industrial policy triangle or network will thus emerge involving the informal, friendly, unnoticed, if not covert, policy-making pattern described by interest group liberal theorists.

Industrial policy advocates expect an industrial policy agency to coordinate all policies of government bearing on industrial development, yet it is unlikely that this coordination function could succeed in the long run. Although many policies have an impact on industrial structure and development, this impact is likely to be a by-product of the pursuit of other objectives. Unless an industrial policy agency has an absolute veto over all policies bearing on industrial development, the influence of industrial policy specialists on other agencies and policies is likely to be weak. Those responsible for environmental, defense, and social policies can be expected to place primary emphasis on pursuing their objectives, even though these objectives might have an adverse effect on industrial development. Defense specialists, for example, are not likely to delay or modify the development of computer guided weapons systems just because an industrial policy agency points out that such developments siphon computer specialists from domestic industry. Defense planners are more likely to respond to their perceptions of technological advances in the weapons of potential enemies. Uncoordinated "back-door" impacts on industrial development are likely to persist even with an industrial policy agency. Those running such an agency will soon discover that attempts to coordinate the far-flung activities of other agencies is not as productive, nor as likely to influence industrial development, as concentrating on the industrial policy agency's own programs and serving its own clients.

A fundamental reason the proponents of industrial policy fail to break away from the interest group liberal framework is that they adhere to much of the ideological orthodoxy which supports it, particularly the distrust of government. According to McConnell, the distrust of the direct exercise of governmental authority leads to a denial of governmental power, the transfer of public authority to private groups, and the anointment of these groups as the principal policy makers for those policies affecting them. Even though industrial policy advocates seem to be in favor of increased government control of the economy, a close reading of their proposals shows substantial distrust of government, especially distrust of elected officials and electoral institutions. Their writings are peppered

[38] A description of this pattern can be found in Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with claims that government planning is undesirable. Since the tripartite planning boards are portrayed as extragovernmental in character, they are supposed to avoid the defects of existing government bureaucracy. Existing industrial policy making is seen as occurring in "withered" governmental institutions without the capacity to make intelligent industrial policy choices.[39] The demand for corporatist representation itself implies a conviction that existing electoral processes and political institutions, like the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary, do not adequately represent societal interests. Since the established political arena is incapable of making competent industrial policy, new specialized institutions are required. According to McConnell and Lowi, past attempts to avoid governmental power and the direct exercise of governmental authority have contributed to the interest group liberal pattern, and the same is likely to be true of industrial policy.

In sum, the proposals for a new American industrial policy are a call to place an old American wine—industrial policy (which its advocates insist has been around a long time)—in a new bottle of corporatist industrial policy making. Their claim is that this new bottle will improve its quality and bouquet. I have argued that this bottle is not new at all, but constructed from the old interest group liberal design. A new label with a new vintage date may be attached, but the product that will eventually emerge will be similar to existing policy. It is probable that without more fundamental change than what industrial policy proponents advocate, the American political system can only produce policy-making mechanisms on the interest group liberal design. Also, it may be that existing industrial policy-making processes are inadequate to respond to foreign competition, and even that corporatist policy-making structures would be a tactic for inducing some policy changes. However, it is an illusion to see a corporatist framework forging a new consensus and producing an open, coherent industrial policy that breaks the interest group liberal mold.

The Virtues of Political Incrementalism

The writings of the industrial policy advocates approach decision making in a manner very close to the "rational-comprehensive" or "root method" model that Charles Lindblom describes in his classic essay, "The Science of Muddling Through."[40] They expect to centralize industrial policy making so that goals can be clarified and a consensus formed around them. Prior goal specification will then permit a routine selection of the appropriate means to achieve them. In this way a coherent and comprehensive set of programs and policies will improve America's competitive economic position. Central coordination of all relevant programs will be achieved. And all this will be informed by the best expert anal-

[39] Reich, *Next American Frontier*, 263, 345.
[40] Lindblom, "Science of Muddling Through."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ysis of the economy, the international environment, and the particular programs selected to achieve industrial policy goals.

More than just an analytical perspective, industrial policy proponents adopt a nonincremental approach to politics. They ignore the possibilities afforded by "political incrementalism."[41] Such a step-by-step, piecemeal approach to altering U.S. industrial policy does not seem adequate to industrial policy advocates. Instead, they want to provoke a national debate over the issue of "industrial policy" in its totality. They seem to expect the debate to lead to the adoption of the explicit values that will inform the policy. They expect the acceptance or rejection of a coherent package of policies. If adopted, this new comprehensive industrial policy would be made through new institutional structures possessing appropriate coordinating authority and employing expert staff.

From the incrementalist perspective, this approach seems flawed in at least three ways. First, it ignores the political difficulty of reaching and maintaining agreement on values, goals, and objectives among diverse groups holding different values and representing competing interests. Second, it relies too much on the need for sound knowledge and good theories about how industrial policy goals can be achieved. Third, it requires a centralized coordination of all aspects of industrial policy, which is probably not achievable and which ignores the alternative possibility of "partisan mutual adjustment."

Industrial policy advocates seek a comprehensive debate about the goals and objectives of an industrial policy; they feel it must "rest on a strong public consensus about overall goals."[42] Creating such a consensus is a principal reason for establishing a tripartite policy-making structure. Irrespective of how truly "representative" such a structure would be, it seems that if genuinely conflicting interests were represented on it, achieving consensus on broad goals would be extremely difficult. The more representative of diverse societal interests, the greater the value conflicts and the difficulty in achieving consensus. If a tripartite policy-making body reached a purported consensus on policy goals, this would mean that it had either reached an agreement based on general, ambiguous goal statements that would unravel once implementation began, or that the consensus was not adequately representative and would be resisted by unrepresented groups as it was carried out.

Incrementalists are skeptical that agruments over goals and values are likely to lead to successful policy agreements. Instead, they recommend ignoring basic value differences while debating individual concrete actions to be undertaken. By concentrating on means rather than ends, parties to policy making may reach mutual agreement on a specific course of action, even though they support it for very different reasons and have different goals in mind. An industrial policy based on a prior total "consensus" cannot take advantage of this process.

[41] Lindblom, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," *Public Administration Review* 19 (November/December 1979): 520.

[42] Magaziner and Reich, *Minding America's Business*, 379.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because industrial policy advocates seek to link ends and means explicitly, they are also likely to create coherent but complex packages of programs to achieve their ends. Such packages are not likely to be agreed to by all interested parties. As Lindbolm has put it, "An operative, integrated solution to a problem is a vast collection of specific commitments all of which are implemented. The odds of agreement among political elites and citizens on these vast collections are extremely slim."[43] If industrial policy advocates insist on such integrated solutions, their proposals are likely to suffer the same fate as similar past attempts to formulate "coherent" and "comprehensive" policy, such as President Jimmy Carter's energy policy.

A comprehensive industrial policy also assumes the existence of a reliable knowledge base to guide its formulation. Clear and coherent theory about how to achieve industrial reform must inform construction and adjustment of the discrete parts of a comprehensive industrial policy. Many economists question whether such reliable knowledge about industrial development exists.[44] Predicting precisely which industries are likely to grow in the future and which are in decline cannot be done with certainty. Mistakes are likely to be made. If these mistakes are part of a single comprehensive industrial policy, they are likely to call into question the entire program. Adjustments to compensate for errors will be very difficult if all parts are perceived as related to a single whole. A comprehensive approach to policy would lead to periodic comprehensive overhauls to correct mistakes, undermining political support in the process. A virtue of incrementalism, as Lindblom points out in his 1959 essay, is that it does not rely on complete theoretical understanding.[45] It permits experimentation, policy making through successive approximations, and incremental adjustment to correct errors. Such an approach to making industrial policy would reflect more accurately the limitations of the economic theory that must direct attempts to improve the economy.

Finally, the advocates of a comprehensive industrial policy ignore the potential of "partisan mutual adjustment" for achieving some coordination of industrial policies. They list the wide variety of separate government actions that affect industrial development and assume that these will only contribute to economic improvement if they are subject to a central coordinating agency. In his *Intelligence of Democracy* Lindblom elaborates the idea that "people can coordinate with each other without anyone's coordinating them, without dominant common purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relation to each other."[46] He describes various forms of mutual adjustment ranging from market exchange to

[43] Lindblom, "Still Muddling," 521.

[44] Shultz, "Industrial Policy"; George Eads, "The Political Experience in Allocating Investment," in Michael L. Wachter and Susan M. Wachter, eds., *Toward a New U.S. Industrial Policy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 466.

[45] Lindblom, "Science of Muddling Through," 246.

[46] Charles Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

manipulation.[47] Given the barriers to successful central coordination discussed in the previous section, improved industrial policy is more likely to result from the various forms of mutual adjustment than a probably futile attempt at central control. As more political actors become involved in public debates over industrial development, the potential for modifying something like defense procurement policy through mutual adjustment is likely to improve. Various policy actors might become more sensitive to industrial development issues; industrial policy advocates offering flexible incentives, willing to accept compromise, and sensitive to the goals of other policy makers might have considerable success. Attempting to subject all policy makers to central imperative coordination would probably induce resistance and opposition. But reasoned argument, negotiation, bargaining, even manipulation might make all policies more procompetitive, while not threatening the basic policy-making autonomy of other policy makers.

An Alternative Strategy for Industrial Policy Making

The major theme of this article is that proposals for comprehensive industrial policy are politically flawed. This is a serious problem, especially for anyone who supports the specific economic reforms proposed. Industrial policy advocates make a strong case that the American economy and industrial base are in trouble, requiring major government intervention to assure future economic growth to maintain the standard of living of Americans. Many of their specific economic proposals would probably improve the economy and ease the pain involved in restructuring industry. Because of the weaknesses discussed above, the political strategy proposed for carrying out these industrial policy reforms is not likely to succeed. Rather than pursue corporatist politics and a comprehensive "all or nothing" industrial policy, it is possible to sketch out an alternative political strategy which is likely to be more successful in reforming industrial structures.

Be Incremental. Industrial policy making is particularly well suited to incremental steps. According to Lindblom, incrementalism involves "a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought."[48] Industrial policy advocates have catalogued industrial policy ills and suggested specific remedies, thus setting the stage for attacking them. Instead of trying to enact reforms as a part of a comprehensive, integrated policy, the discrete remedies should be promoted on their individual merits. Such an approach will not result in a comprehensive integrated policy; some proposals will fail to be enacted. But the successful enactment of some would bring about general economic improvement. The result in terms of the objectives of industrial policy advocates would be better than that which would emerge from a protracted debate over "industrial policy."

[47] Ibid., 21–34, 153–62.
[48] Lindblom, "Still Muddling," 517.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Critics of incrementalism often object that it is a basically conservative policy-making strategy. They might object that incremental industrial policy would wed industrial change to minor variations on an unacceptible status quo. This criticism is undoubtedly correct regarding quick *fundamental* change in socio-economic arrangements, such as a transformation to socialism. However, the industrial policy advocates discussed here propose an essentially *reformist* program, well suited to the incrementalist approach. Incremental change could, in time, alter American industrial structure in the direction advocated by Thurow, Reich, Rohatyn, Magaziner, and others. It is perhaps the preferred strategy for moderate reform in the American context.[49] Industrial policy proponents should take to heart Lindblom's recommendations that incrementalism offers the chance of "smuggling" industrial policy changes into the system. They must, as he says, "learn paths of indirection and surprise, thus reaching objectives that would be successfully resisted were [their] program more fully revealed."[50]

Trust existing representative institutions (presidency, Congress, judiciary). Whatever the faults of existing institutions as agencies of representation, it is not likely that any corporatist system would improve the scope of societal representation or identify the public interest more effectively. The absence of either a tradition or the organs of functional representation in the United States undermines the corporatist approach as a means of encompassing all relevant societal interests. Making industrial policy through "separate institutions sharing power" will be messy, slow, and tortuous, but the result will come closer to encompassing the public interest than a transfer of power to tripartite bodies.

Nor should we underestimate the potential of existing institutions, particularly Congress, for making *good* industrial policy. The current restructuring of industry is not the first transformation of the American economy. Existing institutions have devised appropriate policies to cope with economic change in the past.[51] In specific recent decisions to affect industrial development, one can identify numerous decisions that hindsight indicates to have been appropriate. Alongside the mistakes industrial policy advocates mention, one should list Congress's successes, such as its rejection of the supersonic transport (SST); the bailouts of Chrysler, New York City, and, perhaps, Lockheed; and restructuring the railroad industry. Industrial policy advocates do not show that corporatist mechanisms would have produced better results in these instances.

Be ad hoc. The industrial policy advocates abhor ad hocism; they expect to avoid ad hoc political decisions about individual cases by devising general criteria and utilizing standard routines. They usually cite the ad hoc crisis decision making surrounding the New York and Chrysler cases as models to be

[49] "Incremental politics offers the best chance of introducing into the political system those changes and those policies producing intermediate changes that a discontented citizen might desire." Ibid., 521.

[50] Ibid., 521.

[51] This point is also made in a recent review of Rohatyn's book by Michael Kinsley, "The Double Felix," *The New Republic*, 26 March 1984, 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

avoided. However, the ultimate success of these instances of policy making raises fundamental questions about this argument. In fact, the type of decision making that actually occurred in these instances comes very close to the open, intense public decision making they advocate. The Chrysler decision, in particular, involved an open, intense public debate, centered in Congress, but also widely reported and discussed in the press. The decision was highly politicized, but in a manner in which competing interests and opinions faced each other directly.

This experience suggests that facing the problems of major industries on an ad hoc basis during periods of crisis prevents covert, unrepresentative decision making. Crisis focuses public attention and forces public debate. Creating a routinized and bureaucratized process for subsidizing distressed industries systematically might avoid crises at the cost of pushing some of these decisions out of wider public view. Ad hoc, crisis decision making would permit fundamental debate over the direction of industrial policy which is likely to serve better the public interest.

Avoid delegation. Industrial policy making cannot avoid entirely the well-entrenched pattern of interest group liberalism. Certainly the corporatist approach does not offer much chance of escaping it. An alternative strategy for coping with interest group liberalism would be to take seriously Lowi's objection to broad delegation and his recommendation for a return to the rule of law. One need not embrace completely his scheme of juridical democracy (which is probably not realistic in a modern administrative state) to see the virtue of searching for ways to reduce delegation and formulate more specific standards in law. To be practical, many industrial policies must involve a certain amount of delegation. If interest group liberal patterns are to be avoided, however, ways might be found to reduce delegation. One might formulate in congressional legislation rather precise standards about when and how government interventions should occur to guide industrial development, restructure industries, and retrain workers. For example, one could specify in legislation precise criteria for determining eligibility for receipt of worker's training vouchers, instead of leaving to industrial policy administrators the task of deciding which workers in which failed industries would receive them. Criteria regarding the extent of layoffs, the recent investment history, and the average length of unemployment within the industry could constitute automatic entitlement to training opportunities. Such an approach would require debate within Congress about general principles of industrial development that could guide formulation of these criteria. This kind of open public debate over industrial policy issues is what its advocates seek. It might just occur if Congress itself, as in the case of ad hoc decision making, formulated specific standards for industrial development.

Many who advocate a comprehensive industrial policy often cite Alexander Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures* as an historical model of the kind of effort they wish to undertake. The fate of that report may provide a glimpse of the future of the recent proposals for industrial policy. Hamilton's scheme was never adopted, at least not as a coherent whole. However, in the early nineteenth cen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tury, a number of state governments carried out programs similar to those Hamilton advocated. In commenting on this experience, William Diebold has written: "That all this should be clearer, more logical, and more complete in what Hamilton wrote than in what was done in practice is perhaps another characteristic of industrial policy."[52] Likewise, the logic, coherence, and completeness of the current industrial policy proposals will influence, but not determine, contemporary industrial policy. Clearer acceptance of this outcome should lead those concerned with influencing American industrial development to avoid the insistence on comprehensive corporatist solutions to economic problems. An incremental evolution of industrial policy is now occurring and will undoubtedly determine the future of the industrial economy. Conscious intervention to influence this evolution in desirable directions should be the political strategy of industrial policy advocates. If they insist on fighting first for a corporatist structure to cook up comprehensive solutions, their ability to influence the direction of industrial development will be diminished.*

[52] William Diebold, Jr., "Post and Future Industrial Policy in the United States," in John Pindar, ed., *National Industrial Stategies and the World Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 159.

* I would like to thank Professor Mark Hyde of Providence College for his helpful comments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Franklin D. Roosevelt and The Transcendence of Partisan Politics

SIDNEY M. MILKIS

We have witnessed a serious decline since the mid-1960s in the organizational strength and popular support of American political parties. Most scholars who have sought to explain the weakening of the traditional party system have looked to changes occurring in the electoral process that have had a direct effect on the disaggregation of party loyalty among voters. For example, Walter Dean Burnham stresses party reforms and political developments at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries that he feels irrevocably diminished the scope of party influence on the American political process.[1] Other analysts focus upon recent reforms affecting presidential elections that have weakened the parties' traditional roles in choosing candidates and in financing and directing campaigns. Austin Ranney suggests that these reforms, occurring during the late 1960s and early 1970s, have combined with rapid developments of public relations techniques and the projection of candidate images to reduce electoral politics to something closely approaching a "no-party system."[2]

This article does not seek to discount these developments but attempts to introduce a different factor, namely presidential leadership.[3] In particular, this

[1] Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), especially chaps. 4, 5.

[2] Austin Ranney, "The Political Parties—Reform and Decline," in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 213–247.

[3] For the most part, the decline of party literature has neglected the influence of presidential leadership. However, for useful discussions of the relationship between party leadership and party

SIDNEY M. MILKIS, assistant professor of politics, Brandeis University, is the author of numerous articles on the presidency and party politics. He is preparing a manuscript on party leadership and the development of the modern presidency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

study will suggest that the decline of political parties was extensively influenced by the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt who, though a great party leader in certain respects, acted to weaken the influence of the traditional party system on the political process.

Roosevelt considered traditional party politics an obstacle to the modernization of American government. He anticipated, in part, the critics of the party system of the late 1940s and early 1950s, who advocated a more "responsible" party system comprised of national policy-oriented organizations capable of carrying out platforms or proposals presented to the people during the course of an election.[4] Roosevelt wanted to overcome the state and local orientation of the party system, which was suited to congressional primacy and poorly organized for progressive action on the part of the national government, and to establish a national, executive-oriented party, which would be more suitably organized for the expression of national purposes. Unless such a development took place, Roosevelt argued, the Democratic and Republican parties would be merely "Tweedledum and Tweedledee to each other." The system of party responsibility in America, he argued, "required that one of its parties be the liberal party and the other be the conservative party."[5]

Ultimately, however, Roosevelt concluded that the public good and practical politics demanded that partisan politics be *transcended* rather than *restructured.* In fact, his party discipline, which culminated in the purge campaign of 1938, was directed less at party government than at administrative government. Many of the partisan efforts sought by the New Dealers were directed at legislating procedural reforms that would enhance the capacity and independence of the executive department in the making of public policy. The extensive effort to achieve a modernization of public administration between 1936 and 1940 was an important part of this project. Believing that a strong, independent presidency had a more secure place in the American tradition than "responsible" party government, Roosevelt aimed at building a more responsible democratic government within the presidency rather than through a more permanent link between the executive and legislature. This required extending the personal and

---

decline, see Lester Seligman, "The Presidential Office and the President as Party Leader (with a postscript on the Kennedy-Nixon era)," in Jeff Fishel, ed., *Parties and Elections in an Anti-party Age* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); also, Robert Harmel, ed., *Presidents and Their Parties: Leadership or Neglect*? (New York: Praeger, 1984), especially chaps. 1, 3, 10.

[4] Roosevelt's party leadership probably influenced the report of the American Political Science Association (APSA) Committee on Political Parties, which advocated and gave prominence to the doctrine of party responsibility. See APSA Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950), v, 22–25. An influential member of the committee, E. E. Schattschneider, considered Roosevelt's attempt to reform the Democratic party "one of the greatest experimental tests of the nature of the American party system ever made." See E.E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 163–169.

[5] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, 13 vols. (New York: Random House, 1938–1950), vol. 7, xxviii–xxxii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nonpartisan responsibility of the president to the detriment of collective and partisan responsibility.

As the British case demonstrates, party government and administrative reform need not be incompatible. Woodrow Wilson, who believed that a strong presidency might develop into a partisan force similar to the British prime minister, looked to the reform of parties *and* administration. Such reform might influence the development of a bureaucracy that would "professionally" implement the programs stemming from a government more effectively organized by a majority political party.[6]

The central thesis of this article, however, is that the New Deal gave impetus to an extension of presidential responsibility that tended to *replace* partisan politics with executive administration. Thus, the development of the modern presidency,[7] beginning with the Roosevelt administration, has focused additional responsibility on the executive department while party politics have continuously been neglected or relegated to being personal tools of presidential ambitions and programs. It is misleading to view the New Deal party alignment, as Walter Dean Burnham does, as "a temporary if massive deviation from a secular trend toward the gradual disappearance of the political party in the United States."[8] Rather, the New Deal and Franklin D. Roosevelt's party leadership can be seen as contributing to, rather than simply interrupting, the demise of partisan politics.

This article credits the Roosevelt administration with a rather coherent understanding and program in terms of partisan politics and public administration. This contrasts somewhat with most treatments of the New Deal, which stress the pragmatic and experimental nature of this program. To James MacGregor Burns and most other New Deal scholars, Franklin Roosevelt's presidency was one of "broker leadership"; that is the New Deal was for the most part an improvisational response to the social and economic crises of the 1930s, rather than a planned and conscious direction of events based upon firmly established political values.[9] But this article suggests that the New Deal needs to be taken more seriously as a *political program*, based upon firmly established values, rather than a series of hastily contrived reactions to social and economic developments. However, the focus here is not so much Roosevelt's intentions and deliberations; the central concern is to unravel the intricate and significant relationship between party politics and administrative reform during the 1930s.

[6] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908); "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2 (June 1887).

[7] On the development of the modern presidency, see Fred I. Greenstein, "Continuity and Change in the Modern Presidency," in King, ed., *The New American Political System*, 45–85.

[8] Burnham, *Critical Elections*, 132–133.

[9] See James MacGregor Burns, *The Lion and The Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956), 197–202. For a more complete discussion of the ideology and planning of the New Deal, concerning party politics and administrative reform, see Sidney M. Milkis, "The New Deal, the Decline of Parties and the Administrative State," unpublished dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Practical Commitment to Responsible Party Government

Franklin Roosevelt was strongly influenced by the thought and practice of Woodrow Wilson, who is recognized as the first writer to advance the doctrine of responsible party government. In his later writings, particularly, Wilson stressed the importance of extending the influence of the presidency to facilitate responsible partisan politics. The separation and division of powers weakened somewhat the strength of the president as party leader. Yet the independence of the president from the Congress and his unique position within the political system imposed an "extraordinary isolation" on the president, which, if used effectively, established the chief executive as his party's "major link" with the nation.[10]

To a degree, Roosevelt shared this vision. But his concerns were focused on *practical* rather than *theoretical* considerations. He did not consider a responsible party system to be an essential element of democratic government. Roosevelt did express some concern that the organized opposition to him in Congress was practically obliterated in the election of 1936. But as Turner Catledge suggested at the time, it was more than "mere good sportsmanship" or a "philosophical attitude toward opposition" that caused such regret. Roosevelt's concern for loyal opposition was dominated by practical considerations; without an organized opposition on which he could depend to oppose everything he advanced, Roosevelt would be beset by unorganized groups within his own party ranks, presenting an "undefinable and unpredictable collection of shifting blocs, the most annoying opposition with which any leader would have to deal."[11]

The work of Wilson and a few others notwithstanding, parties have never been defended on theoretical grounds in American democracy to the extent they have in Britain and most other industrial nations; they have rarely been viewed by political representatives as desirable ends-in-themselves. Still, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, they have been recognized by public officials as the most effective instruments of control within a fragmented power structure. For this reason, during times of political crisis, political leaders have sought to become, at least in part, party leaders.

Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt never developed a theory of the party system. But his concern with policy reform led him to try to circumvent the resistance he encountered from his party to a much greater degree than did Wilson. Up until the 1930s, the Democratic party remained committed to its Jeffersonian origins, that is individual autonomy, limited government, and states' rights. In fact, although Alexis de Tocqueville felt that equality required centralization of authority, American democracy had been allied to decentralization until the New Deal. Herbert Croly and Theodore Roosevelt had talked about "new nationalism" and the possibility of resurrecting Alexander Hamilton's nationalism as the "steward

[10] Wilson, *Constitutional Government*, 64–68.

[11] Turner Catledge, "Huge Majority Means Threat of Bloc Tactics," *New York Times Magazine*, 8 November 1936, 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the public welfare."[12] But prior to the New Deal, Democrats associated American liberalism with its Jeffersonian origins, which identified positive government with conservative efforts, beginning with Hamilton's economic policy, to promote business enterprises. Even Woodrow Wilson's program of extending the role of the national government remained committed to individual autonomy from the authority of the central government. Wilson's administration intervened to protect women and child workers, and the Federal Trade Commission was established to prevent unfair and deceptive business practices. But progressive Democrats, as Richard Hofstadter suggests, "preferred to keep the positive functions of government minimal, and, where these were necessary, to keep them on the state rather than the national level."[13] Previous great reform movements in the United States can be seen as reaffirmations of the American tradition of limited constitutional government, but the New Deal, though certainly not a direct rejection of this tradition, most seriously questioned the adequacy of traditional American freedoms.

One significant manifestation of Roosevelt's "new liberalism" was his assault on traditional party politics, a significant watershed in presidential party leadership. Wilson was a strong party leader but, like all previous presidents, he reconciled himself in the last analysis to the strong fissures within his party. In his use of patronage particularly, Wilson pursued a strategy directed at controlling rather than reforming his party in order to get his programs passed. Consequently, Wilson made little effort to strengthen the Democratic party's organization or its fundamental commitment to progressive principles.[14]

On the other hand, Roosevelt made a concentrated effort to influence a party realignment along less ambiguous liberal and conservative lines. He sought to make the Democratic party a party of "militant liberalism,"[15] encouraging those who were not part of that commitment to join the Republican camp. In Roosevelt's second administration, as in that of Woodrow Wilson, Congress was "chafing at its subordinate position."[16]

James Farley, Roosevelt's Democratic party chairman, suggested that the President's attempt to dominate his party indicated his thirst for personal

[12] Theodore Roosevelt, *Works of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1923–1926), vol. XIX, 10–30; also Herbert Croly, *Progressive Democracy* (New York: Macmillan, 1914), 201–219.

[13] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 305. Also see Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 18–21, 74. Apparently, Wilson became more committed to national reform toward the end of his presidency. Commenting on Wilson's expressed agreement with most of the English Labour program announced by the Labour party in 1918, Colonel House wrote in his diary: ". . . . the President has started so actively on the liberal road that I find myself, instead of leading as I always did at first, rather in the rear and holding him back." From the Diary of Colonel House, 24 February 1918, in Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 436.

[14] Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic Party," *Review of Politics* 18 (April 1956): 146–156.

[15] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 7, XXXI.

[16] Lindsay Rogers, "Reorganization: Post-Mortem Notes," *Political Science Quarterly* 53 (June 1938): 170.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power.[17] But FDR's actions to establish a "personal party" can probably be better understood if they are viewed as part of an effort to alter the character of constitutional government in the United States. As early as 1933, in a speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, he argued that where once equality of opportunity was provided by limited government interference in society and expansion in the American economy, certain economic and social changes in the American system demanded that Americans now recognize the "new terms of the old social contract."[18] The closing of the Western frontiers and the growth of industrial combinations to the point of "uncontrolled" and "irresponsible" units within the state signaled the turning of the tide by the end of the nineteenth century. The Depression of the 1930's, argued Roosevelt, indicated all too clearly that government action on behalf of the people was long overdue:

> Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of national resources, or necessarily producing new goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The day of enlightened administration has come.[19]

Roosevelt indicated that the solution to America's problems would require, at minimum, the development of "an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order." This new constitutional order required that there be a change in the liberalism of the Democratic party. And this change could occur only with the extension of presidential power over the party. The New Dealers' attempt to make the party into a more national organization focused not only on the national committee, which was dominated by state and local party leaders, but also on Congress, which registered state and local interests at the national level. In the last analysis, Roosevelt believed that a more principled party politics could only come through the subordination of Congress's position in the development of party policy. Measures of such scope and complexity that he had in view could only be implemented if they were drawn under the strong hand of centralized control; the New Deal could not be planned and built by debate within the legislature and traditional party councils. For this reason, unlike Wilson, Roosevelt made little use of the congressional party caucus. He politely rejected Congressman Alfred Phillips, Jr.'s suggestion in 1937 "that those sharing the burden of responsibility of party government should regularly and often be called into caucus and that such caucuses should evolve party policy and choice of party leaders."[20] A more principled party politics required the development of not so much a personal party as a presidential party.

[17] James Farley, *Jim Farley's Story* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1948), 120.
[18] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 1, 756.
[19] Ibid., 751–752.
[20] Alfred Phillips, Jr. to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 9 June 1937; Roosevelt to Phillips, 16 June 1937,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Deal Party Politics and Presidential Appeal: The Drive for Nationalization

Even though Roosevelt thought he saw in his 1936 landslide victory for a second term an impressive mandate to carry out reforms, his actions would be frustrated unless the fragmentation of constitutional democracy was modified. He expressed hope in his 1934 State of the Union annual message to Congress that the early political successes of his administration indicated that "a strong and permanent tie between the legislative and executive branches of government" was being constructed.[21] Yet as soon as the economic emergency of the early 1930s eased somewhat, the more traditional adversary relationship between the president and the Congress reemerged. Roosevelt's Supreme Court "packing" bill and his more consistent leftist orientation after 1935 contributed to the weakening of executive-legislative relations. When it became apparent that unity within the traditional American party system would not outlast the feeling of panic in the country in the early 1930s, Roosevelt attempted to influence the development of party politics that would allow for a more sustained period of coordinated party government. Without such a development, even the electoral mandate of 1936 would be insufficient to bring about a departure from traditional political practices in the United States.

The Purge Campaign of 1938

The most dramatic aspect of Roosevelt's effort to depart from traditional party politics was his intervention in several congressional primary campaigns in 1938. Roosevelt interceded in a dozen states in an effort to unseat entrenched conservative incumbents within his own party by denying them the Democratic nomination. Such intervention was not unprecedented; William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson had made limited efforts to cleanse their parties of recalcitrant members in this way. Yet Roosevelt's campaign against those who did not support his program took place on an unprecedentedly large scale and, unlike previous efforts, made no attempt to work through the regular party organization.[22]

The degree to which this action was viewed as a shocking departure from precedents in American politics is indicated by the fact that the press soon labeled Roosevelt's 1938 primary campaign as "the purge," a term which became

---

President's Personal File, 2666, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Roosevelt admitted that he was irked by the slowness of the American democratic process. See Anne O'Hare McCormick, "As He sees Himself," *New York Times Magazine*, 16 October 1938; *Fortune*, February 1937, 70.

[21] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 3, 14.

[22] For a discussion of presidential efforts to further party discipline by intervening in primary elections, see Sidney M. Milkis, "Presidents and Party Purges: With Special Emphasis on the Lessons of 1938," in Harmel, ed., *Presidents and Their Parties*, 151–178.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notorious with Adolph Hitler's attempt to weed out dissension in the German Nazi party and Josef Stalin's elimination of "disloyal" party members in the Soviet Communist party. Roosevelt considered this label a slur on his actions as party leader. Nevertheless, as Morton Frisch points out, since Roosevelt was attempting a "cleansing" of his party, a separating out of those with conservative political orientations, this term was, in a sense, an appropriate description of his actions.[23]

For a long time after he became president, Roosevelt made no substantial effort to modify party politics or to affect the outcome of primary contests. When Senator Key Pittman, who up to this time had loyally supported the administration, asked Roosevelt for support in his 1934 Democratic primary fight, Roosevelt replied:

> I wish to goodness I could speak out loud in meetings and tell Nevada that I am one thousand percent for you! An imposed silence in things like primaries is one of the many penalties of my job.[24]

Roosevelt maintained this "imposed silence" until the summer of 1938 when he finally initiated the purge. In 1936 he had refused to fight the renomination of the Democratic incumbent Senator from Virginia, Carter Glass, who was the only congressional member of the majority party to oppose consistently the New Deal from the start. Even as late as January 1938, Roosevelt declared a "hands off" policy when liberal Democrats in Missouri asked for his help in the primary campaign against the conservative incumbent, Senator Bennet Clark.[25]

Roosevelt had long expressed interest in strengthening the National Committee and establishing a firmer commitment to progressive principles among party members elected to national office. The great question was when and how to start working for it. The pressure of events deferred any action until 1938 when New Deal partisan efforts focused on disciplining the congressional party.[26]

It was really the conservatives within the Democratic party who finally influenced Roosevelt to intensify his partisan activity; they struck the first blow when they began to organize aggressively against the New Deal in 1937. In December a coalition of conservative Democratic and Republican senators issued

[23] Morton J. Frisch, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Contribution of the New Deal to American Political Thought and Practices* (Boston: S. T. Wayne, 1975), 81–82.

[24] Roosevelt to Key Pittmen, 25 August 1934, *President's Personal File*, 65.

[25] A. L. Meier to Roosevelt, 22 January 1938, *President's Personal File, 2.*

[26] It was suggested in the press that the President and his close advisers had been talking about facilitating a more fundamental party realignment from the beginning of his first term. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, "We Shall Make America Over," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 1938, 91. In fact, Roosevelt expressed a commitment to reforming the Democratic party as early as 1924. Responding to the dreary convention fight and dismal election of that year, he suggested in correspondence with representative Democrats throughout the country that something should be done to make the Democratic party a "stronger and more militant organization nationally." For example, see Franklin D. Roosevelt to Key Pittman, 4 December 1924, *Key Pittman Papers*, Box 15, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a public statement proclaiming their opposition to any further government encroachment on "the American system of private enterprise and initiative."[27] This press release, which also called for an end to congressional weakness in the face of burgeoning presidential power, signaled the birth of the conservative coalition in Congress, which to this day remains a thorn in the side of liberal Democrats. This group of conservative statesman blocked several important New Deal measures during the Seventy-fifth Congress of 1937–1938, such as the Court Reform Bill, the Wages and Hours Bill, and the Government Reorganization Act. In part, the purge had its birth in Roosevelt's desire to retaliate against those who opposed this part of his program.[28] But, more fundamentally, the struggle over this legislation involved a conflict over control of the Democratic party. Roosevelt's Attorney General, Homer Cummings, wrote in his diary on 8 August 1937:

> It is generally felt that back of all these various fights, including the Supreme Court fight, there lies the question of the nomination of 1940, and the incidental control of party destinies.[29]

The President's reluctance to undertake aggressive partisan leadership was not simply a matter of waiting for the right time to proceed. His cautiousness was partly connected to something more fundamental than such pragmatism. Given the ambiguity built into the historical role of the presidency, Roosevelt considered it neither desirable nor practical to immerse himself too extensively in party politics. He recognized that the authority of the presidency depended on his being the leader of the whole body of the people. In a radio address to the Young Democratic Clubs of America on 24 August 1934, Roosevelt expressed his understanding of the nonpartisan nature of the presidency:

> Whatever his party affiliation might be, the President of the United States, in addressing the youth of the country—even when speaking to the young citizens of his own party—should speak as President of the whole people. It is true that the Presidency carries with it, for the time being, the leadership of the political party as well. But the Presidency carries with it a far higher obligation than this—the duty of analyzing and setting forth national needs and ideals which transcend and cut across all of party affiliation.[30]

[27] *New York Times*, 16 December 1937.

[28] Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), 176. Roosevelt formally initiated the purge on 24 June 1938 in a national radio address wherein he called for the selection of "liberal" candidates in the primary elections. Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 7, 391–400.

[29] Personal and Political Diary of Homer Cummings, 1 August 1937, Box 235, no. 9, 119. *Homer Cummings Papers* (#9973), Manuscripts Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia.

[30] Roosevelt, *Public Papes and Addresses*, vol. 4, 337. Statements such as this were directed to nurturing a national consensus, which would establish a direct link between the President and a constitutency based less on partisan loyalty than government services. The basic thesis of this article, which suggests that New Deal partisan politics, though fervent, looked to a nonpartisan future, may explain why Roosevelt's statement that the presidency requires party leadership is qualified by the phrase, "for the time being."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although after 1800 the president became party leader as well as leader of all the people, the broad commitment in the United States to the separation of powers and federalism has disinclined the chief executive from connecting his ambition too centrally to his party in Congress. The traditional role of the presidency helps to explain Roosevelt's initial hesitancy to attempt to influence congressional contests, as well as the shock that greeted Roosevelt's eventual attempt to transform the Democratic party into a more liberal party. A close look at his actions against conservative Democrats reveals that these actions could achieve only an ephemeral strengthening of party government. This strategy reveals the short-sightedness of the Roosevelt administration and reflects the limited partisan purposes of the New Dealers in the first place. These purposes were most centrally focused on the South and local party organizations.

The Democratic Party and the Campaign for a New South

Not surprisingly, Roosevelt considered the southern bloc to be the greatest obstacle to the transformation of the Democratic party into a purposeful liberal organization. As Thomas Stokes wrote after analyzing the important role played by southern congressmen in scuttling the Wage-Hour Bill: "Southern Democracy was the ball and chain which hobbled the Party's forward march."[31] If the Democratic party was eventually to become a national liberal party, conservative southern Democracy would have to be defeated.

Roosevelt did not confine his efforts to the South during the 1938 purge attempt, but his most outspoken and unequivocal opposition was directed against traditional southern Democracy. He most actively sought to unseat incumbent Senators Walter George from Georgia, "Cotton Ed" Smith from South Carolina, and Millard Tydings of Maryland. Although Tydings represented a border state, his political values and practices identified him with the cause of his conservative colleagues from the South. Roosevelt made an especially determined appeal for administration candidates Lawrence Camp and David Lewis of Georgia and Maryland respectively.

Many northern New Deal supporters expressed great disappointment during and after the 1938 elections at Roosevelt's emphasis on attempting to purge candidates from traditionally more conservative states. For example, Congressman Herman Kopplemann of Connecticut sought White House support in an effort to unseat conservative incumbent Senator Augustine Lonergan. At the advice of Connecticut native Homer Cummings, however, the administration did not intervene, receiving instead a public pledge from the incumbent to support the New Deal and the President in the future.[32] Lonergan was renominated but lost the

[31] Thomas Stokes, *Chip off My Shoulder* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940), 503.

[32] For a report on the Connecticut situation, see Cummings to Roosevelt, 20 September 1938, *Homer Cummings Papers*, Box 170; and Arch McNeil to Roosevelt, 12 August 1938, *President's Official File*, 300, Democratic National Committee, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

general election, partly, Kopplemann suggests, because the public resented his repudiation of the President during the Seventy-fifth Congress. Kopplemann wrote James Farley in November 1938, after the general election:

> I don't know how you personally feel about the attempt of the so-called purge but, naturally, that attempt could not have been expected to succeed in traditionally conservative Democratic states. For instance, in Maryland and in Georgia, the people vote the Democratic ticket, but not necessarily the New Deal ticket. Here in Connecticut, for the past seven years, former Republicans have been voting the Democratic ticket because it was the New Deal ticket.

Because of the administration's relative indifference to the slate of Democratic candidates in Connecticut, Kopplemann argued, the party fared poorly in the 1938 elections.[33]

This observation would seem to be supported by the fact that Roosevelt's one successful purge effort in congressional elections was accomplished against conservative Rules Committee Chairman John J. O'Connor from New York City—Roosevelt's only effort in the urban North.[34] There were other factors that contributed to this victory besides the fact that it was carried out in a northern metropolitan area. Since Roosevelt received the support of the local party organization in this contest and New York was his home state, the charge of outside interference that was lodged against him in other primary contests was not effective in this race.[35] Nevertheless, Roosevelt's effort to transform the Democratic party into a liberal party might have garnered more support had it been directed more aggressively at some of the more recalcitrant northern candidates. Successes in such an attempt might have sufficiently backed conservative southern Democrats into a corner where they either would have acquiesced to Roosevelt's liberal views or abandoned the Democratic party.

This northern strategy, however, would have relegated the Democratic party to being a sectional organization. Roosevelt probably recognized that writing off the South would lead to the development of a doctrinaire liberal party in the North. This would cause a sectional split that Roosevelt wanted to avoid. Heretofore the party had been a national party but at a price to its ability to coordinate policy action. The New Dealers wanted to nationalize the party system in a more

[33] Herman Kopplemann to James Farley, 29 November 1938, *President's Official File*, 300.

[34] Charles M. Price and Joseph Boskin, "The Roosevelt Purge: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Politics* 28 (August 1966): 660–670.

[35] When this contest was going badly, Roosevelt urged the Bronx party leader Ed Flynn to work against the nomination of O'Connor. Flynn reluctantly agreed but insisted that the local party organization be allowed to run the show without interference from the White House. Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), 150. Flynn's account, however, contradicts that of Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, who worked closely with the White House "elimination committee," the group of close presidential advisors responsible for planning the purge campaigns. Ickes writes in his diary that the White House continued to be involved in the O'Connor campaign after Flynn agreed to help. Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 466, 476.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fundamental way; they sought to transform a decentralized party, responsible only to a local electorate, into an organization responsive to the will of the national party leader—the President—and the interests of a national electorate.[36] Roosevelt's appeal to the nation during the 1938 primary was an initial attempt to displace the local and sectional conflicts that were such an important part of the complex American political process in favor of a more nationalized political agenda based upon economic issues.[37]

With such a task in mind, the President initiated his southern campaign by visiting his "other home" in Warm Springs, Georgia in August 1938. Roosevelt endorsed United States Attorney Lawrence Camp in a speech at Barnsville, as Walter George listened from the same podium. The President began his talk by arguing that a positive national program of social welfare legislation would be of special benefit to the South, a region that was disproportionately plagued by economic and social problems. Yet effective action by the federal government, Roosevelt told Georgians, could only be achieved by a party of men who shared a truly "liberal" political philosophy, who were willing to engage the federal government in attending to the southern social and economic needs. This meant, said Roosevelt:

> . . . that if the people of the State of Georgia want definite action in the Congress of the United States, they must send to that Congress Senators and Representatives who are willing to stand up and fight night and day for federal statutes drawn to meet actual needs—not something that serves merely to gloss over the evils of the moment for the time being—but laws with teeth in them which go to the root of the problems, which remove the inequities, raise the standards and, over a period of years, give constant improvement to the conditions of human life in this state.[38]

Roosevelt felt that the deep South would not have to be conceded by a liberalized Democratic party. Conservatism in the South was not really an economic conservatism. Conservative Democracy in this section of the country was firmly established in reaction to the populist movement at the end of the nineteenth century by the exploitation of the race issue. He believed that the people in the South could be persuaded of the advantages of a liberal Democratic party if the race issue and the reconstruction era could be forgotten amid a chorus of demands for economic justice—demands that would be important to the majority of whites as well as blacks. With this in mind, when Roosevelt was asked at a press conference in April 1938—at a time when the New Deal was besieged by the conservative coalition under the leadership of southern Democrats—whether he thought the solid South would stay Democratic very long, he replied:

[36] William E. Leuchtenburg, *Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932–1940* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 268–269.

[37] E. E. Schattschneider discusses the "displacement of conflict" in his *The Semi-sovereign People* (Hindsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1945). See chap. v for his application of this concept to the New Deal and the Democractic party.

[38] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 7, 466–467.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Let me put it this way. I think the South is going to remain Democratic but I think it is going to be a more intelligent form of democracy than has kept the South, for other reasons, in the democratic column all these years. It will be intelligent thinking and, in my judgment, because the South is learning, it is going to be a liberal democracy.[39]

The desire of the administration to focus on economic legislation probably contributed to Roosevelt's lukewarm support of the Antilynching Bill, which would have held local law enforcement authorities responsible for the lynching of prisoners "escaping" their custody. Frederick Delano, Roosevelt's uncle and close political adviser, wrote the President's son, James, in January 1938:

> I personally would like to see the Antilynching Bill dropped on the ground that it would not work well in a hostile atmosphere—and if the Federal government tries to enforce so unpopular a law against local and state opposition it will make matters as bad as they were in *Reconstruction Days* (emphasis Delano's).[40]

This disinclination to attack the race issue did little to assuage the concerns of southern conservatives. Roosevelt's strong attack on traditional southern politics—an attack which coincided, not coincidentally, with a report of the National Emergency Council on economic conditions in the South—convinced southern conservatives that the New Deal would eventually lead to broader black participation. Southerners were concerned about the solicitation of the black vote in the North by the Democratic party. At the urging of Pennsylvania Senator Joseph Guffey, who recognized the attraction of New Deal economic programs for blacks, the Democratic National Committee during Roosevelt's first term established the first effective Negro division a Democratic campaign committee ever had.[41] Southern political leaders were astute enough to see the possible long-run consequences of this campaign strategy for politics below the Mason-Dixon line. When combined with Roosevelt's attack on the economic conditions of their region, such a strategy portended a class-oriented alignment which would remake southern democracy. Moreover, Roosevelt characterized conservative Democrats as "Copperheads" in his fireside chat initiating the purge, an allusion which conjured up images of a renewed northern assault on the South.[42]

Roosevelt's purge campaign in the South was part of a larger plan to strengthen his hand as majority leader throughout the nation at the expense of state and local party leaders. If successful, such a plan would significantly affect the political process and the nation; most of all, however, it promised to remake southern politics. The abolition of the two-thirds rule for national conventions,

[39] *Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 21 April 1938, vol. II (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 338–340.

[40] Frederick Delano to James Roosevelt, 22 January 1938, *James Roosevelt Papers*, Box 7, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[41] For a report on the Democractic party and the black vote, see Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, "The Guffy-Biography of a Boss, New Style," *Saturday Evening Post*, 26 March 1939, 5–7, 98–102.

[42] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 7, 395.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which required support from two-thirds of the delegates for the nomination of president and vice president, was another aspect of this attempt. Although this rule gave a united minority the power to prevent a decision, it had been defended in the past on the ground that it guarded the most loyal Democratic section—the South—against the imposition of an unwanted ticket by the less habitually Democratic North, East, and West. Many Southerners, anticipating what was to come in 1938, unsuccessfully fought to retain this rule at the 1936 Democratic Convention. Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, one of the leaders of the conservative Democrats in the Congress, write after the 1936 convention:

> The abolition of the two-thirds rule will enable the Northern and Western Democrats to control the party, nominate its candidates and write its platforms. All of this will come out in 1940. Meantime, we cannot help ourselves. No party can resist its President when he is running for a second term. There was no possibility of arresting the abrogation of the rule.[43]

To southern Democrats, it appeared that Roosevelt was intent upon building a new party organization. Senator George was able to excite the fear in many old-time southerners in Georgia that the purge against him indicated that the advisers around the President—the Corcorans, the Cohens, the Hopkinses, who had no relationship to the regular Democratic organization—were influencing him toward the remodeling of their ancient and honorable party.[44] The New Dealers, however, were less concerned with reforming traditional party politics than they were with overcoming obstacles to the development of a modern welfare state.

Party Organization—A Modern Tammany?

With the exception of the purge in New York City of John O'Connor, the administration eschewed working through traditional party machines in order to influence the election of a more tractable Congress. All of the members of the "elimination committee," which planned the purge campaign, came from outside the Democratic organization. Democratic Chairman James Farley, who was bitterly opposed to the primary campaign, became less influential once it was finally decided to attack the conservative wing of the party.

Roosevelt did attempt to work "quietly" with local party organizations in such states as Connecticut and Indiana that did not have direct primaries. Roosevelt, at the suggestion of Homer Cummings, did not oppose the nomination of incumbent Lonergan in Connecticut. In "exchange" Lonergan promised to support liberal policies in the future. And in Indiana the administration tried unsuccess-

[43] Josiah Bailey to R. R. King, 10 August 1936, *Josiah Bailey Papers*, Senatorial Series, Political National Papers, Box 475, Manuscripts Department, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

[44] *New York Times*, 16 September 1938.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fully to influence the state Democratic machine to dump the incumbent, Senator Frederick Van Nuys.

Generally, however, the effort to purge the Democratic party stressed a direct appeal to public opinion. In retrospect this strategy might have been an unfortunate one to follow. Edward Flynn, Democratic leader of the Bronx, noted with interest that the most important victory Roosevelt obtained in the purge was the one which Flynn engineered in New York against House Rules Committee Chairman John J. O'Connor.[45] But given Roosevelt's interest in strengthening the national government and the presidency, his attempt to go over the heads of the local party leaders in an effort to influence the people directly is not surprising. Roosevelt was not adverse, in the short-run, to working with local leaders who were amenable to liberal political policies; at times he cooperated with the likes of Ed Flynn, Frank Hague, and Ed Kelly. Yet, clearly his speeches and other political actions were geared toward loosening the grip of local hands on the Democratic organization. In his 1934 book, *On Our Way*, Roosevelt expressed approval of the decline of patronage politics in the United States and "the elimination of more and more local political machines and bosses" whose chief aim in life had been to "feather their own nests."[46]

Roosevelt expressed hope that the American party system was changing from an institution based upon self-interest and pragmatism into one organized on the basis of principle. The lack of integrity of traditional party politics was not his only concern. His vision of a government more extensively committed to equality, redistribution, and the welfare state required more efficient administration. He expressed such a view in his 1935 speech to the Young Democratic Clubs:

> Mere party membership and loyality can no longer be the exclusive test. We must be loyal not merely to persons or parties, but we must be loyal also to the higher conceptions of ability and devotion that modern government requires.[47]

But the New Dealers, their rhetoric notwithstanding, were quite willing to politicize federal administration. Oftentimes their strategy seemed to involve not so much a drive for the end of patronage as it did an attempt to centralize control of patronage within the presidency. As the President-elect, Roosevelt spoke of modifying rather than eliminating patronage practices. Feeling Wilson's adherence to traditional patronage practices was unfortunate, Roosevelt expressed to Homer Cummings in January 1933 his desire to proceed on somewhat different lines, primarily with the view, according to the latter's diary, "to building up a national organization rather than allowing patronage to be used merely to build Senatorial and Congressional machines."[48] During his first term,

[45] Flynn, *You're the Boss*, 151.

[46] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *On Our Way* (New York: The John Day Company, 1934), 248–249.

[47] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 4, 234.

[48] Diary of Homer Cummings, 15 January 1933, Box 234, No. 2, 90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, Roosevelt followed traditional patronage practices. James Farley, a strong organization man, handled patronage, and in most cases appointees were recommended by local organizations or by the Democratic United States senators. But after 1936 Roosevelt did not follow the recommendations of organization people so closely. Beginning in 1938, especially, when Roosevelt's partisan actions became more aggressive, patronage practices circumvented the traditional organization. According to Ed Flynn, who became Democratic chairman in 1940, "the President turned more and more frequently to the so-called New Dealers who were then surrounding him." Under the leadership of presidential aide Thomas Corcoran, these people managed increasingly during Roosevelt's second term to short circuit James Farley and the Democratic National Committee. As a result, many appointments in Washington went to individuals who were committed New Dealers but "who were not Democrats in many instances, and in all instances were not organization Democrats."[49]

By pursuing such a patronage strategy, the Roosevelt administration established an incipient New Deal organization that worked independently of the regular Democratic machinery. This reorganization became linked with the 1938 primary campaigns and the reaction of Congress and regular Democrats against the purge. Until the passage in 1939 of the Hatch Act, which barred federal employees from participating in campaigns, the Roosevelt administration was making use of the growing army of federal workers in local and state political activity, including some of the purge campaigns.[50] In fact, as the *New York Times* reported after its passage, the Hatch Act was a "direct outgrowth of strong arm federal politics, of partisan use of the money appropriated and the powers delegated to the executive by Congress." In large part, "it was the child of 'the purge'."[51]

Before the Hatch Bill became a law, it was felt by many that Roosevelt was putting together a modern Tammany, one that would operate on a national scale independently of the state and local governments.[52] After the Florida primary, in which the Roosevelt administration aided the successful effort of incumbent Senator Claude Pepper to fend off the anti-New Deal challenge of Congressman Mark Wilcox, the *New York Times* reported that the use of money and personnel from federal relief organizations, had given the administration the potential for superior influence in renominating and reelecting its favorites and in punishing independents. The use of relief funds and the Works Progress Administration

[49] Flynn, *You're the Boss*, 153.

[50] On the use of federal employees in the 1938 primaries, see Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures and the Use of Government Funds of 1938, *Investigation of Senatorial Campaign Expenditures*, Senate Report, 76th Congress, 1st Session, Number 10288; also, John Edward Hopper, *The Purge: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1938 Democratic Nominations*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1966, 107.

[51] *New York Times*, 6 August 1939.

[52] Albert Jay Nook, "WPA, the Modern Tammany," *American Mercury* 45 (October 1938): 215–19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was especially salient in the Kentucky primary where Roosevelt sought to help Majority Leader Alben Barkley against a strong challenge from Governor A. B. (Happy) Chandler. Roosevelt's endorsement of Barkley was significant, but equally important was the "federal machine" which worked feverishly on behalf of the incumbent Senator. After Barkley's victory *Newsweek* reported:

> Once the New Deal issue and the President's personality had been injected into the fight, the Barkley-Chandler race resolved into a titanic test between the vote getting power of Federal funds—WPA and farm benefits—against the strength of a well-disciplined state machine. . . . The New Deal won: with reports in from most precincts, Barkley lumbered across the finish line 50,000 votes ahead of his rival. . . .[53]

This federal machine was much more successful in aiding the renomination of pro-New Deal incumbents than it was in "purging" New Deal opponents from the party. With the exception of the congressional primary in New York, which was fought on Roosevelt's home territory, every incumbent that was a target of the purge was able to fight off the challenge of Roosevelt's personality and federal pap. Nevertheless, the development of a New Deal machine was a frightening prospect even for rather well entrenched incumbents, since "purge" campaigns forced them to engage in long and costly campaigns which otherwise might be foregone conclusions.

The Hatch Act, however, made the full development of a national party machine based on federal government spending and organization less likely. It removed the influence of virtually all federal administrative officials from nominating or electioneering efforts for president, vice-president, or members of Congress.[54] It also had strong legal measures that sought to prevent federal job holders from using their influence to coerce votes or money in national elections. Besides serving to further insulate congressional and Senate elections from presidential control, the Hatch Act also gave members of Congress a greater measure of control over the nomination conventions by precluding the participation of federal administrative officers. At the 1936 Democratic Convention, about half of the 1,100 delegates were federal job holders. With passage of the Hatch Act, only cabinet officers, members of Congress, and a few top-ranking policy officers of the Roosevelt regime could be delegates in 1940. In effect the Hatch Act demolished the national Roosevelt political machine as distinct from the regular Democratic organization.[55] Although Roosevelt did manage to control the 1940 convention, his chances of doing so would have been questionable had it not been for the critical foreign situation and his immense personal popularity.

[53] *Newsweek*, 14 August 1938, 9–10.

[54] The act excludes from its provisions the president and vice president, aides paid from appropriations for the president's office, heads and assistant heads of executive departments, and officers who are appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who determine policies to be pursued by the United States. For a summary of the Hatch Act's provisions and development, see James W. Fesler, *Public Administration: Theory and Practice* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980), 120–124.

[55] *New York Times*, 30 July 1939; *Time*, 31 July 1939, 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In spite of these efforts to develop a federal political organization, it is not likely that Roosevelt aimed to develop a national Tammany Hall. He was more interested in orienting the executive department for the formation of liberal public policy than he was in developing a national political machine. He recognized that to carry out his program the party organization would have to be based on principles as well as pap, and that the executive department needed to be professional as well as liberal. As E. E. Schattschneider wrote in reference to the Hatch Act, "a powerful national party organization is not merely a magnified local machine consuming a greater quantity of spoils."[56] This probably explains why after much consideration the President, though he fought passage of this legislation, chose not to veto the Hatch Act.[57] Not only would such a veto most likely have split his party irretrievably and cost the Democrats votes in 1940, but it also would have worked against the achievement of Roosevelt's reform program. The creation of the modern welfare state required effective administration. The New Dealers did not seek to build an executive department which would be independent of political control; they wanted a bureaucracy that would be committed to the perpetuation of the New Deal. But the insulation of federal officials from patronage politics was not incompatible with such a task. The Hatch Act, though it might have weakened the attempt to "cleanse" the Democratic party, may have furthered the cause of the New Dealers to establish a modern welfare state.

Administrative Reform and the Transcendence of Partisan Politics

Roosevelt's purge campaign galvanized opposition throughout the nation. Roosevelt and the New Deal were very popular in the South in the 1930s, especially in Georgia; nevertheless, the attack on the southern incumbents was rejected as overzealous nationalism and partisanship. The major reason given for the failure of the purge campaigns was resentment at the President's interference in matters that were considered to be state and local. In the end, the President's attempt to affect state and local primary contests was viewed as an irresponsible effort to fashion a rubber stamp Congress. His failure demonstrated the strong resistance built into the American political culture against fervent national partisanship. The decentralized nature of the American party system has become attached to such constitutional mechanisms in American politics as the separation of powers and federalism, thereby making any direct attack on this system difficult. *New York Times* columnist Arthur Krock wrote after the failed primary campaign:

[56] Schattschneider, *Party Government*, 164.

[57] This was not an easy decision for Roosevelt. After closely consulting with his attorney general concerning the constitutional and political viability of this bill, he signed it on the final day before it would become a law without his signature. See *New York Times*, 3 August 1939; and memorandum, Frank Murphy to Franklin Roosevelt, 26 July 1939, *President's Secretary's File*, 152, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> He [Roosevelt] has demonstrated in the most public way that the American system and tradition are still stronger than he is. For instance, it is admitted on all sides in Maryland that Representative [David] Lewis, an excellent man and not at all the rubber stamp he professed himself to be, would have run a much better race against Senator Tydings if the President had not forcibly intervened.[58]

Roosevelt was always aware of the limitations of the extent to which his purposes could be achieved by party government in the American context. He realized that while political exigency demanded that the president assume the leadership of his party, the full power and splendor of the office necessitated rising above partisan politics. This realization probably helps to explain why the purge campaign was limited to a few Senate and congressional contests, for the most part in the South, rather than a more systematic nationwide attempt to elect New Dealers.

A Party to End All Parties?

It is not clear to what extent the lack of success of the purge campaign reinforced Roosevelt's notion of the limited significance of political parties. To some degree, Roosevelt's interest in reshaping the Democratic party was sustained well beyond 1938. In fact, Roosevelt made overtures to Wendell Willkie, the liberal Republican who ran for president on the GOP ticket in 1940 and was rejected by his own party in favor of Thomas Dewey in 1944, about the possibility of forming a new liberal party. The project was never pursued very far, however, since by election day Willkie was dead, and five months after election day Roosevelt was dead also. But with the exception of the vague overtures directed at Willkie, Roosevelt's aggressive partisan efforts were insignificant after 1938.[59] He told Homer Cummings in December 1938, that his attitude toward recalcitrant Democrats had become "all milk and honey."[60] Apparently, Roosevelt came to the conclusion that the decentralized character of American politics recommended against strong partisan action as a means to achieve desired policy.

It is interesting to note that Roosevelt's most unequivocal statement on the limited importance of parties came about a year and a half after the purge campaigns. In his Jackson Day speech of 8 January 1940, Roosevelt pointed to both the limited and declining significance of political parties in the United States.

> . . . I do believe in party organization, but only in proportion to its proper place in government. I believe party organization is a sound and necessary part of our Amer-

[58] Arthur Krock, "Roosevelt Reversals Mystify 'Purge' Aims," *New York Times*, 18 September 1938.

[59] For an account of the collaboration between Roosevelt and Willkie, see Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 463–470. Mary Hinchey argues that Roosevelt never followed through on this expressed interest in realignment. Mary Hedge Hinchey, "The Frustration of New Deal Revival, 1944–1946." Unpublished dissertation, University of Missouri, 1965, 41.

[60] Personal and Political Diary of Homer Cummings, 30 December 1938, Box 235, no. 8, 270.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> ican system, and that, effectively organized nationally and by States and by localities, parties are good instruments for the purpose of presenting and explaining issues, of drumming up interests in elections, and, incidentally, of improving the breed of candidates for public office.
>
> But the future lies with those wise political leaders who realize the great public is interested more in government than in politics, that the independent vote in this country has been steadily on the increase, at least for the past generation, that vast numbers of people consider themselves normally adherents of one party and still feel perfectly free to vote for one or more candidates of another party, come election day, and on the other hand, sometimes uphold party principles even when precinct captains decide "to take a walk."[61]

Roosevelt recognized during the 1930s realignment period that party influence might be waning, thereby anticipating the "decline of party" literature that began to appear during the 1960s. He perhaps believed that the resurgence of party politics during the New Deal was temporary. In part his realization may be attributable to the disappointing purge campaign, but apparently Roosevelt saw the handwriting on the wall prior to the partisan efforts of 1938. Beginning in 1937, Roosevelt sought administrative reforms that were intended to help him govern in the *absence* of party government.

Party responsibility and the development of the modern presidency became intermingled during the Roosevelt administration. Most obviously, the liberalization of the Democratic party under Roosevelt and the New Deal realignment led to the development of a modern welfare state and a transition from legislative to executive-oriented government. In addition, however, the Democratic party was to be used as a means to provide the president greater control over the welfare state so that the executive department would be a more independent policy maker than was hitherto possible. Roosevelt believed that liberalism could best be promoted in the long run through a revamping of the executive department which would eventually make traditional party politics less important. In a sense, this would also make the development of responsible party government less necessary. As the *Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management* suggested, with administrative reform the "brief exultant commitment" to progressive government as expressed in the elections of 1932 and, especially, 1936 now would be more firmly established in "persistent, determined, competent, day-by-day administration."[62]

[61] Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 9, 28.

[62] *Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 53. The President's Committee on Administrative Management, headed by Louis Brownlow, played a central role in the planning and politics of executive reorganization from 1936-1940. For a full analysis of the background and impact of this commission, see Barry Dean Karl, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). For further evidence of Roosevelt's commitment to executive administration, see his veto message for the Walter-Logan Bill, which would have severely restricted the discretion of executive agencies, where he praises "administrative tribunals" as "the only means of obtaining

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the last analysis, New Deal reformers viewed the strengthening of presidential administration as better suited to obviating the obstacle of separation of powers than a revamped party system: whereas party government required the constant cooperation of party members in Congress, presidential administration would "only" require the passive acceptance of executive-initiated programs. As Luther Gulick, who played a pivotal role in new Deal administrative reform, put it, the legislature would merely respond positively or negatively to the master plan of policy worked out by the executive, a plan that, in effect would be little more than "a declaration of war, so that the essence of the program is in reality in the gradual unfolding of the plan in actual administration."[63] Legislative acquiescence would certainly not be easy to achieve, yet administrative reform might so strengthen the presidency that executive domination of public policy would be difficult to resist.

Consequently, administrative reform was given a very high priority by the Roosevelt administration. The Executive Reorganization Bill, first proposed in 1937, became a major focus of party responsibility.[64] This bill, suggests Morton Frisch:

> . . . with the power given to the President to rearrange executive agencies and bureaus, would tighten the loosely organized structure of the national government and thus enable him to make more use of his position as head of the *whole nation* rather than as merely head of the *party* governing the nation.[65]

The development of administrative reform into a party program was frustrating to many members of the Democratic party. Such reform incited intense controversy, threatening as it did Congress's influence over the bureaucracy without promising the political reward of seemingly more tangible welfare programs such as Social Security, collective bargaining, minimum wage, and agricultural adjustment.[66]

Yet, Roosevelt considered the overhauling of the executive department an essential ingredient of his liberal program. In fact, the defeat of the Executive Reorganization Bill in April 1938 had an important influence on Roosevelt's decision to undertake his campaign to purge the Democratic party.[67] And he

equality before law . . . wherever a continuing series of controversies exist between a powerful and concerted interest on the one side and a diversified mass of individuals . . . on the other." Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses*, vol. 9, 618.

[63] Luther Gulick, "Politics, Administration and the New Deal," *The Annals* 169 (September 1933): 64.

[64] House Majority Leader Sam Rayburn appealed for party loyalty in regard to the Executive Reorganization Bill, arguing that the defeat of this legislation would indicate a "vote of no confidence" in President Roosevelt. *Congressional Record*, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, 8 April 1938, 5121.

[65] Frisch, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 79. (Emphasis added.)

[66] To the applause of the House, John O'Connor expressed dismay that such a sensitive, albeit politically unrewarding, reform program was being pushed so hard by the administration. *Congressional Record*, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, 31 May 1938, 4609–4611.

[67] In June, Senator Josh Lee of Oklahoma urged Roosevelt to take action against those who opposed the reorganization program and were running for reelection; two days later, interestingly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued to push for administrative reform in the Seventy-sixth Congress, even though this effort required a tremendous expenditure of political capital. The *New York Times* reported in August 1938 that this reform took precedence over several measures such as tax and labor reform: no measure was "closer to the President's heart" and none aroused "more determination to force it through Congress than the Reorganization Bill."[68]

A compromise administrative reform bill eventually passed the Seventy-sixth Congress in 1939. In effect, the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939, which first established the executive office of the president, cleared the path for the development of a strengthened and centralized executive office that provided the president with the ability to respond to the expectations for greater direction of social and economic processes even in the absence of party government.

Of course Roosevelt did not eschew party politics. He recognized that some sort of political organization would be necessary to sustain popular support for his programs. Roosevelt's partisan views and actions indicate that he considered party organizations to have an important, albeit limited, role in the political process. In part, this was a matter of pragmatism, but the Roosevelt administration's limited commitment to party government also grew out of a principled commitment to achieving permanent progressive reform. New Dealers hoped that the expanded role of the national government would lead to the evolution of a professional welfare state largely insulated from the fluctuations of party politics. This view was given clear expression by Joseph Harris, the director of the research staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, in an initial planning session in May 1936:

> We may assume the nature of the problems of American life are such as not to permit any political party for any length of time to abandon most of the collectivist functions which are now being exercised. This is true even though the details of policy programs may differ and even though the old slogans of opposition to governmental activity will survive long after their meaning has been sucked out.[69]

It might be suggested that the program Roosevelt pushed upon the Democratic party for administrative reform prepared his party to end all parties. Roosevelt's party strategy in important respects developed a party of administration, which was established upon programs aimed at replacing party politics with executive administration. As the New Deal developed, it became apparent to many observers that the Roosevelt administration was intent upon rendering party politics and loyal opposition obsolete. *Fortune* magazine noted in 1937:

Whether or not he [Roosevelt] was right is not here important. What is important is

enough, Roosevelt announced his intention to purge the Democratic party of conservatives. Richard Polenberg, *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 183.

[68] *New York Times*, 16 August 1938.

[69] "Outline for the New York Conference," 9–10 May 1936. *Papers of the President's Committee on Administrative Management*, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> that the kind of government for which he asked the popular endorsement was government for the people in which policy was formulated not by the mass of people nor by the representatives of the masses of people but by the people's President.
>
> Precisely where that . . . leaves the loyal opposition theory of Republican policy is all too clear. It leaves it nowhere. A useful opposition can function only in a country in which the vital decisions are made in the Legislature.[70]

The Democratic party became, during the 1930s, a temporary way station on the road to administrative government. Such an administrative party would establish the conditions for the end of parties, unless an anti-administration challenging party would spring up. It is primarily in this capacity that the Republican party has provided "loyal opposition" since the New Deal.

The civil service reform carried out by the Roosevelt administration demonstrates particularly the effort to replace "politics" with "administration." Unlike most of the elements of administrative reform that would strengthen the President per se, the extension of the merit system "upward, outward and downward" cast an especially New Deal hue over government machinery. This entailed extending merit protection after 1938 over the personnel appointed by the Roosevelt administration during its first term; four-fifths of these had been brought into government outside of regular merit channels.[71] Administrative reform, therefore, was pursued in a way to politicize, rather than simply professionalize, the bureaucracy, albeit in a nonpartisan way. This would especially strengthen the hand of presidents sympathetic to the political objectives of the New Deal.

The New Deal Realignment and the Decline of Parties

The creation of the modern presidency and the consequent de-emphasis on party leadership during the New Deal has had an important influence on the historical development of the party system. Roosevelt's party politics, which led to a significant transcendence of partisan politics, ultimately weakened the influence of the party system on public policy. This outcome of the New Deal is often overlooked. Although historical treatments of the party system usually relate the decline of political parties during the twentieth century, such treatments usually consider the important events surrounding the Depression as a dramatic but brief positive interlude in a long period of party decay. But the outcome of the New Deal realignment—the establishment of presidential government and the rejection of traditional partisan politics as archaic—suggests that the "end-of-party" literature has underestimated the "positive" contributions of the New Deal in accelerating party decomposition.

Presidential leadership during the New Deal set the tone for the post-1950

[70] *Fortune*, February 1937, 70–71.

[71] Polenberg, *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government*, 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resumption of party decline by preparing the executive department to be a government unto itself. By depriving traditional party mechanisms of much of their influence over the development of policy, the development of presidential government has exalted the personal aspect of American politics. The expansion and centralization of the executive department has strengthened the president's ability to establish a constituency independent of Congress and traditional party politics. To some degree, this has established a more "responsible" political process without creating more fundamental linkages between the president and Congress. However, the New Deal established a link between politics and administration in such a way that public policy was further removed in important respects from popular representation.

The New Deal regime was effectively held together for some time by the powerful memory of the Depression, a broad commitment to the public philosophy of the New Deal, and presidential leadership. The cause of liberal reform was greatly extended by the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. Unlike Roosevelt, Johnson pursued his reform program through a process that involved careful consultation with the party leadership in Congress. The Great Society involved not only a continuation but a significant departure from the New Deal, which involved an important revival of partisan politics. The passage of this ambitious program was made possible by the effective cooperation between the administration and the large Democratic majorities brought to Congress in 1964.

Nevertheless, there were important parallels between the Roosevelt and Johnson presidencies.[72] Although Johnson avoided any sort of purge campaign, the presidency and executive department assumed additional responsibilities during his administration in policy development, staffing, and campaigns, which further eroded the influence of the congressional party and national committee. The Great Society, like the New Deal, was a partisan program that extended nonpartisan administration.[73] Moreover, the Johnson administration carried out a ruthless attack on the Democratic National Committee beginning in 1965, slashing its budget to the bone and eliminating several important programs, such as the highly successful voter registration division. The President also humiliated Democratic chairman, John Bailey, refusing to replace him, while turning most of his responsibilities over to White House aide Marvin Watson.[74]

As a result of the Johnson administrations' disregard of the traditional party apparatus, the Democratic triumph of 1964, like that of 1936, was short-lived. Journalist Meg Greenfield wrote in June 1966:

[72] For an account of the impact of the New Deal on the Johnson presidency, see William E. Leuchtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), rev. ed., chap. 4.

[73] For a more complete comparison of the Roosevelt and Johnson presidencies in terms of party politics, see Sidney M. Milkis, "Party Leadership, Policy Reform and the Development of the Modern Presidency: The Impact of the Roosevelt and Johnson Presidencies on the American Party System." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

[74] Theodore White, *The Making of the President, 1968* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 107.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The President, whose critics have customarily portrayed him as a man obsessed with politics, is now being charged with indifference to the proper political concerns of a party leader. And the party that only eighteen months ago enjoyed electoral triumphs at every level of government is—according to many of its faithful—in a dangerous state of disrepair.[75]

Johnson's neglect of party affairs represented the continuation of the conflict between the decentralized American party system and the centralization of political power which has become increasingly significant throughout the twentieth century. The demand for stronger national leadership has been stimulated especially by the pursuit of reform represented by the New Deal and the Great Society. Presidential leadership became increasingly salient with the rise of the welfare state, and the greater focus on the presidency has encouraged presidents to look beyond the party system toward a politics of, as Roosevelt put it in his 1933 Commonwealth Speech, "enlightened administration." Franklin Roosevelt's ill-fated efforts to guide the affairs of his party were well and often remembered by Lyndon Johnson,[76] and, therefore, his attempt to extend the national purpose of the New Deal focused on the politics of presidential administration.

Conclusion: The Future Connection Between Presidents and Parties

As the consensus for liberal programs has cooled during the last decade, the effective political direction once provided by the public philosophy of the New Deal and presidential leadership no longer seems possible. However, bureaucratic agencies set in place by the Roosevelt and Johnson administrations have continued to set policy along the line envisioned by New Deal liberalism, although this policy has lost its connection to a governing coalition. The political control once provided by political parties for facilitating consensus and redirecting policy is a thing of the past. And the modern presidency, which was developed to alleviate the need for parties and replace them in the political process, is now burdened by an overload of responsibilities and a lack of organizational support.

In the past the party system has been an important mechanism for redefining the American political system and redirecting public policy. It may be, as some have suggested, that partisan politics has reached such an advanced state of decay that it cannot be raised again as an effective instrument of government. This need not be so, however, if a renewed appreciation of traditional partisanship emerges from the ashes of the American party system. In fact, the

[75] Meg Greenfield, "LBJ and the Democrats," *The Reporter*, 22 May 1966, 9.

[76] Ibid., 12. Johnson indicates in his memoirs that he expected the cohesion of the Democratic party and the support of the Congress after the 1964 election to be temporary. He makes explicit reference to Roosevelt's troubles with the Democratic party in the late 1930s as the best example of the ephemeral nature of party government in American politics. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 103–105.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weakening of the presidency since Watergate and a widespread recognition of the mischiefs of nonpartisanship have led to a revitalization of national party organizations in recent years. It has been suggested that this is not so much a revitalization as the reconstitution of political parties as institutionalized and nationalized organizations.[77]

Perhaps, after all, the nationalization of politics during New Deal realignment paved the way for the transformation rather than the transcendence of the American party system. Such a possibility has been accentuated by the surge of the Republican party in recent years, which in important respects challenges the displacement of politics by administration during the New Deal and Great Society. Although the Reagan presidency fits in many respects the post-New Deal framework of enhancing the authority of the White House and executive department to the detriment to party politics, Reagan campaigned and initially governed as a party spokesman.[78]

Yet the disparate character of political institutions in the United States provides a precarious context for the cultivation of comprehensive party programs. Indeed, the Reagan White House, intent upon a conservative revolution, has fought to impose a comprehensive program of policy "reform" that necessarily looks beyond the limited agreements that can be worked out in the fragmented processes that give shape to American party politics. The assault on the welfare state has not entailed so much a revival of partisan politics as it has the development of a conservative administrative presidency.[79]

Perhaps, presidential leadership, which has greatly influenced party decline, will be directed in the future to party rejuvenation. But this will require extraordinary presidential leadership directed at lessening the influence of the White House in favor of collective responsibility. Moreover, since the rise of presidential government was connected to the achievement of policy reform, it would seem that the revival to party politics would also have to be connected to policy goals. If the Democratic coalition fashioned in the 1930s does prove to be, as the Roosevelt administration expected, the party to end all parties, then the future will not likely bring a new realignment and resurgence of partisanship. Ultimately, the future of the American political system may depend on whether or not the redefinition of the political process during the New Deal period leaves room for a new rendezvous with our political destiny.

[77] Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby, "Institutional Development of Parties," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Spring 1980): 1-27.

[78] Gerald Pomper, "The 1980 Presidential Election and Its Meaning," in Thomas Cronin, ed., *Rethinking the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 24.

[79] Richard Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution *by Shaul Bakhash. New York, Basic Books, 1984. 276 pp. $18.95.*

In time, a history of the Iranian Revolution based upon memoirs, diaries, internal documents, and other now secret or unwritten sources will become possible. The numerous books that are being written today should be compared with the dozens of books on Nazism that appeared in the 1930s rather than with William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. Some are highly partisan; some strive for objectivity. At best, the speeches, proclamations, theoretical works, and newspaper articles now available can be refined into a useful, but necessarily partial and erratic, portrait of Iran's Islamic Republic and its genesis.

It says much for the historical scrupulousness and political sobriety of Shaul Bakhash that he has concentrated throughout this work on writing a nonjudgmental history. As does any historian, Bakhash has chosen to focus on certain topics instead of others. The first six chapters follow a political narrative from the onset of the revolution until the fall of the republic's first president, Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr. The last four deal with economics, land policy, suppression of internal opposition, and, briefly, future possibilities. Beyond question, given the limitations of documentation that affect everyone and his own choices of topic, Bakhash has written an outstanding history, the best currently available in English.

However, looked at in comparison with longer perspective historical studies of comparable political movements, such as the French and Russian Revolutions or the rise of Nazism, there is much that Bakhash has left undone. Bani-Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister whose government fell when the American hostages were seized, are Bakhash's major actors, and they emerge with clarity; but lesser figures, though described better than they have been before, remain in the shadows. Nor does Bakhash explore the pressures within the *ancien regime* that eventually empowered the revolution. His concentration on the political narrative and on economic matters strips his story of the extraordinary passions, tensions, and expectations that gripped Iranians between 1978 and 1980. While the reader discovers *what* happened in the revolution,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at least in the political sphere, he or she does not come away with a sense of *why* it happened or what it felt like.

It would be unfair to charge Bakhash with leaving undone a task that no one can possibly do at the present time. But the revolution has posed critical questions that could have profound impact upon other countries. With his thorough command of Persian language sources, years of journalistic experience with a major Teheran newspaper, and scholarly expertise in the past two centuries of Iranian history, Bakhash is enviably equipped to observe and comment upon a broader range of topics than those covered by his book.

What motivates and holds together the Shi'ite clergy as they undertake political activities previously beyond their imagining? Has the break with the royal past excited in Iranians a sense of possibility or destiny that is not dependent upon shah or ayatollah? Does a regime with roots in a mass following, however unattractive, have virtues and potentialities that were lacking in a monarchical regime resting upon a narrow, privileged social base?

Questions like these may be only partially answerable, but sometimes partial answers are valuable, particularly when they come from knowledgeable and neutral observers. Sometimes simply asking questions is helpful. Bakhash's history is excellent, but it asks only the questions the author feels able to answer.

RICHARD W. BULLIET
Columbia University

Hubert Humphrey: A Biography *by Carl Solberg. New York, W. W. Norton, 1984. 572 pp. $19.95.*

Carl Solberg has written a model political biography. Unlike many practitioners of the new journalism, this former *Time* editor relies on the documentary record rather than the fallible memories of Hubert Humphrey's contemporaries to chronicle the rise and fall of one of the most engaging, and certainly one of the most decent, politicians in recent American history. By mining the rich Humphrey collection at the Minnesota Historical Society, the relevant files at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, and other manuscript collections, together with a careful search of published accounts, Solberg has been able to write a balanced and verifiable account of Humphrey's political career that meets all the tests of academic scholarship.

The portrait that emerges is one of an exuberant, optimistic, but fatally flawed political leader. The author is particularly effective in showing Humphrey at his best—as the young mayor of Minneapolis, fighting the Communists to form the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party that ruled the state for two decades and bred leaders of the caliber of Orville Freeman and Walter Mondale; and as the able senator of the early 1960s who pushed such vital measures as Medicare and the historic 1964 Civil Rights Bill. But Solberg also shows him at his worst. In the 1950s, frustrated by his failure to pass a single one of the fifty-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seven progressive bills he sponsored, Humphrey subordinated himself to the leadership of Lyndon Johnson, who used the Minnesota senator to keep the liberals in line while rewarding Hubert with admission to the inner circle that controlled the Senate. Then in the next decade, after a brief spell of relative independence, Humphrey became LBJ's prisoner again, first as vice president, and than as a captive of the White House in his own 1968 presidential bid.

At times Solberg tries to portray Johnson as the villain, but his account makes it clear that Humphrey's own flaws were responsible for his ultimate downfall. Solberg carefully documents his subject's political weaknesses, including his almost legendary lack of organizational ability, an absence of sound political instinct, an inability to take bold gambles in times of crisis, and above all, a fatal fondness for compromise. As one of his professors said, "he was a liberal Democrat willing to find the middle every time" (p. 70). Unfortunately, at the climax of his political career in 1968, the nation was not in the mood for compromise. Humphrey, aptly described by Solberg as a man who was "always more prone to talk than calculate what might do him most good" (p. 194), ignored those who urged him to resign as vice president in order to disassociate himself from the discredited Johnson administration. Even his famous Salt Lake City speech in late September 1968, hailed for setting forth his own peace plan, simply split the difference on Vietnam at a time when a bold break from his own previous support for the war was imperative.

Hubert Humphrey served his nation most ably as a senator. He had ideas, passion, and dedication. While some might complain, as the *Wall Street Journal* did, that "[his] fertile brain sometimes hatches solutions to problems that may not yet exist" (p. 256), his talent for compromise was ideally suited for the legislative arena, as his skillful handling of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill demonstrated. His troubles began when he caught the presidential fever in the late 1950s, an infection, Solberg quotes Senator George Aiken as noting, "that only embalming fluid can cure" (p. 211). From the mid-1960s on, Humphrey's stature steadily eroded as he made concession after concession in his vain attempt to reach the White House. The ultimate irony may be that even if he had been successful, he probably would have been a poor president, lacking the ruthlessness and the ability to inspire respect, if not fear, that presidential leadership requires. His personality and skills were best suited for the Senate, and despite his failure to reach the White House, he performed ably enough as a legislator to permit Solberg, with only slight exaggeration, to label him (p. 214) "the premier lawmaker of his generation."

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees *by Larry J. Sabato. New York, W. W. Norton, 1984. 251 pp. $15.95.*

What Price PACs? Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Political Action Committees. *New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1984. 122 pp. $8.50.*

Among the torrent of scholarship on political action committees (PACs), both of these volumes make important contributions. Both discuss the emergence of PACs, their funding and political contributions, their organizational patterns, their goals, and their relationships to public officials, political parties, and one another. Both address the controversy about the dangers of PACs to our society. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force views PACs with considerable alarm, and it recommends steps to curb PAC power. The most notable part of the Twentieth Century Fund study, however, is not the Task Force recommendations but Frank J. Sorauf's illuminating, one-hundred page background paper. Sabato and, between the lines, Sorauf are considerably less alarmed than are the Task Force members about the dangers of PACs and are less inclined to regulate them further.

Both Sabato and Sorauf work from standard sources: the Federal Election Commission's data, published studies, and interviews. Additionally, Sorauf's analysis of contributors to PACs presages more elaborate investigations now being published. Sabato's survey of 114 PACs, an unusually large number (60) of personal interviews, and an extraordinary survey of the literature, give his monograph a special texture.

The familiar series of legislative, administrative, and judicial actions that authorized and encouraged the formation of PACs is covered well by both volumes. Sorauf's paper also strongly emphasizes the broader political context: the decline of political parties, candidate-centered campaigns, an increasingly educated, middle-class and issue-oriented electorate, and the shift from the politics of neighborhoods to politics by national economic and social groups and institutions. PACs fit a society organized along economic and social lines better than do traditional political party organizations rooted in geographical districts.

Both Sabato and Sorauf agree that PAC decision making follows patterns of decision in their parent organizations. Washington offices or political affairs staffs also play an important role. Local affiliates wield influence: PACs ordinarily cannot support local candidates who are not approved by them. But in so-called nonconnected PACs—those not affiliated with a union, corporation, or trade association—authority is typically concentrated in a small, self-selected board or staff.

Institutional PACs have participation rates between 20 and 35 percent, while gift sizes vary between $14 in labor PACs and $160 in business PACs. Nonconnected PACs have a response rate of about 3 percent to their mail appeals and receive average gifts of $65. Sorauf's survey data suggest that PAC givers are less politically interested or active than traditional political party and candidate donors. Such givers are not likely to participate in PAC governance or to protest PAC endorsements or expenditure decisions.

Although PACs do not alarm Sabato or Sorauf, PAC activities conform to many public

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perceptions. PACs do give most money to incumbents, and business PACs support officeholders of both parties. PAC contributions are an increasing percentage of total candidate funds. And, independent expenditures by PACs are increasing. Despite Sabato's assurance that PACs spend less than parties do, PACs are rapidly approaching parity with parties. PACs engage in political communications to members, employees, and stockholders and in registration and get-out-the-vote drives. Sabato predicts more of both in the future.

Sabato suggests that the rate of PAC growth is diminishing. But Sorauf finds PAC formation linked to the parent organization's size and its relationship with government. That would presage corporate PAC growth. Sabato also notes that many national PACs are creating state or local affiliates; and Sorauf reports substantial state-level PAC formation in Wisconsin, California, and Minnesota. A large number of local and state PACs might well provide money—largely invisible—to support the unlimited grassroots campaigning and voter mobilization by state and local parties that is now allowed by law.

Sabato and Sorauf are cautious about PAC influence on public policy. Both emphasize the constraints on public officials: their own beliefs, their constituencies, the political parties, other PACs, and so forth. Most congressmen receive small gifts from many PACs. Yet PACs with similar interests exchange information and follow cues from a few visible associations. This concentrates the power of small organizations. Some PACs have contributed systematically before and/or immediately after congressional deliberations on issues of vital concern to them. Nor is one reassured by Sabato's suggestion that PAC influence is strongest on low visibility, "technical" issues. Most regulatory and tax bills fall into this category.

Political parties are potential checks on PACs. Sabato is optimistic about the revitalization of parties. But Sorauf rearranges the usual categories of PACs to show how some associations now share the functions once performed by parties. If Sabato is correct that corporate PACs are expanding political communication and voter mobilization, forming more local and state affiliates, and gradually providing campaign services as well as money, parties may be overshadowed as more and more associations join Sorauf's group of "quasi-party PACs."

Both Sorauf and Sabato have strong reservations about possible limitations on PAC activity. They reject a cap on total PAC contributions to a candidate because this might encourage more independent expenditure. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force finds appeal in such a "mega-cap," however. All would like to see parties strengthened, perhaps by increasing party contribution and spending limits. The Task Force would diminish reliance on PACs by also providing public funding for congressional candidates.

Broader disclosure by nonconnected PACs has broad appeal. But there is no mention of the attractive proposal that their media advertising and mass mailings reveal when their funding is predominantly from outside the district or state of candidates they oppose or support. Similarly, neither the commentators nor the Task Force would eliminate the use of corporate or union treasury funds to administer and operate PACs. Yet elimination of this estimated $20 million subsidy from the treasuries of major economic institutions would surely diminish the influence of PACs without interfering with the principle of free citizen participation in political affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These monographs importantly advance our knowledge of PAC operations and activities. But they tend, in my view, to understate the influence of PACs and their threat to democratic politics.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

The Presidency of Harry S. Truman *by Donald R. McCoy. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1984. 351 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $14.95.*

This book, the latest in the University Press of Kansas American Presidency Series, is the work of its most prominent general editor. Donald R. McCoy has produced the best and most comprehensive one-volume study of the Truman administration yet and has provided other authors with an example they all might well seek to emulate.

The study's virtues lie in the author's mastery of both the primary sources at the Truman Library and the large body of secondary work on the Truman years. Its weaknesses are inherent in the conceptual scheme of this series, one that largely reflects McCoy's own philosophy of historical writing. Consequently, we have a splendid, excellently-researched history that leaves us with an impression of missed chances.

The purpose of each American Presidency book is to present within a space of 350 or so printed pages a comprehensive, largely chronological account of its subject's term in office. While the general editors stress their desire for an "interpretive survey," their definition of the task seems designed to overwhelm that objective, at least when one deals with an administration so momentous and problem-filled.

Whatever aspect of the Truman presidency interests one, he or she will likely find it treated in this volume, almost always with considerable perception. McCoy's handling of matters as diverse as national defense policy (pp. 116–18), Truman's personality (pp. 143–45), the institutionalization of the presidency (p. 164), the fight for the Fair Deal (chap. 8), and the Cold War (passim) struck me as especially notable.

At times, I disagreed with him. I doubt, for example, that the failure of the Fair Deal in Congress can be attributed to the President's failure to establish priorities (p. 190), and I found his treatment of the Cold War rather overly equivocal. More often, as in his brief description of the 1948 campaign, I admired his judgment and craftsmanship. Always, however, I also wished that he had allowed himself to develop his ideas more thoroughly; and frequently I lamented the space devoted to such peripheral matters as the Pacific Trusteeships. The skimpy documentation (dictated by the series format) is also regrettable.

For all its admirable qualities, this book has something of the character of a compact encyclopedia in which many subjects receive brief, intelligent explanation. The author is conscientiously "objective," at least in the sense that a determined evenhandedness amounts to objectivity. And as with an encyclopedia, the reader may find it easier to skip around in the volume rather than to read it straight through. Chapter 11, "Conflict at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Home and Abroad," for example, covers about two dozen topics, ranging from Korea to Estes Kefauver. All are well-managed, but the organization is difficult to follow and the transitions frequently awkward.

To the extent that there is a conceptual framework, it may be found in a ten-page epilogue that summarizes what the author sees as the ultimate significance of the Truman presidency—its role in consolidating "the new American state system" that had emerged from the Franklin D. Roosevelt era. Unfortunately, this is little more than a suggestive afterthought. It does not serve as the creative thesis the study needs.

Scholars will draw on *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* with gratitude for McCoy's balanced, informed thoughts on virtually every aspect of his subject. They also will regret that so talented a historian has foregone an opportunity to make a major contribution to the larger interpretive debate about this important administration.

ALONZO L. HAMBY
Ohio University

The President, Congress, and the Constitution: Power and Legitimacy in American Politics *written and edited by Christopher H. Pyle and Richard M. Pious. New York, The Free Press, 1984. 433 pp. Paper, $14.95.*

For the past decade, Richard Pious of Barnard College has provided important leadership for the study of public law by placing legal issues in their political, philosophical, economic, and social contexts. Here he teams with Christopher Pyle to produce a valuable reader on the interactions between the president, Congress, and the judiciary in the formation of constitutional law.

Consistent with Pious's earlier work on *The American Presidency* (1978), this reader focuses on questions of long-term *legitimacy* that are raised in the exercise of political power. The book attempts to counterbalance a literature "that currently emphasizes amoral aspects of political behavior and the policy-making process" (p. xv). Building on the initial premises and conceptions of the framers, Pyle and Pious search for the principles that guide and confine politicians today. They draw widely from classical works, the framers and their contemporaries, contributors from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and more recent scholars and practitioners. The result is an effective collection that adds an important dynamic to other selections that they draw from key court cases. The reader thus has an opportunity to study judicial doctrines against the backdrop of evolving political thought.

The issues include separation of powers, emergency powers, inherent powers, congressional delegation, the rise and fall of the legislative veto, powers of appointment and removal, vetoes, the spending power, foreign affairs (treaties and executive agreements), and the war power (undeclared wars, protection of lives and property, various interventions by the United States in foreign lands, and the War Powers Resolution).

The authors designed the book for use in courses on the presidency, Congress, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

courts. It would be good news to hear of law schools willing to break their traditional concentration on case law to use this book and permit a broader appreciation of how law develops. The selections drive home a point that should be obvious but is widely resisted: the courts are *not* the sole interpreters of the Constitution, nor do they have either the first or the final word. Rather, constitutional issues are hammered out over the decades in a nationwide dialogue involving all three branches and the private sector.

The book proceeds on the assumption that "the most important people in American politics today are not the politicians or their financial backers, nor the electorate and their manipulators, but the founders who wrote, and reinterpreted, the constitutional rules that define what constitutes a legitimate exercise of governmental authority" (p. xx). This assumption has merit by forcing the reader to understand long-term principles of government, but the founders held a variety of conflicting, shifting views. Politicians today—from all three branches—must sift from this varied menu of "framers' intent" and adapt it to contemporary needs. Few of the issues today, if any, can be resolved simply by studying the intentions of those who wrote two centuries ago. For example, the collisions between congressional investigations and the doctrine of executive privilege are a source of never-ending conflict, with no direction from the constitutional text and precious little from the doctrine of implied powers. Most of the disputes are settled short of going to court, which is fortunate because courts have only the most rudimentary rules to arbitrate such conflicts.

This fact serves to underscore the need for the Pyle-Pious reader. Principles matter, and to the extent that the framers' intent helps to clarify the use of power and provide boundaries for an eventual resolution, all is well and good. The three branches (and the interested public) must search conscientiously for accommodations that will satisfy not only immediate needs but long-term principles. This reader provides both assistance and encouragement toward that worthy goal.

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe About Civil Liberties *by Herbert McCloskey and Alida Brill. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1983. 512 pp. $29.95.*

McCloskey and Brill have compiled a veritable encyclopedia of political tolerance in America. From freedom of speech to due process of law, they have painstakingly documented the degree of public support for the theory and practice of civil liberties.

The data for this book come from two national cross-section surveys of the adult population. Both studies included large samples of community leaders and opinion elites. Sampling, interviewing, and distribution of the self-administered questionnaires were entrusted to the Gallup Organization. The authors used a sentence-completion method to measure attitudes toward civil liberties. The responses were examined individually, in a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chapter-by-chapter survey of the major domains of the First Amendment and as indices in later analyses of the learning of tolerance.

In each domain, the survey results are prefaced by a concise summary of current constitutional doctrine, making for a vivid juxtaposition of judicial and popular reasoning about freedom and authority. The authors' principal findings include the familiar asymmetry between support for civil liberties in the abstract and support for concrete applications of these liberties. In some instances the discrepancy is breathtaking. Elites and opinion leaders tend to be more tolerant than ordinary citizens, though this difference is narrowed in the area of "emerging liberties" such as gay rights.

Differences in tolerance are traced to a variety of demographic, psychological, and political characteristics. The authors argue that tolerance is instilled by "social learning," a process that includes exposure to civil libertarian norms, the development of an understanding of these norms, and group or peer pressure. The learning of tolerance is also dependent upon various personal traits and values.

Elite-mass differences in tolerance are cited as illustrative of social learning. The authors show that elites are more tolerant even after their socio-economic advantages are taken into account. Elite tolerance is thus attributed to their greater proximity to the cultural mainstream, their greater ability to understand the reasons underlying civil liberties, and to peer conformity. Even within elite groups, variations in tolerance are consistent with the social learning argument—legal elites are most supportive of press freedoms; police officials are least supportive of procedural due process; members of the clergy are disapproving of "immoral" behaviors, but approving of civil disobedience.

Personal traits associated with intolerance include the authoritarianism syndrome—political conservatism, misanthropy, anomie, inflexibility, religiosity, low self-esteem, and low political interest. The demography of tolerance tends to be urban, educated, professional, and youthful. The age differences are robust and suggest both generational and period effects.

It is difficult to evaluate the authors' social-learning explanation of tolerance, for they eschew multivariate analysis altogether. Here and there they partial out the effects of some particular variable, but there is no systematic attempt to tease out the independent contributions of personal traits, exposure to libertarian norms, etc. The authors' analysis is also based on the assumption that social learning is unidirectional. While assuming that conservatism encourages the expression of intolerant views, they ignore the possibility that intolerance itself may promote a conservative outlook. A further difficulty with the analysis is their failure to examine separately the exposure/comprehension and yielding/acceptance components of learning. Conservatives may be more informed about civil liberties than liberals, yet they may be less tolerant because they are able to cite arguments in favor of restraining individual freedoms.

The weaknesses of the explanatory analysis do not detract from the value of this book. It is a major sourcebook on public tolerance in America. The authors display an admirable disdain for scholarly jargon and the book should be of interest to a wide-ranging audience.

SHANTO IYENGAR
Yale University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission *by Ramesh Thakur. Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1984. 375 pp. $30.00.*

Having ended ten years ago in disaster for the United States, the Vietnam war continues to generate a stream of literature which seeks to come to terms with every facet of that profoundly traumatic experience. One such facet concerns the collapse of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and of the "supervision and control" machinery set up by those agreements. Why did the peacekeeping mechanism set up at Geneva fail to keep the peace? In an effort to answer that question, Ramesh Thakur studied the historical record of the Vietnam International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), and has produced an important contribution to the understanding of peacekeeping, as well as of the Vietnam war.

The author's stated theme concerns the relationship between international peacekeeping in the ICSC, the foreign policies of the three countries represented on the Commission (Canada, India, and Poland), and wider international politics (p. 1). He further argues that peacekeeping is successful when limited to narrowly defined tasks of overseeing military disengagement upon the cessation of hostilities, but fails when extended to embrace political tasks of conflict resolution, and is not viable against the self-defined interests of a superpower (p. 2). Curiously enough, Thakur hardly tries to prove this thesis; in any case, the ICSC had no political functions. Instead, he demonstrates conclusively, in great detail, and with considerable repetitiveness, that the ICSC did not work for entirely different reasons. These included its restricted mandate (both on the military and the political sides); its tripartite structure; the lack of cooperation of the parties; the inadequacy of its *modus operandi*; and the lack of a political authority—such as is routinely provided in United Nations peacekeeping operations—to lend the necessary political backing (p. 270). Accordingly, the three members of the Commission reported to, and received instructions from their respective governments, which sought to promote their countries' divergent interests and interpreted the ICSC mandate with that end in view (p. 5). In the last analysis, however, the reason for the failure of the ICSC was rooted in the mutually exclusive aims of the parties that shaped the course of the conflict: the refusal of the United States to countenance the "loss" of South Vietnam and the refusal of North Vietnam to accept permanent partition (p. 271).

We learn that initally—from 1954 to 1956—the ICSC worked reasonably well; its members genuinely strived to carry out their inadequate mandate impartially and managed to implement the military provisions of the Geneva accords, including regroupment, fairly smoothly. During that period the Polish Commissioners, with Soviet support, generally pressed for reasonable compliance by North Vietnam (p. 250). Thakur's account of Polish maneuvering in the context of the developing Moscow-Beijing conflict is one of the more interesting aspects of the book.

Portents of impending trouble came when the U.S. along with South Vietnam refused to accept the political aspects of the Geneva Agreements or to recognize them as binding. In fact, as Thakur shows on the basis of the Pentagon Papers, the United States was determined from the outset to prevent an election that was bound to result in unification under

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ho Chi Minh. Ho had won the war against the French in 1954; he accepted the Geneva accords as a temporary measure to enable the belligerents to disengage and the French to extricate themselves and prepare for reunification by elections in 1956. When the South Vietnamese with U.S. support rejected elections and sought to make the 17th parallel into a permanent boundary, the North Vietnamese felt free to resume the fighting.

Thakur devotes a great deal of space to the widely criticized policy followed by the Indian chairman of the Commission, who was also its Secretary-General. As the author sees it, the polarization of the other two members, whose links to the superpowers turned them into spokesmen for the respective Vietnamese parties, forced India to look after its political and security interests. Hence the deliberate policy of awarding violations evenly to the two parties. Still and all, except for the period (1959–62), when India was embroiled in a territorial dispute with China, New Delhi mostly favored the North Vietnamese position.

By the 1960s, as American intervention became the salient fact in the Indochinese war, the ICSC became a helpless spectator, unable and unwilling to agree on any course of action, ignored and frustrated when it tried. Its end came in 1973 when Canada withdrew.

The lessons of this failed experiment in peacekeeping are clearly set forth in the closing chapters. Peacekeeping can only work with the cooperation of the parties and, at least, with the acquiescence of the great powers. At the same time, its implementation must be impartial and must, therefore, be insulated from the political and strategic policies of the parties and of the participants in the peacekeeping machinery. It is far from clear, however, whether in the circumstances prevailing in Vietnam any kind of serious peacekeeping effort was feasible at all.

GEORGE L. SHERRY
Occidental College

The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices *by Stephen Hess. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1984. 160 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

As the saying goes, "it takes two to tango." If one is interested in the kinds of news about government and politics produced by the press, one needs to look at journalists as well as at the government professionals who channel information to them. Stephen Hess, whose earlier studies concentrated on the mode of operation of Washington reporters, has now put the spotlight on the other dancing partners, government press officers and their offices.

Like his earlier research, this book is based on direct observations. The targets are press officers in five federal agencies. Hess spent a year soaking and poking in the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Transportation, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House, devoting one to three months to each agency. He also observed and interviewed reporters in agency press rooms to get their appraisals of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agency's press operations. Seasoned civil servants and reporters were questioned to gain historical pespective on changes in the style of operation in the wake of personnel and administration changes.

The product of this research is a slim yet meaty volume written in jargon-free, comprehensible prose. The book begins with a discussion of the folklore about the incompetency of government press officials and then proceeds to compare the facts to the myths. There are details about the organization of various types of government press offices and the way individual and group contacts with the print and electronic media are managed. Coverage of routine agency activities is described, as well as responses to crises, such as the Department of Transportation's handling of news about the crash of an Air Florida flight in Washington, D.C. A fairly lengthy chapter probes leaks and other informal communications. It sheds new light on the reasons for leaks and the roles they play in politics. Two chapters deal with press officers as people, pointing to the difference between press secretaries and career press officials, and the problems faced by any profession that has an image and professional status problem. Compared to reporters, press officers rank low on the prestige scale.

A final chapter sums up Hess's appraisal of government press officials. It ought to help in raising their prestige. His findings have convinced Hess that government press officials are a hardworking, efficient, and unappreciated lot who turn out fine press releases. They do not manipulate the news, as often charged, other than shouting when it is good and whispering when it is bad. Regardless of any Machiavellian notions that government press officials might harbor, their subordinate position and the vagaries of bureaucratic politics preclude them from controlling the flow of information. They spend most of their time in two pursuits: trying to find out what others in their agency are doing and gathering material that has been requested by reporters. Good reporters, for their part, balance government releases with information gathered from other sources.

Hess, who is a senior fellow in the govenmental studies program at the Brooking Institution, has provided us with an appraisal that is almost totally positive and counter-stereotypical. Regardless of the accuracy of his evaluation, it is bound to raise eyebrows and suspicions that living for a year with press officials has clouded his judgment. It would, therefore, be helpful if other scholars turned their attention to this important link in the information-production chain to corroborate Hess's findings or amend or correct them. Scholars and citizens alike need to know whether their sources of news are relatively pure or tainted.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

The Militarization of High Technology *edited by John Tirman. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984. 247 pp. $28.00*

The subject matter of this book is far more interesting than its title would suggest. The ten essays are not, as one might anticipate, an historical account of the interaction of tech-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nology with the military. As Tirman states at the outset, "The bias of the book will be quickly apparent. It is not a bias against military spending per se, or against the use of high technology in military technology, or against adequate military strength. The issues are important. . . . Rather it is to argue this somewhat new notion that military procurement has a profound, perhaps damaging effect on the vitality of commercial high technology" (p. xiii).

Tirman has marshaled arguments to support the theory that the military related agencies now may play a major role in the erosion of the country's technological lead. This rebuttal to the generally accepted view that the United States military fosters the advance of this country's technological capability is worthy of serious consideration. The author points out, for example, that the military-related agencies of the government and the "military-industrial" firms that they influence, constitute the largest planned economy in the free world. Like most large planned economies, it is inefficient and constitutes a major drag on our technology and economy. The government agencies that do the planning and procurement exert far more bureaucratic control over the firms in the planned economy than large conglomerate firms exert over their subsidiaries.

The planned economy employs over one-third of all scientists and engineers in the country and dispenses almost half of all federal expenditures (excluding self-funding programs such as social security). It thus creates a major brain drain which has a pervasive effect on the technological progress in non-defense related activities in academia and industry.

The large number of scientists, engineers, executives, and others employed or supported in these enterprises come to accept as normal inadequacies such as pedestrian planning, late fulfillment of development or production contracts, unacceptably high rejection rates, poor quality, and large cost overruns. As these people move into other industries they carry their learned incapacities with them.

Several essays make the case that not only non-defense technological progress is being harmed, but this country's lead in technologies such as semi-conductors, electronics, aircraft, and nuclear power is being eroded by this planned economy in our midst. Even the reliability and affordability of our weaponry has been adversely affected by the preference that the planned economy shows for "baroque" (sophisticated embellishment of existing devices) in preference to true technological innovation.

The essay by Warren Davis on "The Pentagon and the Scientist" should be read by any scientist or engineer who is considering working on a classified project in either academia or industry. It presents a useful exposition of the hazards to one's career trajectory that can now be anticipated from such work.

Although not all the essays are uniformly instructive, (Tom Schlesinger's "Labor, Automation and Regional Development" seems almost extraneous), the book is a useful addition to the library of anyone interested in the social science aspects of high technology.

HARVEY PICKER
Columbia University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Free Trade between Mexico and the United States? *by Sidney Weintraub. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1984. 205 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $9.95.*

Sidney Weintraub challenges the prevailing wisdom that political obstacles and economic costs outweigh the potential benefits of free trade between the United States and Mexico with an extremely informative and accessible book certain to spur both academic and policy debate. Socio-political concerns—such as income distribution and national autonomy—are linked to economic criteria as Weintraub argues that these countries would both be better off economically under a free trade regime than they are today. This transformation could be accomplished without either country having to relinquish basic national objectives. Though Weintraub stresses that extending free trade in goods to unencumbered flows of both capital and labor is not inherently necessary, he also points out the advantages of such a shift.

Concentrating on Mexico's misgivings about free trade, the crux of Weintraub's argument is that current economic disparities between the two countries do not preclude a mutually beneficial arrangement. Throughout the book Weintraub highlights Mexico's very real concerns vis-à-vis its asymmetrical economic and political dependence on the United States, and it is here that his considerable expertise on Mexico is most evident. However, when blaming Mexico's protectionist industrial policy for current inefficiencies in the Mexican economy, Weintraub pays insufficient attention to the international constraints the country has faced, such as high interest rates, global recession, and declining prices for oil exports.

To prove his case, Weintraub examines current trade patterns, Mexican trade policies and programs, the reasons behind Mexico's decision to refuse to enter into the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), as well as the arguments in both countries for and against free trade. Ultimately, however, the conclusions reached regarding the merits of a free trade regime are based on a series of affirmations that, in the absence of hard data and projections, are largely wishful thinking. Weintraub believes that Mexico has crossed the necessary economic threshold that will enable it to benefit from free trade; he states that such an arrangement would give Mexico greater control over what he assumes to be an inevitable process of market integration. The reader must rely on the author's judgment that the time is now ripe for what would amount to a mammoth shift in Mexican trade policy. These key arguments are inadequately supported and the author himself repeatedly notes that his conclusions are both uncertain and potentially inaccurate.

Weintraub underestimates the potentially disruptive effects of a move to free trade. Too many problems associated with such a shift are dismissed by reference to a transitional period of adjustment. Merely recognizing the vast political opposition such a measure would encounter does not in itself make the idea more palatable to the various sectors that would oppose it. Here one wishes that Weintraub would have expanded his very insightful references to the role of domestic constituencies, potential negotiating strategies, cross-national coalitions, implementation measures, and institutional arrangements. There is no guarantee, either, that there would be a redistribution of the potential benefits

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from free trade within Mexico, and this robs Weintraub of one of his strong selling points.

Finally, *if* Weintraub is right about Mexico's potential strength in the automotive, steel, petrochemical, and certain labor-intensive consumer goods industries such as textiles and apparel, then the primary resistance to free trade will actually be centered within portions of labor and business constituencies in the United States, thus raising the question of whether he erred in choosing to concentrate on Mexico's objections to free trade. Following the logic of his analysis, it would seem that ultimately the greatest obstacles lie north of the border.

Weintraub begins with the assumption that ideas matter and that greater understanding can lead to regime transformation. If not finally convincing in what is, in essence, a judgment call regarding the merits of the free trade option, Weintraub's thoughtful and lucid essay will certainly contribute to a less emotional and more informed debate.

CATHRYN THORUP
Overseas Development Council

Winston S. Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939–1941, Volume VI *by Martin Gilbert. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1983. 1,308 pp. $39.00.*

The authorized biography of Churchill, begun on a grand scale more than twenty years ago by Randolph Churchill and now being completed by Martin Gilbert, is one of the most remarkable scholarly ventures in British historiography. This, the most important and enthralling volume, covers the years when Britain faced Nazi Germany alone and Churchill came to embody the British cause. Although the book offers no big surprises in telling in staggering detail a story that has been told many times before, it is surprisingly gripping. It is a triumphant account of Churchill's triumphant achievement.

Essentially, Gilbert presents a day-by-day chronicle of Churchill's activities, allowing Churchill's own words as far as possible to tell the story. The length is daunting: 1,274 pages of text, or 1.5 pages per day of the twenty-eight months covered. Yet the narrative never lags. Gilbert draws on a huge body of primary sources—the Churchill papers; War Cabinet, War Council, and Admiralty papers; and the diaries and letters of Churchill's private secretaries, to name only a few—and has accomplished the Herculean task of bringing order out of the chaos of data. He gives little in the way of interpretation, only the bare necessities about the war as a whole, and nothing on the wider thoughts of the other players in the drama. Gilbert focuses closely on Churchill and presents us Churchill's perspective almost exclusively—a strategy justified not only by Churchill's overwhelming importance but also by his vast historical and geopolitical understanding.

The volume contains countless episodes and themes to attract the scholar and general reader alike, among them Churchill's rise from the Admiralty to Downing Street, his role in the Norwegian fiasco, his kindness to his predecessor Neville Chamberlain, his struggle to prevent the collapse of France, his personal courage during the blitz, his strategic mistakes in Greece, and his ceaseless efforts to involve the United States in the war. But per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

haps two themes above all others insist on attention. One is Churchill's amazing resilience and relentless urge to action—well known Churchillian qualities that win admiration anew because of the fullness of this volume's account of the awful weight of daily and hourly crises shouldered by the Prime Minister. Occasionally Churchill showed stress by outbursts of anger, but generally he astonished those around him by his vitality, humor, and confidence. No one earned his wrath by proposing action, only by delaying it. Of course, Churchill meddled in details, logistical, tactical, and diplomatic. But his meddling was a necessary price for the impetus to action only he could supply.

The second notable theme is Britain's intelligence operations, especially the decrypting of the German "Enigma" system. Gilbert shows that the British ability to decode German radio signals was not merely a device for a few sensational coups, but an essential ingredient in British survival. However, Churchill did not, as has been charged, allow Coventry to be bombed or Russia to go unwarned in order to protect the secrecy of his vital source of information. Only in one case—the German invasion of Crete—did Churchill withold knowledge of German plans to the detriment of British forces for fear of revealing the Enigma secret.

The size and detail of this volume will discourage many people from reading it straight through. But many scholars will find it an invaluable source; and even more will enjoy dipping into it to read on this or that episode. But those who venture into it should beware: it is such fascinating reading they may well find themselves trapped.

THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK
Northwestern University

British Politics in Perspective *edited by R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984. 251 pp. $27.50.*

The study of British politics used to be edifying but also a trifle boring. On the one hand, the British system was mature, stable, responsive, and effective, with political parties that offered real choices to the electorate but at the same time were not (literally) at one another's throats. On the other, precisely because the system was so sensible and moderate, it was hard for the average political scientist to get very worked up about it; although, it must be said, many Americans did believe that the United States could derive important political lessons from the British experience.

Now everything has changed. With Britain's economy stubbornly refusing to grow as fast as other people's, with bombs going off in Brighton as well as Belfast, and with the Conservative and Labour parties moving ever farther apart, Britain no longer seems quite such a strong candidate for emulation. Yet, that said, the very fact that the British system has lost so much prestige, together with the fact that it has been changing very rapidly, makes Great Britain in many ways a far more intriguing country to study than it was a generation ago. Does politics account for Britain's economic decline? Or has economic decline been the principal cause of political change? How does the British political system

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

today compare with what it used to be in the great days of Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill?

Questions like these were clearly in the minds of the two dons at Leicester University who organized the present collaborative volume. Its theme is change. Its nine contributors were asked to ruminate on recent changes in British institutions, ideas, and political processes—including not just parliament, the prime ministership, and the political parties, but also such matters as "fiscal crisis" and Britain's relations with the European community.

The authors have responded, as authors will on such occasions, in wildly disparate ways. One or two, notably Geoffrey Alderman on the electoral system, are hot for reform: they want to improve as well as describe. Others, including James Barber on the prime ministership, maintain that the scale of political change is not actually all that great. Still others, led by Rodney Barker, who writes on "the rise and eclipse of the social democratic state," have contributed discursive and somewhat idiosyncratic essays (though Barker deserves credit for the best line in the volume: "To begin an account of British politics with a discussion of the state may seem like opening an English cookery book with a recipe for horse meat"). Most of the authors seem unclear about what sort of audience their editors wanted them to aim at, and most of them, sadly, offer little that is new in the way of either facts or ideas. The only real exceptions are Wyn Grant, who describes graphically the decline of quasi-corporatism in Britain (a body called the Retail Consortium, which once had direct access to ministers, now finds that members of the government cannot even find the time to see its representatives), and Michael Shackleton, who, although an employee of the European Parliament, gives a balanced and perceptive account of why Britian's relations with her common market partners have never quite jelled (the difficulties arising out of both institutional and policy differences).

Part of the trouble with *British Politics in Perspective* is that it is, on the whole, dully written, by people who do not seem to believe in their task. The book is much less exciting than the new political world it purports to describe. But part of the trouble probably also lies in the fact that most of the contributors seem to have put off producing their chapters—and then produced them very quickly. The book is at once breathless and already slightly dated. In particular, although Margaret Thatcher has now been prime minister for more than five years, little of the book relates to the Thatcher era. Thatcher herself seldom appears. This is not so much Hamlet without the prince as Hamlet before the action of the play has really begun.

ANTHONY KING
University of Essex

Multinational Excursions *by Charles P. Kindleberger, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1984. 275 pp. $22.50.*

Charles Kindleberger is widely regarded as one of the giants in international trade, especially expert on the multinational corporation (MNC). Moreover he writes well and acces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sibly. These characteristics, as well as his erudition and practical good sense, all come through in this book. Yet not even his unusual qualities can turn a disparate set of essays into an interesting and significant book.

The twenty papers collected here were mostly written in the early 1970s. Age is part of the problem. Acknowledged duplication is another problem. The most important defect is that no coherent argument is developed. This weakness is inevitable when separate papers are compiled into a book with a minimum of editing. With some effort the reader can construct a coherent argument:

With declining transport and communications costs, the optimum market for many economic activities has become very large. If firms are allowed to serve that market with minimum interference, economic efficiency and welfare will increase. The MNC, prepared to serve a wide market, has a crucial role in permitting the world economy to take advantage of this potential for efficiency.

But, the optimum political and social units are small and want to restrict the outsider, including the MNC. There is, therefore, likely to be conflict between the objectives of economic welfare and political independence of the nation state.

As long as economic welfare remains important, it may be well not to restrict economic institutions to the nation state, but to build international political institutions capable, where needed, of regulating the MNC.

Many of the proposals for regulation, or a code of conduct, are unrealistic. The conflict between MNCs and governments centers around the division of rents, the difference between the minimum rewards needed to attract MNCs, and the minimum benefits which a society is prepared to accept to allow a MNC to operate. No international machinery can effectively deal with this conflict.

Indeed most issues between MNC and host country are best left to the market and national decision. Countries that give weight to nationalist or populist objectives will attract little MNC investment. Those that value the economic benefits of MNC will avoid disincentives to their operation.

International machinery is appropriate where the conflict is between two or more countries, with the MNC facing conflicting policies on taxation, export controls, or monopoly regulation. Even on these issues different decisions are appropriate under different circumstances for economic efficiency. It is, therefore, best to develop machinery to deal with conflict, not rules to decide the outcome beforehand.

The aim of these recommendations is economic rationality, the avoidance of distortions to enhance economic efficiency. That argument, however, rests on the dubious assumption that markets function well. But worldwide resource allocation is far from an economic optimum even without MNC regulation to distort it. For instance, government risk insurance, which Kindleberger decries, may actually counteract, not cause distortions. Kindleberger surely would have trenchant comments on such questions. The book is disappointing because it does not adequately explore some of the major issues Kindleberger raises and the ideas he advocates.

Political scientists can get in this book an introduction to the views of a well-informed lucid mainstream economist on the role of the MNC. They may find particularly provocative Kindleberger's discussion of the conflict between political and economic objectives

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and his dismissal of two widely read books highly critical of MNC—*Global Reach* and *The Age of Imperialism*. These books reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the book as a whole: well written and argued, sensible and well informed, but so sketchy that many will find them unpersuasive.

It is nevertheless valuable to have Kindleberger's ideas available in book form. Several of the papers in this book, originally presented in speeches, scattered testimony, or highly specialized journals would not otherwise be readily available.

GUSTAV F. PAPANEK
Boston University

Chinese Defence Policy *edited by Gerald Segal and William T. Tow. Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1984. 286 pp. $29.95.*

The complex issues of Chinese security and defense policies have too often been obscured by an exclusive preoccupation with the question of Western arms and technology transfer to the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a means of counterbalancing Soviet power. This excellent conference volume avoids such reductionism in favor of an approach that integrates the discussion of strategy and Chinese force structures and capabilities within the broader context of PRC domestic politics and foreign policy interests and behavior. The result of this collaboration of eighteen European, Israeli, and American specialists is a concise, well-organized, and valuable introduction to the entire range of issues that are subsumed under the label of Chinese defense policy.

The general picture that emerges is of a China considerably stronger than that portrayed by its detractors, yet far from being in the same league as the two superpowers. The fallacy of trying to understand Chinese security policy through comparisons with the United States and the Soviet Union becomes obvious once one becomes acquainted with the distinctive features of China's security environment, its strategic doctrine, the problems of modernizing China's military forces, and the foreign policy and security goals of the PRC with respect to other countries and regions. To take but one example, as Bill Sweetman argues in his chapter on China's air forces, the technology gap between the PRC and the superpowers need not be eliminated but merely reduced to "acceptable proportions" in order to enhance China's security (p. 80). Similarly, in his excellent chapter on People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces, Harlan Jencks suggests that improvements in organizaton, training, logistics, defense technology, and so forth are at least as important as the acquisition of improved weaponry, and that the former unlike the latter can be achieved relatively quickly and cheaply. As a poor country, China cannot afford the expensive gimmickry that wealthy countries often deem essential to their defense. Nevertheless, China's defense industries are slowly modernizing and, for both political and economic reasons, the PRC has even joined the company of world arms merchants, finding lucrative markets in the Middle East as Yitzhak Shichor describes in detail.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another virtue of relative national poverty is an accent on the political dimension of national security rather than the military dimension. Joachim Glaubitz reminds us that "China tends to buy its security with diplomatic currency" (p. 224). Almost all the contributors note the flexibility of Chinese foreign policy in recent years, in particular Peking's moves to defuse tensions with the Soviet Union via diplomatic means. As a consequence of this limited Sino-Soviet détente, Chinese threat perceptions have altered. The late 1970s' shrill Chinese exhortations to forge an anti-Soviet global united front have been replaced by more tempered and differentiated assertions of Chinese interests in both bilateral and regional contexts.

Like almost all of the chapters in *Chinese Defence Policy*, those on Chinese foreign policy economically compress into fewer than twenty pages each the essence of the PRC's interests and interactions in the countries and regions concerned (U.S., USSR, Western Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East). The chapters by Shichor and by Yaacov Vertzberger on the Middle East and South Asia respectively are particularly worthwhile. Reading these very compact essays, however, is a bit like eating dried fruit—the flavor is there but not the juice. Fortunately, many of the scholars represented have written at much greater length elsewhere on these same subjects (Robert Sutter on U.S.-China relations, William Tow on arms sales to China, etc.). The chapters correctly make no pretense of being the last or most complete word on their subjects.

In sum, this collection, ably edited by Segal and Tow, is an excellent briefing book on the subject of PRC defense policy. As a well-balanced, thoughtful, and concise introduction, it raises most of the issues that are sure to command the attention of China specialists and Asian security analysts alike for many years to come.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession *by Frederick C. Teiwes. Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1984. 169 pp. Cloth $22.50; paper $12.95.*

This volume is a collection of three essays on leadership and political power in the People's Republic of China. Together they comprise a most interesting and insightful retrospective and prospective analysis of the source of political power in contemporary China. This short volume is a thoughtful analysis of the problems of governance in China and communist political systems in general. It provides us with an excellent opportunity to reflect on the relationship between culture and ideology, on the one hand, and political process on the other.

The first essay challenges the pre-Cultural Revolution model of a two-line struggle in Chinese politics. In place of competition between radical Maoists and moderates, Teiwes argues for a Mao-centered view of Chinese politics. He makes a compelling case that Mao Zedong was the balancer within the Party, using his enormous prestige to move the Party

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sometimes in a more moderate direction and at other times to accelerate the pace of revolutionary transformation. While effectively challenging the two-line struggle model of Chinese political life, Teiwes is a bit less successful at defining the exact nature of Mao's leadership style. It is not clear whether Mao was the master dialectician who shifted the political tides in China as the situation required or the inveterate opportunist who tried to promote both modernization and equality. That Mao had disproportionate political power and was an indispensible partner in the winning coalition in any issue area is clear. Whether there was a logic and coherence to the many faces of Mao is a question left in doubt.

The second essay attempts to explain the source of Mao's enormous political power during his lifetime and the source of Deng Xiaoping's authority as his successor. Mao's power came from legitimacy, the presumption that he had the right to rule, which was extended to him by the Chinese masses and by China's other political leaders. So great had been the Chairman's triumph in the Chinese revolution that during his lifetime he remained without peer among the political elite. As for Deng, Teiwes argues that his long and visible ties to Mao are the foundation of his post-Mao authority. While Deng must rely more on performance, party tradition, and institutionalized rules than did Mao, having been Mao's "close comrade-in-arms" before the Cultural Revolution is the foundation for his claim to leadership.

The third essay traces the changing rules for elite behavior during different periods: stable Maoism after 1949, the Cultural Revolution from 1966–76, and post-Mao since 1976. During the early years Teiwes emphasizes the wisdom of staying close to Mao and not forming factions. During the Cultural Revolution period factions became a necessity of life to survive in the battleground of elite conflict. In the post-Mao period the need to stay in Deng's good graces is critical, but it is moderated by the growth of collective leadership and the institutionalization of the political process. In short, Deng ". . . must account for elite interests to a far greater extent than Mao" (p. 131).

Even with Mao gone from the scene, the institutionalization of the Chinese political process will continue to face stiff competition from the drive towards personalism that has deep roots in the Chinese tradition and receives additional support from communist determinism. Deng's blatantly manipulative attempts to promote the rule of law in China has been sometimes heroic, sometimes tragic, and sometimes downright laughable, as in the trials of the Gang of Four which made a mockery of legal due process. Is Deng the last leader who will exercise extraordinary power and mold the nation to his vision of a better and ideologically correct future? There may never be another Mao, as Teiwes argues. That alone will not guarantee unidirectional progress toward the rule of law, collective leadership, institutionalization of the political process, and the development of legal-rational authority in China.

JOEL GLASSMAN
University of Missouri-St. Louis

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics *edited by R. James Woolsey. San Francisco, ICS Press, 1984. 289 pp. Paper, $8.95.*

Most of the contributors to this anthology, including several prominent members of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, subscribe to something like the following view of the history of deterrence in the nuclear age. In the beginning, there was an American monopoly followed by a period, lasting through the early 1960s, of overwhelming American nuclear superiority. During this period there arose in America the view that nuclear weapons have only two uses: deterrence, which is their primary use, and the total assured destruction of an adversary, which would occur only if the U.S. or its European allies were attacked by the USSR. In the early 1960s, according to this view, the Kennedy administration made a huge and potentially disastrous error. It mistakenly assumed that the achievement of some arbitrary level of assured destruction must be the motive force behind all forms of nuclear deterrence; it assumed that nuclear weapons are quite useless as instruments of military or political policy; and, most importantly, it assumed that the Russians believed likewise and that they would, therefore, seek with the U.S. to build a stable regime of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). According to the way of thinking represented in this book, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the other key shapers of American nuclear policy during this period assumed, incorrectly, that the Russians would eventually agree to American terms for nuclear deterrence; that nuclear war can never be justified ethically; that nuclear "strategy" is a misnomer and that international politics must function, eventually, independently of the capacity of each superpower to annihilate the other.

These contributors seek to promote a revolution in the way Americans typically approach the subject of nuclear deterrence. Patrick Glynn is surely correct when he asserts that the difference between the nuclear war-fighting view he advocates and that of MAD is probably so deep as to betray "epistemological" or "conceptual" incommensurability. Brent Scowcroft is also obviously correct in asserting that, at the core of the revolutionary (if not exactly new) view he advocates is the perceived centrality of the beliefs of the Russians. Any plausible deterrent strategy must, in his view, seek to occupy the same psychological territory as that occupied by the Russians, or else we risk irrelevance and illusion and thus blackmail or catastrophe.

It is, therefore, obvious that in attempting to evaluate the correctness of the view represented in this volume, we must try to peer into that "black box" of Soviet beliefs and decision making. But what *do* the Russians believe about nuclear war and its avoidance? Did Kennedy, McNamara, Bundy et al. merely project incorrectly onto the Russians an American view, MAD, which the Russians find categorically irrelevant? Is MAD, therefore, a mere "theory," as most of the contributors to this volume seem to believe, concocted from equal parts political and military naivete and microeconomic over-sophistication? Or is MAD, conversely, more like a fact of modern life, fully realized and accepted by Russian and American leaders alike? The authors of the present volume tend to cite, in support of their view, indirect and highly ambiguous data, such as the size and type of Russian nuclear deployments or published Russian strategic pronouncements. This information

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leads them to conclude that the Russians indeed believe they can fight and win a nuclear war with the U.S.

JAMES G. BLIGHT
Harvard University

The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression *edited by Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1984. 199 pp. $29.95.*

This evocative volume deals with the "elusive and complex issue of state terror" (p. 9). The book does show the complexity of this phenomenon, but clear conceptualizations remain elusive, especially distinctions between oppression, repression, and terrorism. In fact, the bulk of the book is about repression, not terrorism. Several of the authors do not use the term terrorism at all.

While John McCamant's charge in Chapter 1 that the political science literature ignores "the awful and bloody deeds of governments" (p. 11) is overdrawn, his critique of the "antiseptic" nature of the major models is appropriate, particularly the lack of salience of political repression in them, analytically or descriptively. He looks at interest group models, system theory, structural-functionalism, Marxism, *dependencia*, elite theory, and geopolitics. The first three overly stress consensus, and, while Marxism and *dependencia* talk about oppression, political repression is not a central analytic aspect of them. This results from conceptual difficulties regarding the nature of the state and of politics. McCamant asserts that we must lay aside our models and begin afresh, and he makes suggestions for doing so. Strikingly, he leaves out one important model altogether—the Weberian one. Although undergoing a resurgence now, the Weberian perspective has not been important in American social science in large part because of the severe damage done by Talcott Parsons to it. Parsons simply left out most of its major elements, and it is precisely these elements that are most pertinent here. In fact, all of McCamant's suggestions for a new model are already central to the Weberian perspective.

Michael Stohl discusses the international aspects of state terrorism in Chapter 2, contending that "the state then is as much a user of terror in its international affairs as in its domestic activities" (p. 43). The clearest delineation of the major characteristics of state terrorism is that provided by George Lopez in Chapter 3. He focuses on the following: the political climate, types of regime change, how terror is institutionalized, the ideology of the ruling group, tactics and technologies, internal and external support mechanisms, and outcomes—stagnation, reform, or revolution. In a nice summary of these phenomena in Latin America (Chapter 6), John Sloan makes a distinction between repression and terrorism in which the latter is more "severe," more "deliberately lethal and cruel" (p. 83). This distinction does not get us very far; it merely underscores the conceptual unease and ambiguity that is endemic to the book.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Chapter 5, David Pion-Berlin provides unconvincing arguments and evidence, mostly of a quantitative correlational variety, about a dominant causal linkage between orthodox economic doctrine, particularly stabilization measures, and repression in Argentia, specifically, and in the rest of Latin America. The implicit argument is that governments pursuing nonorthodox economic doctrines would not be predisposed toward repression. But these assumptions are not examined, either analytically or empirically.

In addition to two nice case studies of the Philippines and South Africa, there is an interesting speculative chapter on the United States. Frederick Homer links "government terror" to what he characterizes as "containment policy . . . where the majority of individuals are concerned about social peace and personal safety, and these concerns take precedence in their minds over the niceties of civil liberties" (p. 171). This majoritarian form of "terror," which he links to Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of American society, is seen to have aggressive, intrusive aspects as well as ones of indifference.

Finally, Lopez and Stohl suggest interesting avenues for new research, but they do not clarify the conceptual ambiguities that underlie much of their book. Despite these problems, however, this interesting and useful volume should certainly go a long way toward accomplishing the editors' goal of sparking inquiry and scholarly enthusiasm about "one of the more underexamined phenomena of our era" (p. 189).

THOMAS M. CALLAGHY
Columbia University

The Higher Civil Service in Europe and Canada: Lessons for the United States
edited by Bruce L. R. Smith. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1984. 110 pp. $9.95.

This compendium of papers presented at a 1983 Brookings Institution Conference contains excellent short essays on the higher civil service in five Western countries. The ultimate aim of the conference was "to explore ideas for reform (in the United States) through a look at the experiences of other industrialized nations" (p. 2). Quite sensibly, however, the editor concludes that although "The lessons to be drawn for the United States seem deceptively simple in some respects . . . the answers to the fundamental questions remain elusive" (p. 17). They remain elusive because reform is a difficult matter under the best of circumstances, and reform without good theory (the case here) makes reform design exceedingly risky and its consequences quite unpredictable.

The essays by William Plowden (Great Britain), Colin Campbell (Canada), Renate Mayntz (West Germany), Bernard Gournay (France), and James Fesler (the United States in comparative perspective) are little gems for comparative politics classes. Students can read them quickly and come away with a remarkable amount of factual information and with an appreciation of the near universal pressures for maintaining or extending politicians' influence over top civil servants. What most sets the United States off in this regard is the very large number of top administrative appointees from outside the ranks of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civil service. Politicians do make important appointments in the other systems (although a smaller number), but they usually choose from among career civil servants who have had extensive experience in government and have, therefore, been socialized into the norms of civil service culture. Their appointees are, as a result, in a good position to bridge the gap between civil servants and politicians made wide in the United States by appointed officials who often are little concerned about the long-term consequences of actions that threaten to undermine the morale and effectiveness of civil servants.

The contributors to the volume are understandably cautious about the implications for reform. Smith's conclusions were quoted above. David Stanley wisely begins his contribution to the volume by quoting James Fesler's statement at the conference: "Much of what we have heard is not readily exportable" (p. 93). Stanley then draws a series of lessons from the conference anyway. These lessons usually have a certain appeal, but the most interesting are difficult to evaluate since they are in part based on experiences in other systems, which may not travel well. Stanley ends by suggesting something underlying much of the concern at the conference, namely that "the United States needs to establish a civil service doctrine that truly recognizes and accepts that an effective bureaucracy is a major element in the nation's governance" (p. 101).

In the volume's concluding essay, Hugh Heclo argues that "the problem of the higher civil service is not, fundamentally, a problem of personnel policy." It is a constitutional issue, one involving "the fundamental rules (written or unwritten) by which a political community organizes itself" (p. 104). Heclo argues that no doctrine governing the appropriate relationships among the parts of government and their personnel exists in the United States. We tend to stress the narrow technical questions of personnel policy and avoid deeper issues concerning the role of the higher civil service in the political order. We emphasize a "public management" approach which views the career administrator as "a task-oriented achiever of goals" while, says Heclo, "a civil servant is an official in service to the state and public" (p. 106).

It is not obvious that we can have a higher civil service of the type Heclo hopes for in the United States; and it may be that we do not want one. But a key virtue of his essay is that it leads away from the often sterile and narrow reform concerns of the personnel experts who study our bureaucracy and toward a consideration of the fundamental issues concerning constitutional structures and political culture which strongly affect the nature of our civil service. Perhaps a system such as ours, which fosters institutional competition and establishes no clear master for the bureaucracy, cannot nurture a higher civil service of the European type. Other forms (though not necessarily the one we have now) may be better suited to our political system. This is a subject for both comparative analysis and intensive study of our own system, with an emphasis on the complex relationships between top career administrators and political officials. The Brookings volume provides some good background material for such work.

JOEL D. ABERBACH
The University of Michigan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics *by Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. 317 pp. $27.50.*

The concept of equality for minorities in urban politics is frequently discussed but seldom defined and measured. In *Protest In Not Enough* the authors give us an empirical account of the struggle for political equality in ten northern California cities over a period of twenty years. Most importantly, their work compares the efforts of blacks and Hispanics and attempts to develop a "theory of incorporation."

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb ask three basic questions: How open are urban political systems? How did political incorporation of minorities occur? Did political incorporation make a difference for policy? In answering these three questions the Bay Area political scientists shed new light on the well-traveled ground of urban politics.

From near zero in 1960, blacks and Hispanics had achieved some representation in seven of the ten cities by 1980. For all ten cities, minority council representation reached 55 percent of the size of the minority population. The authors are quick to point out that their concept of equality moves beyond numerical representation to include the degree to which minorities are incorporated in the dominant governing coalitions. On both counts blacks started earlier, increased more steadily, reached higher levels, and extended over more cities and people than Hispanics. However, progress has been uneven and the authors emphasize that ethnic succession is in no sense inevitable.

One factor accounting for the higher level of black electoral activity was the influence of the national civil rights movement. In terms of demand-protest activity, the absolute size of the minority group was closely related to the level of activity for both blacks and Hispanics. However, in the case of electoral mobilization, the relative size of the minority population was more significant than absolute size. In contrast to several previous studies, the authors found that demand-protest and electoral strategies did not interfere with each other and were often used effectively together.

Previous works have also contended that minority representation in local politics is often only symbolic. Yet, Browning et al. find that when minorities are incorporated into liberal coalitions, local government is indeed more responsive to minority needs. Moreover, these new dominant coalitions "tended to strengthen mayors and city councils at the expense of city managers, to push for district elections rather than at-large elections, and to promote other changes designed to undermine the older reform structures that had previously characterized city government" (p. 250). These findings lead the authors to challenge the thesis that socio-economic variables are more important than political ones in shaping urban policy. They also support the notion that federal social programs stimulated demand-protest and electoral mobilization by increasing the availability of minority resources and leaders.

Black demand-protest and electoral mobilization were closely related to white support while Hispanic demand-protest and Hispanic electoral mobilization was closely associated with prior levels of Hispanic demand-protest which in turn was related to black activity. Despite the interrelatedness of black and Hispanic demand-protest and the potential for electoral mobilization, the authors find a basic mistrust among blacks and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hispanics. This mistrust was exploited by white liberal politicans as well as conservatives. A further exploration of the obstacles facing multiethnic coalitions is perhaps the only area that needs strengthening in this pioneering study.

CHARLES P. HENRY
University of California at Berkeley

Communists in Harlem during the Depression *by Mark Naison. Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1983. 355 pages. $22.95.*

Mark Naison's fine book was obviously a doctoral dissertation and a prodigious task for one teacher. In spite of complaints about black studies, excellent volumes have appeared in all of the social sciences on the Negro in American life, and this is one of them. It is panoramic, detailed and the product of the historians' tools and sources, tested by wide-ranging interviews of participants.

Naison says in his introduction that he is interested in adding a balance to the writings of Richard Wright, Harold Cruse, and Wilson Record which, regardless of their contributions and importance, view "Communist activity largely through the dynamics of manipulation, disillusionment, and betrayal" (p. xv). In his acknowledgments, he lists interviews with the most well-known Communists and fellow travelers informed on his subject and says that they "opened their lives" to him because he would treat fairly what had been misrepresented (p. xi).

These two positions have led some to conclude that the volume is pro-Communist, but this reviewer does not find such to be the case. There is a bias toward those who, regardless of their affiliation or motives, fight against social injustice and for change, and a fascination with the nature of people who cause change. His analysis of the Communist line as dictated by the Comintern, the U.S.A. Communist Party (USACP), and World Congresses with regard to the solution of the problems of black people in America is anything but flattering: self-determination in the black belt, denial of union responsibility for discrimination, the honesty of the Nazi-Soviet pact, the imperialist nature of World War II, the flip-flopping of positions on racial action in accordance with the perceived interest of Russia or the USACP, and the failure to understand or to organize the black working class (pp. 18, 44, 101–2, 268–9, 273–83, 289). The changes which the party brought about in litigation, the law, in writing and publication and the performing arts, labor unions, and employment, he admires, as he does the people involved, although he is aware always of self-interest, politics, and human frailty. It is the political and social effects of the radical alternative provided by the Communist Party that interest him, the productive interface with other organizations and their leaders seeking racial change in America.

Such controversy, however, should not obscure the considerable and painstaking research the book represents. First of all it covers not only the Depression, but a period from World War I to America's entrance into World War II. The book covers: the pronouncements on racial policy and tactics by World Congresses, the Comintern and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USACP; the Scottsboro case and the fight with the NAACP; every important Communist personality and black leader in Harlem (their backgrounds, development, ability, motivation, and tactics); the activities of the Communist Party and its fights with the NAACP, the Urban League, the Garveyites United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the Negro Labor Committee (Socialist), the Harlem Ministry; Harlem politics; Communist city-wide politics; Communist campaigns dealing with employment, job discrimination, racial boycotts, the Works Progress Administration (WPA), unions, the performing arts, creative writing, education, and Negro history; the activities of front organizations; party social and racial life; and the Moscow connection. The list is probably not inclusive.

Naison claims too much influence for party activities. His approach comes close to assigning influence because of association, an odd kind of McCarthyism. Once or twice he does admit the shrewd self-interest and gains made by black leaders, artists, and intellectuals through association with Communist efforts (pp. 192–99, 204–18, 266, 300). The truth is that black leadership was both bold and sophisticated in these relationships. Certainly A. Phillip Randolph used Communist support to aid in achieving his objectives and banished them when they were a hindrance or without leverage.

There are inadequacies in the book's political analysis. One reads these pages as though the FBI and an intelligence community did not exist in America. The nature of the 1936 New York City Charter and especially the nature and workings of the modified Hare system of proportional representation (single transferable vote type) are not explained (p. 235). Hence the Communist victories (pp. 235, 237) and the election of Ben Davis to the City Council cannot be understood except by the informed reader.

The truth is that Communism made no headway among Harlem voters, and the election of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. and Benjamin Davis was a function mainly of racial appeal, Communist strength elsewhere in Manhattan, and the workings of proportional representation.

JOHN A. DAVIS
City College of New York

The Neoliberals: Creating the New American Politics *by Randall Rothenberg. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984. 287 pp. $16.95.*

Although written before the 1984 presidential primaries, this first book-length effort to define, describe, and defend neoliberalism is Rothenberg's response to Walter Mondale's "Where's the beef?" Unfortunately, Rothenberg's answers provide little more sustenance than did Gary Hart's. *The Neoliberals* is a compendium of the articles and speeches of economists Lester Thurow and Robert Reich, of editors Charles Peters of *The Washington Monthly* and James Fallows of *The Atlantic*, of Congressmen Richard Gephardt, Albert Gore, Jr., and Timothy Wirth, and of Senators Bill Bradley, Paul Tsongas, and especially Gary Hart, who is cited more than any other neoliberal. Largely bereft of critical analysis, *The Neoliberals* is a shallow summary of recent policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposals on such matters as economic growth, military reform, tax revision, and education and training programs—sorry, I forgot to say "human-capital policy."

To prove the distinctiveness of neoliberalism, that it constitutes a dramatic break with and repudiation of past liberal tenets, Rothenberg forgets and/or falsifies a lot of recent history. Contrary to the author's assertions, getting a stagnant economy moving was as much an aim of New Dealers as of "Atari Democrats." An emphasis on economic growth, and the belief that "you can't slice a shrinking pie," come straight from Leon Keyserling's advice to Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy's proposal for investment tax credits. The neoliberal obsession with "pragmatism" and "realism" is as much a legacy of the New Frontier as Hart's concern with military reform is the heir of the 1960s Pentagon whiz kids. Similarly, Rothenberg mistakenly eulogizes Joseph Schumpeter as a neoliberal champion of small business, and wrongly claims that the neoliberal opposition to centralization and affirmation of competition "hearkens [sic] back to [Theodore Roosevelt's] TR's New Nationalism" (p. 206). This fundamentally ahistorical approach also leads Rothenberg to such absurd sentences as: "On January 19, 1977, the 'era of limits' ended" (p. 53) and "Nineteen seventy-one was the year the world economic system collapsed" (p. 97).

To distinguish neoliberalism from contemporary conservatism, moreover, Rothenberg resorts to slogans and stereotypes. Thus, neoliberals prefer cooperation to class struggle, desire market-based incentives rather than regulation, are for technology but not technocracy, like entrepreneurial small business but not big bureaucratic corporate business, advocate flat-rate taxes instead of loopholes, and support industrial policy not centralized planning. Clichés are no substitute for ideology, however, and Rothenberg fails to articulate "neoliberalism's communitarian theme" or to dispel the charge that the "national interest" of neoliberalism "may be nothing more than the special interests of the liberal upper-middle class" (p. 247).

Neoliberalism is as much a reaction to the new structural problems of the economy in the 1980s as the New Deal was a response to the Great Depression. It deserves a far more searching analysis than this superficial paean to Silicon Valley.

HARVARD SITKOFF
University of New Hampshire

Hidden Spending: The Politics of Federal Credit Programs *by Dennis S. Ippolito. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1984. 169 pp. Cloth $19.95; paper $9.95.*

This book provides an incisive, well-written analysis of weaknesses in the budgetary treatment of federal credit assistance and offers guidelines for improvement. The title is well chosen. Despite the large volume of federal credit activity, much of it remains hidden from the view of government officials and the public. The unified budget carries direct loans on a net basis, so that only the differences between new loan disbursements and repayments appear. Most direct loans are charged to off-budget agencies. The budgetary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consequences of guaranteed loans are visible only in the case of default. Loans of government-sponsored enterprises are not subject to review by Congress. Little or no information is available on the subsidy elements of credit activities, such as below-market loan rates and long maturities. Even less is known about the external effects of federal credit assistance on the capital markets.

These and other reasons for the author's well-justified concerns are interspersed throughout the book. He demonstrates how the underlying concepts and methods of handling credit transactions are inherently complex and little understood. While acknowledging these problems, the author apparently views the politics of the issue as the overriding problem. Members of Congress, he suggests, have found it politically expedient to use credit as a tradeoff for direct spending by granting credit assistance to programs that could not otherwise compete successfully for scarce resources.

In seven chapters, the book describes current practices in dealing with federal fiscal activities; the components of federal credit activity; accounting procedures in use and the resultant distortions, especially in the transactions of the Federal Financing Bank; major examples of credit expansion and the loss of control; recent congressional attempts to improve controls through introduction of a credit budget; and the Reagan administration's initiatives in credit policy. A concluding chapter provides a succinct summary, as well as a thoughtful examination, of approaches to better credit control.

Budget policy experts will generally agree with the author's suggestions for improvement in the control of federal credit activity. Many of the ideas have been exposed to congressional hearings in recent years and/or appear in the Reagan administration's budget proposals for fiscal year 1986. The author would begin his proposed reforms with a more comprehensive overall federal budget, in which he includes "not just an end to off-budget evasions but also 'cost equivalence' between direct spending, tax, and credit programs" (p. 145).

While holding forth some hope that his credit budget reforms could be approved, the author is less sanguine about how to go about resolving the accountability problems associated with government-sponsored enterprises. "Despite protestations to the contrary," he holds, "government-sponsored enterprises are not independent. They have significant and advantageous links with the government. Most important, they enjoy preferred borrowing status" (p. 146). He believes that the only long-run solution lies in creation of a special commission on budget control to encompass spending, credit, off-budget entities, and government-sponsored enterprises.

This book provides valuable background on a significant, yet poorly understood, component of the overall budget problem that seems destined to receive concerted attention by the Congress during the remainder of the 1980s. Its contents merit wide dissemination.

ELSIE M. WATTERS
Tax Foundation, Incorporated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy *by David M. Ricci. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 335 pp. $30.00.*

In the spirit of the platonic dictum that "the life that is unexamined is not worth living," I believe that a profession that is unexamined is not worth pursuing. This is, I judge, a first-class critical examination of political science in America since its beginnings ("as such") a century ago. It warrants thoughtful reading by both novices and established professors.

"Tragedy," it is explained early on, is not meant in the sense of *disaster* or *calamity*, but in the literary-theatrical sense. Typically, if not essentially, a tragedy involves not a conflict of an evil with a good, but a conflict in which differing "goods" are diminished or destroyed. In Ricci's account and analysis there are no evil intentions, no villains. Rather, able and well-intentioned men and women are by the unfolding of historical circumstances put into a situation in which their labors are functionally rational—providing careers for individuals and sustaining a professional organization—but substantively irrational—failing to provide support and guidance for democratic polity.

A secondary metaphor, introduced early and recurring, is that of a Temple of Science. If each separate science is a column in the Temple of Science, what then forms the pediment and roof? Does political science have a responsibility, as the Greek founders thought, beyond a single column? If not, what follows?

Various aspects of political science are mentioned only in passing or are completely ignored. No attempt is made, for example, to delineate and describe "fields." But a description of all aspects of political science was not the objective. Rather, the objective was to delineate, analyze, and evaluate main-stream political science—those ideas and institutions that gave it a self-awareness and a separate identity and that have since shaped its evolution.

Centrally, the treatment focuses on perceived disparities between politics and science. The theme or thesis is that a commitment to science, at least to certain conceptions of what that term describes and mandates, has been at best only marginally supportive of the welfare and aspirations of the democratic-republican polity that supports the enterprise and hopes for some guidance from it. The intellectual-institutional milieu for the rise of political science was the late nineteenth-century emergence of the university, with its commitment to scientific research, and the concomitant forces of specialization and professionalization. But from the beginning it has been difficult to reconcile the scientific enterprise with the moral, philosophical, and institutional context of a polity resting on "non-scientific" foundations.

Ricci's account treats the essential aspects of the science-democracy relationship through the main historical and intellectual developments of the past hundred years. A separate but related theme is what he sees as the failure of the scientific enterprise to succeed in its own terms. It has not, that is, achieved "science," taking as model natural science. Rather, it has substituted conformity to "methods" as interpreted by philosophers of science.

The book concludes with a discussion of the "current mood in political science, where behavioral techniques are still popular, but where confidence in their ultimate efficacy has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

declined over the last ten to fifteen years" (p. 275). Critical theory is reviewed, John Rawls and Robert Nozick are appraised, and so forth. No solution of a simple and easy nature is proposed: no argument that the ancients knew it all, no plea that we find answers in this or that "school." There *is* a plea that we strive for a "great conversation," as against the "little conversations" of discipline, circle and sect, a conversation that will draw on many sources and, above all, will address important as against trivial matters.

I can "fault" the work in various ways. I judge that Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* is made to carry too much freight. I find the call to novices to "deceive" their behavioral mentors (by pretending conversion while planning subversion) to be unnecessary, even offensive. But over-all, high marks. This is a learned, incisive, and balanced work, not (as the title might suggest) a shrill charge of error or sin. It deserves to be taken seriously.

DWIGHT WALDO
Syracuse University

Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics *by Roger Bell. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1984. 377 pp. $24.95.*

The admission of states to the American union has great potential for illuminating the play of political forces, particularly when the new state is a former Polynesian kingdom in which Caucasians are only one of half-a-dozen sizeable racial and ethnic minorities. Roger Bell's lively, opinionated account of statehood for Hawaii captures some of that potential but lacks the balance and sophistication necessary for a fuller realization.

The author, trained in U.S. history at the University of Sydney, has cast a commendably wide net, drawing upon secondary sources, newspapers, public documents, and a variety of personal papers and oral histories. The breadth of his research may account for the author's difficulty in maintaining a focus on his topic; he seems at times to be more intent on other objectives, such as interpreting Hawaiian history and passing liberal judgment on a variety of political actors and issues. Perhaps in compensation, he tells us less than we need to know about such directly relevant matters as postwar factionalism in the Hawaiian Democractic party, the politics of the Hawaiian constitutional convention, and the congressional "dealing" that finally brought admission.

The author's difficulty in managing his voluminous material shows up in other ways. The first two chapters, covering Hawaiian history to 1941, are unnecessarily long. The extensive discussion of Hawaiian minorities fails to yield a clear picture of their proportions in various periods. There is occasional mishandling of minor details. For example, Howard Smith was not a Mississippian (p. 256); Senator Tom Connally was not defeated in 1952 (fn. 27, p. 329); and Strom Thurmond did not carry Louisiana in 1948 by a majority (p. 139). In one instance the author misreports his own table, stating that Gallup polls between 1950 and 1958 showed a drop in support for statehood from 76 percent to 63 percent, when the table in note 1, p. 339 puts the latter figure at 65 percent (p. 253).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He mistakenly asserts that statehood gave citizens of Hawaii the right to vote on amendments to the U.S. constitution. And it seems likely that the large number of "abstaining" members on several congressional votes were in reality absent members.

Conceivably, of course, one could be careless or uninformed about details and still limn correctly the large picture, but my confidence in Bell's capacity to do so is shaken by the error of his major theme, namely, that the delay in Hawaiian admission from 1947 to 1959 was primarily the fault of southern members of Congress pursuing an anti-civil rights strategy. My feeling is that those fellows have enough sins of their own to atone for without being saddled with someone else's. True, they often worked and voted against Hawaiian statehood, but it is clear from the author's own account and from his passing statements that partisan considerations were the principal stumbling block. Admission for Hawaii was supported by mainland Republicans because they mistakenly believed that Hawaii would be a GOP state. Democrats, accepting that premise, tied the admission of Hawaii to statehood for Alaska, believing (also incorrectly) that Democratic domination of that territory would continue. The salience of partisan politics became particularly apparent in 1954. The Republicans who then controlled the House passed a bill for Hawaiian statehood only; they refused to bring to the House floor, or to appoint a conference committee for, a Senate-passed measure admitting both Hawaii and Alaska. The deadlock lasted until then-Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson engineered a deal to admit Alaska in 1958 and Hawaii in 1959.

Although I have dwelt upon the problems with this book, my criticisms should not be misunderstood. This is not a bad book with few redeeming qualities; it is a good and interesting book with some serious shortcomings.

CLIFTON MCCLESKEY
University of Virginia

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

Bahrain: vol. 49, World Biographical Series *compiled by P. T. H. Unwin. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Press, 1984. 265 pp. $43.50.*

The Book of the States, 1984–85; vol. 25. *Lexington, Kentucky, The Council of State Governments, 1984. 545 pp. $42.50.*

Bureau of the Census Catalog 1984 *prepared by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. 268 pp. $7.00.*

East Central Europe During World War I: From Foreign Domination to National Independence, 2 vols. *by Wiktor Sukiennicki. New York, Columbia University Press, 1985. 1,228 pp. $60.00.*

Eastern European National Minorities, 1919–1980: A Handbook *by Stephan M.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Horak et al. Littleton, Colo., Libraries Unlimited, 1985. 355 pp. U.S., $47.50; elsewhere, $57.00.

The Far East and Australasia 1984–85, 16th ed. *prepared by Europa Publications. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1984. 945 pp. $140.00.*

Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times, An Encyclopedic View *edited by Otis L. Graham, Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander. Boston, G. K. Hall & Co., 1985. 483 pp. $27.50.*

Historical Periodicals Directory: Latin American and the West Indies, vol. 4. *edited by Jessica S. Brown and Susan K. Kinnell. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 157 pp. $95.00.*

Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment: 1982 Census of Governments *prepared by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. 131 pp. $3.75.*

International Acronyms, Initialisms & Abbreviations Dictionary, vol. 1 *edited by Ellen T. Crowley and Helen E. Sheppard. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 730 pp. $140.00.*

Labor in America: A Historical Bibliography. *Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1985. 307 pp. $60.50.*

Local Government in Metropolitan Areas: 1982 Census of Governments *prepared by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 313 pp. $4.75.*

The Middle East in Conflict: A Historical Bibliography *edited by Gail A. Schlachter and Pamela R. Byrne. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1985. 302 pp. $64.00.*

The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. XVI: 1841–1843 *edited by Clyde N. Wilson. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1984. 744 pp. $34.95.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 49: 1918 *edited by Arthur Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 576 pp. $47.50.*

Selected Writings and Speeches of Alexander Hamilton *edited by Morton Frisch. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1985. 524 pp. Cloth, $25.95; paper, $14.95.*

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Bibliographic Guide to Recommended Books for Small and Medium-sized Libraries and School Media Centers *by Stephen M. Horak. Littleton, Colo., Libraries Unlimited, 1985. 373 pp. U.S., $27.50; elsewhere, $33.00.*

Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers *by Gérard*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau. New York, Harper & Row, 1985. 224 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $14.95.

Who's Who in the Soviet Union: A Bibliographical Encyclopedia of 5,000 Leading Personalities in the Soviet Union *edited by Borys Lewytzkyj. New York, K. G. Saur, 1984. 428 pp. $125.00.*

Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918–1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power *by Klaus Schwabe. Translated from the German by Robert and Rita Kimber. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1985. 565 pp. $36.00.*

World Economic Outlook, April 1985. *Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1985. 283 pp. $15.00.*

Correction: In Gerald Segal's review of *Global Perspectives on Arms Control* edited by Adam M. Garfinkle and *The European Missile Crisis: Nuclear Weapons and Security Policy* edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Nicolaj Petersen (PSQ, Winter 1984–85: 718–720), typographical mistakes changed the meaning of two key sentences. Professor Segal wrote (1) that some of the most sensible true believers in arms control are to be found in *European* NATO, and (2) that the execution of the Garfinkle collection was *in*consistent with the original interesting idea.

The Editors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROVOCATIVE FINDINGS

Saudi Arabia

The Ceaseless Quest for Security

Nadav Safran

Nadav Safran combines vast scholarship and his deep familiarity with Arab culture in the most sophisticated and demystifying book ever written about Saudi Arabia. This book—a masterguide of insight and analysis—traces the roots of Saudi preoccupation with security and its expression in defense and foreign policy through half a century and four reigns.

Belknap $25.00

Political Murder

From Tyrannicide to Terrorism

Franklin L. Ford

This unprecedented inquiry into assassination crosses civilizations, cultures, religions, and classes to locate the common thread of this often mysterious, always shocking phenomenon.

Does assassination work? Does it ever produce results consistent with the aims of those who attempt it? Or it is "bad politics"? Ford's fast-paced narrative finds intriguing implications in numerous cases. $29.50

Asian Power and Politics

The Cultural Dimensions of Authority

Lucian W. Pye

In a major new book, Lucian Pye reconceptualizes Asian political development as a product of cultural attitudes toward power and authority.

Breaking with modern political theory, he shows how power differs profoundly from one culture to another by contrasting the great traditions of Confucian East Asia with Southeast Asian cultures and South Asian traditions of Hinduism and Islam. He also explores in depth the national differences within these larger traditions.

Belknap $25.00

The First Socialist Society

A History of the Soviet Union from Within

Geoffrey Hosking

Here is a compelling and often tragic history of what Soviet citizens have lived through from 1917 to the present. Hosking explains the political and economic circumstances that have changed Marxist ideology. $29.50

A History of the Jewish People

Edited by H. H. Ben-Sasson

"Here is a work that triumphantly makes available the fruits of a wealth of learning and scholarship that will surely establish new standards for the presentation of research."

—Times Literary Supplement

$18.95 paper

at bookstores or from

Harvard University Press

Cambridge, MA 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To: The Academy of Political Science
2852 Broadway
New York, NY 10025-7885

From: _____

_____
Address

_____
City State Zip Code

☐ New member

☐ Transfer to life membership ($300)

☐ Gift membership to _____

_____
Address

_____
City State Zip Code

☐ Contribution
Check for $_____
Certificate for ____ shares of _____

REGULAR MEMBERSHIP

☐ One year	$25.00
☐ Three years	58.00
☐ Student enrolled at _____ (institution)	16.00

SPECIAL MEMBERSHIP

Annual

☐ Contributing	$35
☐ Sustaining	45
☐ Supporting	55
☐ Patron	100 or more

Life

☐ No further dues	$300

LIBRARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

☐ One year	$35

Foreign postage, $6 additional a year

☐ Payment enclosed

☐ Charge my
☐ American Express ☐ Master Card ☐ Visa

_____
Inter Bank No. (Required only for MasterCard)

_____
Charge Card No. Expiration Date

_____
Signature

Special members receive a certificate suitable for framing

Contributions are tax deductible

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Three scholarly research collections from Clearwater Publishing:

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs

Second Series • 1937-1939 • Volumes 4-16

The personal correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt—private and official—on foreign affairs, selected, organized and indexed by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. (A continuation of the Belknap Series)

- 6,000 pages in fascimile reproductions of the original documents.
- Separate index volume provides access by names of people and places and by subject.
- Each volume contains detailed table of contents.

Complete 14-Volume Set: $450.

Diary and Itineraries/Usher Books

The White House Usher Books list every official who came to the White House, whether on official business or as a personal guest. The pages of *Usher Books* reveal the hourly activities of the President and his family, including many fascinating details.

Diary and Itineraries comprise a catalog of all of the President's officially scheduled appointments throughout his four terms, as well as the details of all of the President's trips.

4 x 6″ silver halide mf: $175

Presidential Diaries

The complete and copious notes that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. kept during his tenure under Roosevelt, including notes taken by Morgenthau and his secretary during meetings with the President plus notes from his telephone conversations. (Morgenthau alone among cabinet members had weekly meetings with FDR throughout his presidency.)

4 x 6″ silver halide mf: $60

Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc.

1995 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10023
800-231-2266
212-873-2100 in New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambridge

Powers of Theory

Capitalism, The State, and Democracy

Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland

Authors Alford and Friedland evaluate major theories on the nature of the state and present a new, synthetic framework for a more comprehensive theory of the state. They show that social theory influences the way in which we understand and therefore operate in the world. In this sense, theory has power, and its adequacy is therefore crucial for the future.

Cloth $49.50 Paper about $14.95

Bringing the State Back In

Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Editors

This volume includes some of the best interdisciplinary scholarship on states in relation to social structures. The contributors make use of theoretically engaged comparative and historical investigations to provide improved conceptualizations of states and how they operate. The volume is programmatic and proposes new directions for the analysis of state structures, capacities, and the impact of states on social and political patterns of conflict.

Contributors: Theda Skocpol, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter B. Evans, Alice H. Amsden, Margaret Weir, Charles Tilly, Peter Katzenstein, Ira Katznelson, David Laitin, Alfred Stepan.

Cloth about $42.50 Paper about $14.95

Concorde and Dissent

Explaining High Technology Project Failures in Britain and France

Elliot J. Feldman

Conventional explanations of the failed joint effort by Britain and France to build the supersonic aircraft—the Concorde—and the separate and also somewhat unsuccessful projects to build new international airports in London and Paris, suggest the French possess a rational planning expertise and the British an amateurish one. Professor Feldman challenges such stereotypes, arguing instead that policy failures in the two countries can be explained in terms of political instability. His book is unique in developing such detailed, controlled case studies for the comparison of political systems, and offers new insights into public policy making in Britain and France.

$34.50

The Politics of World Economy

The States, the Movements and the Civilizations

Immanuel Wallerstein

This new collection of essays follows *The Capitalist World Economy* (C.U.P., 1979). Whereas the previous volume concentrated on historical and economic analyses of world capitalism, this book treats the political manifestations of the world-system, dealing with such highly topical issues as the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the world-system, the relations of Third World states to the capitalist "core," and the potential for socialist or revolutionary change.

Studies in Modern Capitalism/Etudes sue le capitalisme Moderne

Cloth $39.50 Paper $9.95

Japan

This booklet, based on articles published in *The Economist*, focuses on the political economy of Japan. It surveys Japan's economy, trade, industry, technology, government, and finance, as well as the role played by foreign companies in Japan.

Paper $3.95

All prices subject to change.

At bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022
800-431-1580 (outside New York State and Canada)
MasterCard and VISA accepted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

James Q. Wilson *on the issues . . .*

This fall, D. C. Heath announces the Third Edition of James Q. Wilson's critically acclaimed text, *American Government: Institutions and Policies.* In the following comments, the author reflects on the institutions of American government—their efficacy, and how they are perceived by the American public.

Q: Is our national government competent to govern? The continual impasses over the budget, the inability to control the deficit—are these signs of some kind of political gridlock?

A: I don't think so. The deficit is a serious problem, and so long as Congress and the president believe that they can neither raise taxes nor cut the big-ticket spending programs, the budget process is going to have a slightly unreal quality. But apart from that, the business of government gets done here about as well as anywhere. We are coming to grips with tax reform; health and safety regulation has been strengthened and price regulation has been reduced; we are struggling to find the right balance between military preparedness and diplomatic innovation.

Q: But people seem to have lost confidence in the system . . .

A: I don't think so. Americans tend to denigrate themselves and suppose that they have made a mess of things. And no matter who is in office, there are always plenty of examples of political shortsightedness. But critical as they are of a particular government, Americans continue to like the system, and rightly so.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Q: How does your text try to get this point across?

A: Not by preaching at the students, or waving the flag, or offering offhand judgments about what is or is not a good policy. I try to put American government into a historical and comparative context so that the student can see how much we have changed—in such areas as civil rights, environmental protection, and care for the elderly—and how other countries manage similar problems. I think when you do that carefully, the student sees that our political system is not in gridlock, is remarkably experimental, and, though chaotic and undisciplined, nonetheless has the virtues of those defects.

American Government:
Institutions and Policies
Third Edition
James Q. Wilson
Harvard University and University of California, Los Angeles
1986 Cloth 720 pages est.
Instructor's Guide/Study Guide/Test Item File/
Computerized Test Items/Video Cassettes/Film Policy

This highly acclaimed and widely adopted classic is now available in a thoroughly updated Third Edition. **AMERICAN GOVERNMENT** keeps pace with recent developments in the field, linking governmental institutions and political processes with the outcomes of public policy. Updated through the 1984 elections, and with major revisions in its coverage of the Constitution, policy-making, and interest groups in particular, this authoritative text provides students with a provocative analysis of today's political scene.

D. C. Heath and Company
College Division 125 Spring Street Lexington, Massachusetts 02173
Or call us, toll-free, at 1-800-225-1388.
In Massachusetts, call collect at 617-863-1948

Wilson's AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Third Edition
Clarity Without Compromise!

PLACE YOUR ORDER TODAY!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRACY

By RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE. Incorporating many advances of the past decade, Holcombe develops a model of democratic decision making that focuses on the fact that representatives can profit more from passing legislation to benefit special interests than from passing legislation in the general public interest. $24.50

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK, 1984

Edited by KEITH R. SANDERS, LYNDA LEE KAID, and DAN NIMMO. This is the first volume of a planned series of anthologies covering topical areas in political communication. The aim is to capture the "rich variety of problems, techniques, controversies, and literature comprising political communications studies in the 1980s." $30.00

LIBERAL DEMOCRATS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

The History of the German Democratic Party and the German State Party

By BRUCE B. FRYE. A thorough critical history of the DDP and DstP based on archival research that reveals new information about the failure of the German middle classes in politics. $24.95

BECOMING AMERICAN

The Early Arab Immigrant Experience

By ALIXA NAFF. "A masterly piece of writing, which is structured firmly on research findings and original personal interviews, and which glows with intuitive understanding."—DR. AFIF TANNOUS. $19.95

MEDIA CONTROL IN IRELAND, 1923–1983

By KIERAN WOODMAN. "[Woodman] has attacked a difficult and complex subject, writing with the insight of an insider, yet preserving objectivity. The main theme is the complex and evolving interrelationship between Catholicism and nationalism in Ireland as expressed in the control of literature and the electronic media."—RALPH E. MCCOY. (January) $29.95

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS
P.O. Box 3697, Carbondale, Illinois 62902-3697

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coming in 1985
for today's students
and tomorrow's citizens

★Patterson
★Davidson &
★Ripley Third Edition

A More Perfect Union

Introduction to American Government

New Third Edition
Coming, Spring 1985

also for 1985

- **Scope and Methods of Political Science,** Fourth Edition
  Alan C. Isaak,
  Western Michigan University
- **American Foreign Policy,**
  Third Edition
  Henry T. Nash, Hollins College

Examination copies for adoption consideration available upon request. *Please indicate course title and text presently used.*

THE DORSEY PRESS • HOMEWOOD, IL 60430

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Basic Books, Inc.

A Brotherhood of Memory
Jewish Landsmanshaftn in the New World
MICHAEL R. WEISSER
$18.95

Choosing Elites
ROBERT KLITGAARD
$19.95

Exodus and Revolution
A Political Meditation
MICHAEL WALZER
$15.95

Images of Voting/ Visions of Democracy
PETER NATCHEZ
$21.95

The Party Goes On
The Persistence of the Two-Party System in the United States
XANDRA KAYDEN & EDDIE MAHE, JR.
$17.95, October

Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis
The Collapse and Revival of New York City
MARTIN SHEFTER
$21.95

The Rise of Modern Judicial Review
From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE
$23.95, November

The Rise of the Trading State
Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World
RICHARD ROSECRANCE
$19.95, November

Schooling for All
Race, Class, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal
IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR
$17.95, November

A World of Secrets
The Uses and Limits of Intelligence
WALTER LAQUEUR
A Twentieth Century Fund Book
$21.95, October

Now in paperback

Channels of Power
The Impact of Television on American Politics
AUSTIN RANNEY
An American Enterprise Institute Book
$6.95

Decision Making at the Top
The Shaping of Strategic Direction
GORDON DONALDSON & JAY W. LORSCH
$6.95

The Heyday of American Communism
The Depression Decade
HARVEY KLEHR
$12.95

Congress and the Common Good
ARTHUR MAASS
$8.95

The Evolution of Cooperation
ROBERT AXELROD
$6.95

What Do Unions Do?
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF
$9.95, October

Normal Accidents
Living with High-Risk Technologies
CHARLES PERROW
$10.95

Basic Books, Inc.
10 E. 53rd St., New York, NY 10022
Call toll-free (1-800) 638-3030

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eight noted political scientists take an in-depth look at what *really* went on during

ELECTION 84

Landslide without a Mandate?

Edited by ELLIS SANDOZ and CECIL V. CRABB, Jr., Louisiana State University

CONTENTS:

Introduction: The Silent Majority Finds its Voice
by ELLIS SANDOZ

The Presidential Election of 1984
by THOMAS E. CRONIN

Ronald Reagan's Presidential Leadership
by FRED I. GREENSTEIN

The Voters Say Yes: The 1984 Congressional Elections
by CHARLES O. JONES

The New Federalism and State Elections
by DANIEL J. ELAZAR

Economic Issues and Reaganomics
by STEPHEN L. McDONALD

"Standing Tall" as a Foreign Policy: Diplomacy and Security in Reagan's Second Term
by CECIL V. CRABB, Jr.

The 1984 Election and the Future of American Politics
by WALTER DEAN BURNHAM

Conclusion: The Reagan Victory—Retrospect and Prospect
by ELLIS SANDOZ and CECIL V. CRABB, Jr.

MENTOR 0-451-62424-6 $4.95/5.95*

Now available in new editions...

THE SMOKE RING

Tobacco, Money, & Multi-National Politics
Revised and Updated for paperback edition

By PETER TAYLOR. With a new Foreword by Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the United States. "A sensible and altogether fair consideration of why governments place wealth before health and an examination of the political and economic power of tobacco."—*The Washington Post*

MENTOR 0-451-62426-2 $4.95/NCR

JAPAN

The Fragile Super Power
Second Revised Edition

By FRANK GIBNEY. *This widely acclaimed study of contemporary Japanese society and politics has been substantially revised to cover changes under Nakasone, the explosive growth of U.S.-Japanese trade, and Japan's strengthened diplomatic profile. Available January 1986.*

MERIDIAN 0-452-00776-3 $8.95/$11.95* *Price in Canada

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019

NAL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF URBAN SPACE

By M. GOTTDIENER

This challenging and original study synthesizes and reconceptualizes urban science in a manner that can explain the current state of metropolitan development, drawing into a critical dialogue the leading theoretical traditions in contemporary social science.

Gottdiener evaluates the explanatory models for urban forms used by the fields of geography, economics, and sociology and evaluates alternative perspectives critical of mainstream work, assessing them according to their theoretical limitations. He also explores the urban public policy implications of his research in comparison with the limited usefulness of mainstream urban theory.

$27.50 hardcover



PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The Johnson Presidency

By W. HENRY LAMBRIGHT

How do science and technology issues become important to a particular presidency? What is the role of the presidency in the adoption of national policies affecting science and technology? How does implementation vary between a president's own program and one that is inherited?

These are a few of the questions raised in this book, which includes twenty-four case studies of specific decision processes occurring in the Johnson presidency. Lambright provides a framework for analyzing how the presidency as an institution deals with such issues in an important book for all students of presidential policy.

$25.00 hardcover



THE DISMANTLING OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

By BRYCE WOOD

". . . will surely be one of the half dozen classics in U.S. diplomatic history with Latin America, an essential tool of all specialists."

—Cole Blasie

Continuing the story told in *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*, Wood analyzes the gradual erosion of an important policy in U.S.–Latin American relations.

$27.50 hardcover

Free shipping on prepaid orders

TEXAS

BOX 7819 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78713 **University of Texas Press**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION
The Presidency and the American System
Bert A. Rockman

"begins to fill the biggest gap in the literature about the presidency by placing the presidential office in the broader context of leadership issues...much needed." —*Worldview*

272 pp.	1984	$29.95	ISBN 0-03-058032-3
paper edition:	1985	$14.95	ISBN 0-03-003347-0

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
edited by **Tinsley E. Yarbrough**

This book presents a history of the Reagan administration's policies and practices regarding a variety of significant human rights issues. It's the first study available in this area.

256 pp. (tent.) September 1985 $31.95 (tent.) ISBN 0-03-000857-3

UNINFORMED CHOICE
The Failure of the New Presidential Nominating System
Scott Keeter and **Cliff Zukin**

" I recommend *Uninformed Choice* to scholars and practitioners of presidential nominating politics and to the next Democratic party reform commission. One would be hard-pressed to find a stronger argument for a greater party role in presidential nominating politics than the findings in this book." —*Political Science Quarterly*

272 pp.	1983	$29.95	ISBN 0-03-061588-7

Order from your local bookseller or direct from

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS
521 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10175

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICAN POLITICS

CHICAGO DIVIDED
The Making of a Black Mayor

PAUL KLEPPNER

The racially charged 1983 mayoral campaign in Chicago left the city "divided against itself." Kleppner discusses the racial and ethnic tensions that have marked Chicago politics since the Daley era and analyzes the interplay of race, ethnicity, and politics that culminated in an urban political revolution—the election of Harold Washington as Chicago's first black mayor.

"The great service that Paul Kleppner performs in *Chicago Divided* is to synthesize a rich and varied collection of studies, statistics and impressions."—*Illinois Issues*

331 pages, illus.
$26.00 (cloth)
$9.50 (paper)

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 1916–1952
Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society

DONALD T. CRITCHLOW

In this first scholarly study of the nation's oldest and most prestigious think tank, Critchlow explores the relationship between professional expertise and public policy. Examining such issues as the elitist nature of expertise, he shows the interaction between individual choices and social history and challenges previous notions of corporate/state linkages in modern America. Based on internal files from the institution itself, as well as other manuscript collections and extensive interviews, *The Brookings Institution* explores new areas in the history of public policy and institutional history.

261 pages $23.00



NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS
DEKALB, ILLINOIS 60115

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Get Involved in Politics.

Pick up some of Harvard's fascinating and controversial political science titles.

Asian Power and Politics

The Cultural Dimensions of Authority

Lucian W. Pye

This book represents a dramatic advance in the theory of comparative political cultures, as Lucian Pye breaks with modern political theory, believing that power differs profoundly from one culture to another. He reconceptualizes Asian political development as a product of cultural attitudes about power and authority.

Belknap $25.00

The First Socialist Society

A History of the Soviet Union from Within

Geoffrey Hosking

Here is a compelling and often tragic history of what Soviet citizens have lived through from 1917 to the present. Through Hosking's analysis of this vast and complex country, we come to understand how ideas of Marxism have changed, taking on almost unrecognizable forms by unique political and economic circumstances.

$29.50

Liberalism and American Constitutional Law

Rogers M. Smith

The author describes the adverse influence of modern liberalism's governing ideas on the development of American constitutional law and offers a new, more purposive theory to suit contemporary needs. $22.50

Ordinary Vices

Judith N. Shklar

"A distinguished book, full of wit, humanity, and insight . . . It is also, and more importantly, a moral philosophy for liberals." –Michael Walzer

Belknap $7.95 paper

America's Unwritten Constitution

Science, Religion, and Political Responsibility

Don K. Price

"A work of deep reflection by a respected doyen is an occasion of considerable significance . . . He traces the roots of the problem not to the Constitution but to the unwritten constitution of fixed political customs which have come to encrust it."

–*The Political Quarterly*

$6.95 paper

Harvard University Press

79 Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VIETNAM:
A Documentary Collection
Westmoreland v. CBS
on microfiche

- The complete trial transcripts
- 30,000 pages of exhibits, largely consisting of top-secret government documents, recently declassified, from the CIA, the DOD, the LBJ Library, etc.
- 10,000 pages of pre-trial pleadings.
- 25,000 pages of depositions and affidavits by William Bundy, Robert Komer, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, William Westmoreland and other major figures in the Johnson Administration, and by officials of CBS News

A rich legacy for scholars of law and journalism and historians of the Vietnam War.

Complete Collection: 1000 silver halide microfiche with 250-page printed guide. List Price. . . . $2,500

For further details, Call Clearwater toll free at 1-800-231-2266*

*1-212-873-2100 in New York

Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc.
1995 Broadway
New York, NY 10023

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Control of Federal Spending

Edited by C. Lowell Harriss
1985 / 188 pp. / $8.95

The Soviet Union in the 1980s

Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann
1984 / 244 pp. / $8.95

The President's War Powers: From the Federalists to Reagan

Edited by Demetrios Caraley
1984 / 204 pp. / $7.95

National Security and Nuclear Strategy

Edited by Robert H. Connery and Demetrios Caraley
1983 / 186 pp. / $7.95

The Crisis in Higher Education

Edited by Joseph Froomkin
1983 / 177 pp. / $7.95

The Property Tax and Local Finance

Edited by C. Lowell Harriss
1983 / 242 pp. / $9.95

The Communications Revolution in Politics

Edited by Gerald Benjamin
1982 / 205 pp. / $6.95

Food Policy and Farm Programs

Edited by Don F. Hadwiger and Ross B. Talbot
1982 / 254 pp. / $6.95

20% discount to Academy members
Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NY 10025-7885 / (212) 866-6752

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Grayson Kirk
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Alfred C. Neal
Vice President and Treasurer

Leland M. Goodrich
Secretary

C. Lowell Harriss
Executive Director

Courtney C. Brown
John V. Connorton, Jr.
Gerald L. Curtis
Eli S. Jacobs
Frank J. Macchiarola
Robert MacCrate
Thomas M. Macioce
George B. Munroe
Norma Pace
Edward L. Palmer
Russell A. Phillips, Jr.
Mary G. Roebling
George T. Scharffenberger
Franz Schneider
Stephen Stamas
Harold A. Stevens
John R. Stevenson

HONORARY MEMBERS

George W. Ball
Claude T. Bissell
Arthur F. Burns
Roberto de O. Campos
Jorge Castañeda
Barber B. Conable, Jr.
John Sherman Cooper
Arthur H. Dean
Luther Gulick
W. Averell Harriman
Lord Harris of High Cross
Oveta Culp Hobby
Lady Bird Johnson
Mary Lasker
John J. McCloy
W. Earle McLaughlin
Charles Malik
Michael J. Mansfield
Paul Martin
Saburo Okita
N. A. Palkhivala
Galo Plaza
Gordon Robertson
Lord Roll of Ipsden, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Carlos P. Romulo
Dean Rusk
S. M. Sikri
Margaret Chase Smith
Robert Stanfield
The Earl of Stockton
James E. Webb

The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, promotes objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting divergent views of these problems. It does not make policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, issued twice a year. Members receive both publications.

Regular membership: one year, $25.00; three years, $58.00; student, $16.00 a year. Special membership: contributing, $35; sustaining, $45; supporting, $55; patron, $100 or more; life, $300. Foreign postage is $6 additional per year. *Contributions are tax deductible.*

Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10025-7885 / (212) 866-6752

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED